From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 59D773D3CEE; Fri, 24 Apr 2026 13:32:29 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1777037549; cv=none; b=IQJS/qvXxceqpxNeQ8FnBQKMMKZWXdKf5npooKS53F924+/R1g6M00657IpO3aDbod/BeeJqRBv/e9lRj6mD/XMZFLh8zrg1Yx97J5cTGbRjEx2lC8ae0MADQTr0bE/M9IVCaF/z7RgMIXb2aLJs0zufbkCG9lHjrvMBa28QnxM= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1777037549; c=relaxed/simple; bh=wiiAXhgqAzpMBOVBNe5M2yfYGYQVvzYpNc5l4VsrmaM=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=lugQjkjJ6Phhg4wUSqejS44CDhjnst+hmzLJ1gNbUw0wFgQpo/Eh1nFyN9j9MlOFqgOkHyYS+1WbC0QzxABO6IRNkXrPNJAcR+sG8KPucQBb4I+axz6wrA3S2CNGBhRXIH3Y3j5bhR7zz1DqcAeO4iSZ6+4fmJFd3sdzchuebuc= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=ze+LZwt7; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="ze+LZwt7" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id A0F8CC19425; Fri, 24 Apr 2026 13:32:28 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1777037549; bh=wiiAXhgqAzpMBOVBNe5M2yfYGYQVvzYpNc5l4VsrmaM=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=ze+LZwt7EvCfh9R4ylgowjT81GMs984bp/DnYNeqTlmqWZBZl9HySVeznKE3fBt5x BqzaLUnHiZ+nOnRdmNhDd7SbUM5bAJEAQu9KPcAubQqUcKEUV0BXmqRWT/0RY9gW2n mOlodw3txyoN63D/ALAYExMc3c8sEud0sUwZCjdw= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Michael Bommarito , Namjae Jeon , Steve French Subject: [PATCH 7.0 20/42] ksmbd: require minimum ACE size in smb_check_perm_dacl() Date: Fri, 24 Apr 2026 15:30:45 +0200 Message-ID: <20260424132424.707064238@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.53.0 In-Reply-To: <20260424132420.410310336@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260424132420.410310336@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Michael Bommarito commit d07b26f39246a82399661936dd0c853983cfade7 upstream. Both ACE-walk loops in smb_check_perm_dacl() only guard against an under-sized remaining buffer, not against an ACE whose declared `ace->size` is smaller than the struct it claims to describe: if (offsetof(struct smb_ace, access_req) > aces_size) break; ace_size = le16_to_cpu(ace->size); if (ace_size > aces_size) break; The first check only requires the 4-byte ACE header to be in bounds; it does not require access_req (4 bytes at offset 4) to be readable. An attacker who has set a crafted DACL on a file they own can declare ace->size == 4 with aces_size == 4, pass both checks, and then granted |= le32_to_cpu(ace->access_req); /* upper loop */ compare_sids(&sid, &ace->sid); /* lower loop */ reads access_req at offset 4 (OOB by up to 4 bytes) and ace->sid at offset 8 (OOB by up to CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE + SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES * 4 bytes). Tighten both loops to require ace_size >= offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) + CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE which is the smallest valid on-wire ACE layout (4-byte header + 4-byte access_req + 8-byte sid base with zero sub-auths). Also reject ACEs whose sid.num_subauth exceeds SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES before letting compare_sids() dereference sub_auth[] entries. parse_sec_desc() already enforces an equivalent check (lines 441-448); smb_check_perm_dacl() simply grew weaker validation over time. Reachability: authenticated SMB client with permission to set an ACL on a file. On a subsequent CREATE against that file, the kernel walks the stored DACL via smb_check_perm_dacl() and triggers the OOB read. Not pre-auth, and the OOB read is not reflected to the attacker, but KASAN reports and kernel state corruption are possible. Fixes: e2f34481b24d ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6 Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-4 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito Acked-by: Namjae Jeon Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/server/smbacl.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) --- a/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c @@ -1342,10 +1342,13 @@ int smb_check_perm_dacl(struct ksmbd_con ace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)pdacl + sizeof(struct smb_acl)); aces_size = acl_size - sizeof(struct smb_acl); for (i = 0; i < le16_to_cpu(pdacl->num_aces); i++) { - if (offsetof(struct smb_ace, access_req) > aces_size) + if (offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) + + aces_size < CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE) break; ace_size = le16_to_cpu(ace->size); - if (ace_size > aces_size) + if (ace_size > aces_size || + ace_size < offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) + + CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE) break; aces_size -= ace_size; granted |= le32_to_cpu(ace->access_req); @@ -1360,13 +1363,19 @@ int smb_check_perm_dacl(struct ksmbd_con ace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)pdacl + sizeof(struct smb_acl)); aces_size = acl_size - sizeof(struct smb_acl); for (i = 0; i < le16_to_cpu(pdacl->num_aces); i++) { - if (offsetof(struct smb_ace, access_req) > aces_size) + if (offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) + + aces_size < CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE) break; ace_size = le16_to_cpu(ace->size); - if (ace_size > aces_size) + if (ace_size > aces_size || + ace_size < offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) + + CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE) break; aces_size -= ace_size; + if (ace->sid.num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES) + break; + if (!compare_sids(&sid, &ace->sid) || !compare_sids(&sid_unix_NFS_mode, &ace->sid)) { found = 1;