From: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
To: michael.bommarito@gmail.com
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
sam@mendozajonas.com, fercerpav@gmail.com,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, davem@davemloft.net, edumazet@google.com,
pabeni@redhat.com, horms@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net 3/6] net/ncsi: validate GMCMA address counts against the payload
Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2026 12:12:09 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260423191209.3296515-1-kuba@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260422160342.1975093-4-michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
This is an AI-generated review of your patch. The human sending this
email has considered the AI review valid, or at least plausible.
---
net/ncsi: validate GMCMA address counts against the payload
This commit adds payload length checks to the NC-SI GMCMA response handler
to ensure the advertised address count does not exceed the packet size.
> diff --git a/net/ncsi/ncsi-rsp.c b/net/ncsi/ncsi-rsp.c
> --- a/net/ncsi/ncsi-rsp.c
> +++ b/net/ncsi/ncsi-rsp.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -1127,9 +1135,21 @@ static int ncsi_rsp_handler_gmcma(struct ncsi_request *nr)
> struct sockaddr_storage *saddr = &ndp->pending_mac;
> struct net_device *ndev = ndp->ndev.dev;
> struct ncsi_rsp_gmcma_pkt *rsp;
> + unsigned int addr_bytes;
> + unsigned int payload;
> int i;
>
> rsp = (struct ncsi_rsp_gmcma_pkt *)skb_network_header(nr->rsp);
> + payload = ncsi_rsp_payload(nr->rsp);
> + if (payload < sizeof(rsp->address_count) + sizeof(rsp->reserved) +
> + sizeof(__be32))
The commit message states it validates the fixed GMCMA fields plus checksum.
Does the NC-SI payload length actually include the 4-byte checksum?
Looking at ncsi_validate_rsp_pkt(), the common.length field does not include
the checksum, but it does include the 2-byte code and 2-byte reason fields.
Is it possible the subtraction of sizeof(__be32) here coincidentally works out
to the same 4 bytes as subtracting the code and reason fields, but conceptually
misrepresents the packet layout?
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + addr_bytes = payload - sizeof(rsp->address_count) -
> + sizeof(rsp->reserved) - sizeof(__be32);
> + if (rsp->address_count > addr_bytes / ETH_ALEN)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> ndev->priv_flags |= IFF_LIVE_ADDR_CHANGE;
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but does this read-modify-write
of priv_flags in softirq context race with other modifications?
Since priv_flags is a standard unsigned int, could a concurrent update from
process context holding rtnl_lock (such as modifying IFF_PROMISC) silently
discard this IFF_LIVE_ADDR_CHANGE update or vice versa?
>
> netdev_info(ndev, "NCSI: Received %d provisioned MAC addresses\n",
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but are the updates to pending_mac
and gma_flag further down in this function safe from data races?
The caller ncsi_rcv_rsp() explicitly drops ndp->lock before invoking the
response handler:
ncsi_rcv_rsp()
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ndp->lock, flags);
ret = nrh->handler(nr);
Since the NC-SI subsystem allows userspace to inject commands concurrently via
Netlink, could multiple Get MC MAC Address responses process simultaneously on
different CPUs and cause a torn write when copying the 6-byte MAC address into
ndp->pending_mac?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-23 19:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20260422160342.1975093-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
2026-04-22 16:03 ` [PATCH net 1/6] net/ncsi: validate response packet lengths against the skb Michael Bommarito
2026-04-23 19:12 ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-04-22 16:03 ` [PATCH net 2/6] net/ncsi: bound filter table state to software limits Michael Bommarito
2026-04-23 19:12 ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-04-22 16:03 ` [PATCH net 3/6] net/ncsi: validate GMCMA address counts against the payload Michael Bommarito
2026-04-23 19:12 ` Jakub Kicinski [this message]
2026-04-22 16:03 ` [PATCH net 4/6] net/ncsi: validate OEM response payloads before parsing Michael Bommarito
2026-04-22 16:03 ` [PATCH net 5/6] net/ncsi: validate AEN packet lengths against the skb Michael Bommarito
2026-04-22 16:03 ` [PATCH net 6/6] net/ncsi: validate GP payload lengths before parsing Michael Bommarito
2026-04-23 19:12 ` Jakub Kicinski
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