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From: Rion Kiguchi <kiguchi.r.sec@gmail.com>
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: linux-staging@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	security@kernel.org, Rion Kiguchi <kiguchi.r.sec@gmail.com>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3] staging: vme_user: validate slave window size against buffer size
Date: Sat,  9 May 2026 18:26:27 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260509092627.1136357-1-kiguchi.r.sec@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2026050935-designing-glancing-2e16@gregkh>

The VME_SET_SLAVE ioctl in drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c accepts
a user-controlled slave.size and forwards it to vme_slave_set() without
comparing it against image[minor].size_buf. The slave-image kernel
buffer is allocated at probe time with a fixed size of PCI_BUF_SIZE
(0x20000 / 128 KiB), but the configured VME window size can be made
much larger via the ioctl.

The subsequent read() / write() handlers (vme_user_read /
vme_user_write) clamp the I/O range against vme_get_size(), which
returns the size the bridge driver has programmed for the window
(i.e. the attacker-supplied slave.size). vme_get_size() does not
consult size_buf, so an oversized window passes the existing bounds
checks, and buffer_to_user() / buffer_from_user() then index
image[minor].kern_buf with offsets beyond the actual allocation.

Result: a local user with read/write access to /dev/bus/vme/s* can
trigger out-of-bounds read and write of the kernel slab adjacent to
the slave-image buffer.

Fix: reject slave.size > size_buf in the VME_SET_SLAVE handler.
With this check in place, the existing bounds checks in
vme_user_read() / vme_user_write() against vme_get_size() are
sufficient to prevent OOB access; no additional checks in
buffer_to_user() / buffer_from_user() are needed.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
Signed-off-by: Rion Kiguchi <kiguchi.r.sec@gmail.com>
---
Changes in v3:
 - Drop redundant checks in buffer_to_user() / buffer_from_user();
   the existing vme_get_size()-based bounds checks in vme_user_read()
   / vme_user_write() are sufficient once VME_SET_SLAVE rejects
   oversized windows (Greg's review feedback)
 - Reword commit message to explain why vme_get_size() does not
   already catch this

Changes in v2:
 - Use git send-email instead of Gmail web compose (v1 corrupted
   the diff)
 - Drop redundant Reported-by tag (author == reporter)
 - Add Assisted-by tag per Documentation/process/coding-assistants.rst

 drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c | 9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c b/drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c
index 11e25c2f6..64e95b026 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c
@@ -394,6 +394,14 @@ static int vme_user_ioctl(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
 				return -EFAULT;
 			}
 
+			/*
+			 * Reject window sizes larger than the kernel buffer
+			 * allocated at probe time, otherwise subsequent
+			 * read/write would access memory beyond kern_buf.
+			 */
+			if (slave.size > image[minor].size_buf)
+				return -EINVAL;
+
 			/* XXX	We do not want to push aspace, cycle and width
 			 *	to userspace as they are
 			 */
@@ -401,7 +409,7 @@ static int vme_user_ioctl(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
 				slave.enable, slave.vme_addr, slave.size,
 				image[minor].pci_buf, slave.aspace,
 				slave.cycle);
-
+				
 			break;
 		}
 		break;
-- 
2.43.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-05-09  9:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-05-09  7:53 [PATCH] staging: vme_user: validate slave window size against buffer size Rion Kiguchi
2026-05-09  8:04 ` Greg KH
2026-05-09  9:07   ` [PATCH v3] " Rion Kiguchi
2026-05-09  9:15     ` Greg KH
2026-05-09  9:16     ` Greg KH
2026-05-09  9:26   ` Rion Kiguchi [this message]
2026-05-09  9:58     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman

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