From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D42C43D5642; Wed, 20 May 2026 16:31:24 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1779294686; cv=none; b=c0t2EXfGKLXimg5zvU1UttlfqzqQiOJbyZZoWolKo/zMchnQvzFViIQ0PQ5wSKAq8khtebFfiYZHpGkCmGBrS+Dvib24xL8Mppo9gGN3IV/VtRrq6rXiJ2jHZf9G3w6+APz/dg8vm/w+y8y2fs3s73K1dH53C13b6kiVMV9AgC8= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1779294686; c=relaxed/simple; bh=C3NVLQJR1/8qs+1S7Bqr7JEmna2WyGbVwMN9CpIeD78=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=h79Amt+4P6R6VRYB1LK0bBI2oojYSn8ReMF3ZFuwQEnmnc168qRQzWMFtLzL95cbFvjHsk0wg7azkrv6Q+H0DVpQPIM9GFpbRAYXPqEYUNZujADnHITf+5qmpTf6RtlL9w52SFsvYGIKO7aRZEl0dEhfDrf3+i7HZbiWOU+2w34= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=VC6bBsvi; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="VC6bBsvi" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 463341F000E9; Wed, 20 May 2026 16:31:24 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1779294684; bh=zRPuaodprnVLRxvs6jwDmGVlUAWiJ2kyQWbvP7hORzg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=VC6bBsvi5FkFkJWJl/MNGmysiy5KDT2skBwCvAJtWb8KjsSOQ0YKs0OOVN6DqEr9a JreRaIH9cuDVTxBl+wOw2s0qAdTvfZlR4UBf1lCOEFrw6mHH0XJQ2B9bX7hzqF83b9 3Va5azA+Ppt3ePC27lArawzRqaE2JV+w/Dgh7BTg= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Eduard Zingerman , Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi , Alexei Starovoitov , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 7.0 0134/1146] bpf: Fix variable length stack write over spilled pointers Date: Wed, 20 May 2026 18:06:24 +0200 Message-ID: <20260520162151.355133123@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.54.0 In-Reply-To: <20260520162148.390695140@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260520162148.390695140@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Alexei Starovoitov [ Upstream commit 4639eb9e30ab10c7935c7c19e872facf9a94713f ] Scrub slots if variable-offset stack write goes over spilled pointers. Otherwise is_spilled_reg() may == true && spilled_ptr.type == NOT_INIT and valid program is rejected by check_stack_read_fixed_off() with obscure "invalid size of register fill" message. Fixes: 01f810ace9ed ("bpf: Allow variable-offset stack access") Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260324215938.81733-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 23b35605ae377..8d00bd0f8b79d 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -5241,6 +5241,18 @@ static void check_fastcall_stack_contract(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, } } +static void scrub_special_slot(struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi) +{ + int i; + + /* regular write of data into stack destroys any spilled ptr */ + state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT; + /* Mark slots as STACK_MISC if they belonged to spilled ptr/dynptr/iter. */ + if (is_stack_slot_special(&state->stack[spi])) + for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) + scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[i]); +} + /* check_stack_{read,write}_fixed_off functions track spill/fill of registers, * stack boundary and alignment are checked in check_mem_access() */ @@ -5338,12 +5350,7 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, } else { u8 type = STACK_MISC; - /* regular write of data into stack destroys any spilled ptr */ - state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT; - /* Mark slots as STACK_MISC if they belonged to spilled ptr/dynptr/iter. */ - if (is_stack_slot_special(&state->stack[spi])) - for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) - scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[i]); + scrub_special_slot(state, spi); /* when we zero initialize stack slots mark them as such */ if ((reg && register_is_null(reg)) || @@ -5467,8 +5474,13 @@ static int check_stack_write_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, } } - /* Erase all other spilled pointers. */ - state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT; + /* + * Scrub slots if variable-offset stack write goes over spilled pointers. + * Otherwise is_spilled_reg() may == true && spilled_ptr.type == NOT_INIT + * and valid program is rejected by check_stack_read_fixed_off() + * with obscure "invalid size of register fill" message. + */ + scrub_special_slot(state, spi); /* Update the slot type. */ new_type = STACK_MISC; -- 2.53.0