From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C0D0619A288; Fri, 24 Apr 2026 13:36:53 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1777037813; cv=none; b=CHX6+NgntyHPNLNARaERgM7c9m8CNqzgWxoEoNnBRzdkSsg96TmnT+ZvawUbosm7gs7mSkZ1qQlKsfnprOgKNSloh+U9k2lJHU0wsWTDwLZGQoTK6p6ULdPrstldTGCvQ69IILUIo9ABjcaT/TKYeGEwZ1VCOTI5jHZUx5q6C9k= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1777037813; c=relaxed/simple; bh=zbXA3UNKelyDzTecCvLqjGmp24Gwk2UZjohmOnSQMPY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=a5i40mY0klDUyLt2b63XAv+5Rs6WTMoHiUR8Jni1tw2+ZNIH0HRcp9gztDQd8yDC++PvrdaEpVdpNRCuz3Q9oFcATkv1rC1SnW/oACRezLW2iZnFGzxHJFj3zhMRmYFJ1pDhtyzG/cgVp0Go+Kqpy2/ht1hhhq+Mofi/UBHjCwU= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=XeAUDj9R; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="XeAUDj9R" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 4AA38C19425; Fri, 24 Apr 2026 13:36:53 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1777037813; bh=zbXA3UNKelyDzTecCvLqjGmp24Gwk2UZjohmOnSQMPY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=XeAUDj9RZcJHbvIXmQhQ0VLPx9wwrDDhzoMefZ/2AuMIoBMs6I3JXHTCFtWMEMAmx cMPUf3qoyGzyKEKQtBDm0jCEP9khdVRhIyDt9eMu6lmroxGIEonqJFKvUV21lRiLEJ LydIwGpaxUEzA80e6jkKsVF6vY9Oc3rTPW4+BS8E= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, stable Subject: [PATCH 6.6 078/166] usb: gadget: f_ncm: validate minimum block_len in ncm_unwrap_ntb() Date: Fri, 24 Apr 2026 15:29:52 +0200 Message-ID: <20260424132549.160058985@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.53.0 In-Reply-To: <20260424132532.812258529@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260424132532.812258529@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Greg Kroah-Hartman commit 8f993d30b95dc9557a8a96ceca11abed674c8acb upstream. The block_len read from the host-supplied NTB header is checked against ntb_max but has no lower bound. When block_len is smaller than opts->ndp_size, the bounds check of: ndp_index > (block_len - opts->ndp_size) will underflow producing a huge unsigned value that ndp_index can never exceed, defeating the check entirely. The same underflow occurs in the datagram index checks against block_len - opts->dpe_size. With those checks neutered, a malicious USB host can choose ndp_index and datagram offsets that point past the actual transfer, and the skb_put_data() copies adjacent kernel memory into the network skb. Fix this by rejecting block lengths that cannot hold at least the NTB header plus one NDP. This will make block_len - opts->ndp_size and block_len - opts->dpe_size both well-defined. Commit 8d2b1a1ec9f5 ("CDC-NCM: avoid overflow in sanity checking") fixed a related class of issues on the host side of NCM. Fixes: 2b74b0a04d3e ("USB: gadget: f_ncm: add bounds checks to ncm_unwrap_ntb()") Cc: stable Assisted-by: gregkh_clanker_t1000 Link: https://patch.msgid.link/2026040753-baffle-handheld-624d@gregkh Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_ncm.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_ncm.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_ncm.c @@ -1196,8 +1196,8 @@ parse_ntb: block_len = get_ncm(&tmp, opts->block_length); /* (d)wBlockLength */ - if (block_len > ntb_max) { - INFO(port->func.config->cdev, "OUT size exceeded\n"); + if ((block_len < opts->nth_size + opts->ndp_size) || (block_len > ntb_max)) { + INFO(port->func.config->cdev, "Bad block length: %#X\n", block_len); goto err; }