From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: michael.bommarito@gmail.com,linkinjeon@kernel.org,stfrench@microsoft.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ksmbd: require minimum ACE size in smb_check_perm_dacl()" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree
Date: Fri, 24 Apr 2026 11:41:26 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026042426-growing-dime-ce6e@gregkh> (raw)
The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x d07b26f39246a82399661936dd0c853983cfade7
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable@vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2026042426-growing-dime-ce6e@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From d07b26f39246a82399661936dd0c853983cfade7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2026 15:15:33 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] ksmbd: require minimum ACE size in smb_check_perm_dacl()
Both ACE-walk loops in smb_check_perm_dacl() only guard against an
under-sized remaining buffer, not against an ACE whose declared
`ace->size` is smaller than the struct it claims to describe:
if (offsetof(struct smb_ace, access_req) > aces_size)
break;
ace_size = le16_to_cpu(ace->size);
if (ace_size > aces_size)
break;
The first check only requires the 4-byte ACE header to be in bounds;
it does not require access_req (4 bytes at offset 4) to be readable.
An attacker who has set a crafted DACL on a file they own can declare
ace->size == 4 with aces_size == 4, pass both checks, and then
granted |= le32_to_cpu(ace->access_req); /* upper loop */
compare_sids(&sid, &ace->sid); /* lower loop */
reads access_req at offset 4 (OOB by up to 4 bytes) and ace->sid at
offset 8 (OOB by up to CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE + SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES
* 4 bytes).
Tighten both loops to require
ace_size >= offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) + CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE
which is the smallest valid on-wire ACE layout (4-byte header +
4-byte access_req + 8-byte sid base with zero sub-auths). Also
reject ACEs whose sid.num_subauth exceeds SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES
before letting compare_sids() dereference sub_auth[] entries.
parse_sec_desc() already enforces an equivalent check (lines 441-448);
smb_check_perm_dacl() simply grew weaker validation over time.
Reachability: authenticated SMB client with permission to set an ACL
on a file. On a subsequent CREATE against that file, the kernel
walks the stored DACL via smb_check_perm_dacl() and triggers the
OOB read. Not pre-auth, and the OOB read is not reflected to the
attacker, but KASAN reports and kernel state corruption are
possible.
Fixes: e2f34481b24d ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-4
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
diff --git a/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c b/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c
index 061a305bf9c8..bba26a0355bb 100644
--- a/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c
@@ -1342,10 +1342,13 @@ int smb_check_perm_dacl(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, const struct path *path,
ace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)pdacl + sizeof(struct smb_acl));
aces_size = acl_size - sizeof(struct smb_acl);
for (i = 0; i < le16_to_cpu(pdacl->num_aces); i++) {
- if (offsetof(struct smb_ace, access_req) > aces_size)
+ if (offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) +
+ aces_size < CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE)
break;
ace_size = le16_to_cpu(ace->size);
- if (ace_size > aces_size)
+ if (ace_size > aces_size ||
+ ace_size < offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) +
+ CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE)
break;
aces_size -= ace_size;
granted |= le32_to_cpu(ace->access_req);
@@ -1360,13 +1363,19 @@ int smb_check_perm_dacl(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, const struct path *path,
ace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)pdacl + sizeof(struct smb_acl));
aces_size = acl_size - sizeof(struct smb_acl);
for (i = 0; i < le16_to_cpu(pdacl->num_aces); i++) {
- if (offsetof(struct smb_ace, access_req) > aces_size)
+ if (offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) +
+ aces_size < CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE)
break;
ace_size = le16_to_cpu(ace->size);
- if (ace_size > aces_size)
+ if (ace_size > aces_size ||
+ ace_size < offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) +
+ CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE)
break;
aces_size -= ace_size;
+ if (ace->sid.num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES)
+ break;
+
if (!compare_sids(&sid, &ace->sid) ||
!compare_sids(&sid_unix_NFS_mode, &ace->sid)) {
found = 1;
next reply other threads:[~2026-04-24 9:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-24 9:41 gregkh [this message]
2026-04-24 13:03 ` [PATCH 6.6.y 1/3] smb: move some duplicate definitions to common/smbacl.h Sasha Levin
2026-04-24 13:04 ` [PATCH 6.6.y 2/3] smb: common: change the data type of num_aces to le16 Sasha Levin
2026-04-24 13:04 ` [PATCH 6.6.y 3/3] ksmbd: require minimum ACE size in smb_check_perm_dacl() Sasha Levin
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