From: Sam Edwards <cfsworks@gmail.com>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Sam Edwards <cfsworks@gmail.com>,
Sam Edwards <CFSworks@gmail.com>,
Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>,
Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH 6.18.y] ceph: fix num_ops off-by-one when crypto allocation fails
Date: Tue, 5 May 2026 18:43:03 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260506014302.4261-2-CFSworks@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2026050453-gesture-wrinkle-173c@gregkh>
From: Sam Edwards <cfsworks@gmail.com>
commit a0d9555bf9eaeba34fe6b6bb86f442fe08ba3842 upstream.
move_dirty_folio_in_page_array() may fail if the file is encrypted, the
dirty folio is not the first in the batch, and it fails to allocate a
bounce buffer to hold the ciphertext. When that happens,
ceph_process_folio_batch() simply redirties the folio and flushes the
current batch -- it can retry that folio in a future batch.
However, if this failed folio is not contiguous with the last folio that
did make it into the batch, then ceph_process_folio_batch() has already
incremented `ceph_wbc->num_ops`; because it doesn't follow through and
add the discontiguous folio to the array, ceph_submit_write() -- which
expects that `ceph_wbc->num_ops` accurately reflects the number of
contiguous ranges (and therefore the required number of "write extent"
ops) in the writeback -- will panic the kernel:
BUG_ON(ceph_wbc->op_idx + 1 != req->r_num_ops);
This issue can be reproduced on affected kernels by writing to
fscrypt-enabled CephFS file(s) with a 4KiB-written/4KiB-skipped/repeat
pattern (total filesize should not matter) and gradually increasing the
system's memory pressure until a bounce buffer allocation fails.
Fix this crash by decrementing `ceph_wbc->num_ops` back to the correct
value when move_dirty_folio_in_page_array() fails, but the folio already
started counting a new (i.e. still-empty) extent.
The defect corrected by this patch has existed since 2022 (see first
`Fixes:`), but another bug blocked multi-folio encrypted writeback until
recently (see second `Fixes:`). The second commit made it into 6.18.16,
6.19.6, and 7.0-rc1, unmasking the panic in those versions. This patch
therefore fixes a regression (panic) introduced by cac190c7674f.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d55207717ded ("ceph: add encryption support to writepage and writepages")
Fixes: cac190c7674f ("ceph: fix write storm on fscrypted files")
Signed-off-by: Sam Edwards <CFSworks@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
---
Hi stable team,
Beware! This is my first manual stable backport; I followed Greg's supplied Git
commands and read process/stable-kernel-rules.html, but novice mistakes are
still possible. Please scrutinize appropriately. :)
This patch does not substantially differ from upstream; I only resolved the
`rc = 0;` conflict.
This fix is currently unnecessary on LTS series other than 6.18, as on those
cac190c7674f ("ceph: fix write storm on fscrypted files")
has not been applied: there is no panic, only degraded performance.
Cheers,
Sam
---
fs/ceph/addr.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/ceph/addr.c b/fs/ceph/addr.c
index 390f122feeaa..3af6795cb3c1 100644
--- a/fs/ceph/addr.c
+++ b/fs/ceph/addr.c
@@ -1373,6 +1373,10 @@ int ceph_process_folio_batch(struct address_space *mapping,
rc = move_dirty_folio_in_page_array(mapping, wbc, ceph_wbc,
folio);
if (rc) {
+ /* Did we just begin a new contiguous op? Nevermind! */
+ if (ceph_wbc->len == 0)
+ ceph_wbc->num_ops--;
+
rc = 0;
folio_redirty_for_writepage(wbc, folio);
folio_unlock(folio);
--
2.52.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-06 1:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-04 8:49 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ceph: fix num_ops off-by-one when crypto allocation fails" failed to apply to 6.18-stable tree gregkh
2026-05-06 1:43 ` Sam Edwards [this message]
2026-05-09 12:46 ` [PATCH 6.18.y] ceph: fix num_ops off-by-one when crypto allocation fails Sasha Levin
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