From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>,
Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>,
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 5.15.y] smb: client: validate the whole DACL before rewriting it in cifsacl
Date: Fri, 24 Apr 2026 20:37:18 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260425003718.2642374-1-sashal@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2026042446-omen-saddling-ddde@gregkh>
From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 0a8cf165566ba55a39fd0f4de172119dd646d39a ]
build_sec_desc() and id_mode_to_cifs_acl() derive a DACL pointer from a
server-supplied dacloffset and then use the incoming ACL to rebuild the
chmod/chown security descriptor.
The original fix only checked that the struct smb_acl header fits before
reading dacl_ptr->size or dacl_ptr->num_aces. That avoids the immediate
header-field OOB read, but the rewrite helpers still walk ACEs based on
pdacl->num_aces with no structural validation of the incoming DACL body.
A malicious server can return a truncated DACL that still contains a
header, claims one or more ACEs, and then drive
replace_sids_and_copy_aces() or set_chmod_dacl() past the validated
extent while they compare or copy attacker-controlled ACEs.
Factor the DACL structural checks into validate_dacl(), extend them to
validate each ACE against the DACL bounds, and use the shared validator
before the chmod/chown rebuild paths. parse_dacl() reuses the same
validator so the read-side parser and write-side rewrite paths agree on
what constitutes a well-formed incoming DACL.
Fixes: bc3e9dd9d104 ("cifs: Change SIDs in ACEs while transferring file ownership.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-4
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
[ renamed smb_acl/smb_ace/smb_sid/smb_ntsd to cifs_* and widened num_aces from u16 to u32 for 6.1's __le32 field ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/cifs/cifsacl.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 85 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c b/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c
index bf861fef2f0c3..b6dc3543a40f8 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c
@@ -753,6 +753,78 @@ static void dump_ace(struct cifs_ace *pace, char *end_of_acl)
}
#endif
+static int validate_dacl(struct cifs_acl *pdacl, char *end_of_acl)
+{
+ int i, ace_hdr_size, ace_size, min_ace_size;
+ u16 dacl_size;
+ u32 num_aces;
+ char *acl_base, *end_of_dacl;
+ struct cifs_ace *pace;
+
+ if (!pdacl)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (end_of_acl < (char *)pdacl + sizeof(struct cifs_acl)) {
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse DACL\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ dacl_size = le16_to_cpu(pdacl->size);
+ if (dacl_size < sizeof(struct cifs_acl) ||
+ end_of_acl < (char *)pdacl + dacl_size) {
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse DACL\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ num_aces = le32_to_cpu(pdacl->num_aces);
+ if (!num_aces)
+ return 0;
+
+ ace_hdr_size = offsetof(struct cifs_ace, sid) +
+ offsetof(struct cifs_sid, sub_auth);
+ min_ace_size = ace_hdr_size + sizeof(__le32);
+ if (num_aces > (dacl_size - sizeof(struct cifs_acl)) / min_ace_size) {
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse DACL\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ end_of_dacl = (char *)pdacl + dacl_size;
+ acl_base = (char *)pdacl;
+ ace_size = sizeof(struct cifs_acl);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_aces; ++i) {
+ if (end_of_dacl - acl_base < ace_size) {
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse ACE\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ pace = (struct cifs_ace *)(acl_base + ace_size);
+ acl_base = (char *)pace;
+
+ if (end_of_dacl - acl_base < ace_hdr_size ||
+ pace->sid.num_subauth == 0 ||
+ pace->sid.num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES) {
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse ACE\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ ace_size = ace_hdr_size + sizeof(__le32) * pace->sid.num_subauth;
+ if (end_of_dacl - acl_base < ace_size ||
+ le16_to_cpu(pace->size) < ace_size) {
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse ACE\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ ace_size = le16_to_cpu(pace->size);
+ if (end_of_dacl - acl_base < ace_size) {
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse ACE\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static void parse_dacl(struct cifs_acl *pdacl, char *end_of_acl,
struct cifs_sid *pownersid, struct cifs_sid *pgrpsid,
struct cifs_fattr *fattr, bool mode_from_special_sid)
@@ -760,7 +832,7 @@ static void parse_dacl(struct cifs_acl *pdacl, char *end_of_acl,
int i;
int num_aces = 0;
int acl_size;
- char *acl_base;
+ char *acl_base, *end_of_dacl;
struct cifs_ace **ppace;
/* BB need to add parm so we can store the SID BB */
@@ -772,11 +844,8 @@ static void parse_dacl(struct cifs_acl *pdacl, char *end_of_acl,
return;
}
- /* validate that we do not go past end of acl */
- if (end_of_acl < (char *)pdacl + le16_to_cpu(pdacl->size)) {
- cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse DACL\n");
+ if (validate_dacl(pdacl, end_of_acl))
return;
- }
cifs_dbg(NOISY, "DACL revision %d size %d num aces %d\n",
le16_to_cpu(pdacl->revision), le16_to_cpu(pdacl->size),
@@ -787,6 +856,7 @@ static void parse_dacl(struct cifs_acl *pdacl, char *end_of_acl,
user/group/other have no permissions */
fattr->cf_mode &= ~(0777);
+ end_of_dacl = (char *)pdacl + le16_to_cpu(pdacl->size);
acl_base = (char *)pdacl;
acl_size = sizeof(struct cifs_acl);
@@ -804,7 +874,7 @@ static void parse_dacl(struct cifs_acl *pdacl, char *end_of_acl,
for (i = 0; i < num_aces; ++i) {
ppace[i] = (struct cifs_ace *) (acl_base + acl_size);
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_DEBUG2
- dump_ace(ppace[i], end_of_acl);
+ dump_ace(ppace[i], end_of_dacl);
#endif
if (mode_from_special_sid &&
(compare_sids(&(ppace[i]->sid),
@@ -1262,10 +1332,9 @@ static int build_sec_desc(struct cifs_ntsd *pntsd, struct cifs_ntsd *pnntsd,
dacloffset = le32_to_cpu(pntsd->dacloffset);
if (dacloffset) {
dacl_ptr = (struct cifs_acl *)((char *)pntsd + dacloffset);
- if (end_of_acl < (char *)dacl_ptr + le16_to_cpu(dacl_ptr->size)) {
- cifs_dbg(VFS, "Server returned illegal ACL size\n");
- return -EINVAL;
- }
+ rc = validate_dacl(dacl_ptr, end_of_acl);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
}
owner_sid_ptr = (struct cifs_sid *)((char *)pntsd +
@@ -1625,6 +1694,12 @@ id_mode_to_cifs_acl(struct inode *inode, const char *path, __u64 *pnmode,
dacloffset = le32_to_cpu(pntsd->dacloffset);
if (dacloffset) {
dacl_ptr = (struct cifs_acl *)((char *)pntsd + dacloffset);
+ rc = validate_dacl(dacl_ptr, (char *)pntsd + secdesclen);
+ if (rc) {
+ kfree(pntsd);
+ cifs_put_tlink(tlink);
+ return rc;
+ }
if (mode_from_sid)
nsecdesclen +=
le32_to_cpu(dacl_ptr->num_aces) * sizeof(struct cifs_ace);
--
2.53.0
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-25 0:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-24 9:42 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] smb: client: validate the whole DACL before rewriting it in" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree gregkh
2026-04-25 0:37 ` Sasha Levin [this message]
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