From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 335E33C1976; Fri, 24 Apr 2026 13:40:30 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1777038030; cv=none; b=QZMg/1P/HiVqS1QingtEis/7IEpwPM6M5am6jABJnDnXV+HffKIRMCTbwUfA/hebJL1NBojhxbaO0siX9S+W1BC3arTLu74WlFvQruoJwDJMlcANMD8v4i/t3DUK8r61Clt7oc165p0yjoY3mhGWCYTwbGYVx1ASAwF+cYcVR/w= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1777038030; c=relaxed/simple; bh=KwLJpwpNcIstCNqAQLD+7Rk/3pGPnT3qqpxNvuvXowI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=KP4Dx9aUtQRwvUnq5g3yb1z/uUoqMr4Y1SjSnxUYHg8mFE9cq9f1R2N088DDFB0SsykNCcC4boPaKrUYE/oZCvnr+xLTahWiET8OX58JT5CCc2ALZTQVOGuWgt/SpaX+/jbqI1YxwczjSVovp3zfL+VEnvh7WZSqCJLPV0W4ilE= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=yfe7Ww1T; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="yfe7Ww1T" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 8A0E4C19425; Fri, 24 Apr 2026 13:40:29 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1777038029; bh=KwLJpwpNcIstCNqAQLD+7Rk/3pGPnT3qqpxNvuvXowI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=yfe7Ww1T0SKQ7Wv9j9AX/QzVgBtXHMBa3lun4pS712skT8VNczvmG+oin2JtOg5l9 3MgyUXHEu9uq4JbHkfre+191os6qgsWMLX9O07lHoVpwDDLh1Up0mMUDlUiBCmPk9N 6sqkGTjUUFvbCUttjA46t7HVCgczw2lKBoL2o8cs= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Alexander Potapenko , Sebastian Alba Vives , Sean Christopherson , Herbert Xu Subject: [PATCH 6.6 164/166] crypto: ccp: Dont attempt to copy ID to userspace if PSP command failed Date: Fri, 24 Apr 2026 15:31:18 +0200 Message-ID: <20260424132607.359726993@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.53.0 In-Reply-To: <20260424132532.812258529@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260424132532.812258529@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Sean Christopherson commit 4f685dbfa87c546e51d9dc6cab379d20f275e114 upstream. When retrieving the ID for the CPU, don't attempt to copy the ID blob to userspace if the firmware command failed. If the failure was due to an invalid length, i.e. the userspace buffer+length was too small, copying the number of bytes _firmware_ requires will overflow the kernel-allocated buffer and leak data to userspace. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26 Read of size 64 at addr ffff8881867f5960 by task syz.0.906/24388 CPU: 130 UID: 0 PID: 24388 Comm: syz.0.906 Tainted: G U O 7.0.0-smp-DEV #28 PREEMPTLAZY Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 12.62.0-0 11/19/2025 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0xc5/0x110 ../lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description ../mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xbc/0x260 ../mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xa2/0xe0 ../mm/kasan/report.c:595 check_region_inline ../mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline] kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 ../mm/kasan/generic.c:200 instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline] _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline] _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26 copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:236 [inline] sev_ioctl_do_get_id2+0x361/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2222 sev_ioctl+0x25f/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2575 vfs_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0x11d/0x1b0 ../fs/ioctl.c:583 do_syscall_x64 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xe0/0x800 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e WARN if the driver says the command succeeded, but the firmware error code says otherwise, as __sev_do_cmd_locked() is expected to return -EIO on any firwmware error. Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko Reported-by: Sebastian Alba Vives Fixes: d6112ea0cb34 ("crypto: ccp - introduce SEV_GET_ID2 command") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c @@ -932,6 +932,9 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_get_id2(struct s goto e_free; } + if (ret || WARN_ON_ONCE(argp->error)) + goto e_free; + if (id_blob) { if (copy_to_user(input_address, id_blob, data.len)) { ret = -EFAULT;