From: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
To: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, davem@davemloft.net, edumazet@google.com,
kuba@kernel.org, pabeni@redhat.com, jiri@resnulli.us,
victor@mojatatu.com, security@kernel.org,
zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com, stable@vger.kernel.org,
kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net v2 1/1] net/sched: sch_teql: Introduce slaves_lock to avoid race condition and UAF
Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 15:15:47 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260626141547.GA1310988@horms.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAM0EoMmJZxAbOsyW7bBp0DbTTiQKZeGaaBHPEw45D5b6DKDEvg@mail.gmail.com>
On Fri, Jun 26, 2026 at 06:16:43AM -0400, Jamal Hadi Salim wrote:
> "
>
> On Wed, Jun 24, 2026 at 6:40 PM Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> wrote:
> >
> > The teql master->slaves singly linked list is not protected against
> > multiple writes. It can be mod'ed concurently from teql_master_xmit(),
> > teql_dequeue(), teql_init() and teql_destroy() without holding any list
> > lock or RCU protection.
> >
> > zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com has demonstrated that the qdisc is freed
> > after an RCU grace period, but teql_master_xmit() running on another
> > CPU can still hold a stale pointer into the list, resulting in a
> > slab-use-after-free:
> >
> > BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in teql_destroy+0x3ca/0x440 linux/net/sched/sch_teql.c:142
> > Read of size 8 at addr ffff88802923aa80 by task ip/10024
> >
> > The zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com repro created concurrent AF_PACKET
> > senders on a teql device against a thread that repeatedly adds/deletes the
> > slave qdisc, together with a SLUB spray that reclaims the freed slot; the
> > resulting UAF is controllable enough to be turned into a read/write
> > primitive against the freed qdisc object.
> >
> > The fix?
> > Add a per-master slaves_lock spinlock that serializes all mutations of
> > master->slaves and the NEXT_SLAVE() links in teql_destroy() and
> > teql_qdisc_init(). teql_master_xmit() also takes the same slaves_lock
> > around those updates.
> > Annotate master->slaves and the per-slave ->next pointer with __rcu and
> > use the appropriate RCU accessors everywhere they are touched:
> > rcu_assign_pointer() on the writer side (under slaves_lock),
> > rcu_dereference_protected() for the writer-side loads (also under
> > slaves_lock), rcu_dereference_bh() for the loads in teql_master_xmit() and
> > rtnl_dereference() for the loads in teql_master_open()/teql_master_mtu(),
> > which run under RTNL.
> > Pair this with rcu_read_lock_bh()/rcu_read_unlock_bh() around the list
> > traversal in teql_master_xmit(), so that readers either observe a fully
> > linked list or are deferred until the in-flight mutation completes. The two
> > early-return paths in teql_master_xmit() are updated to release the RCU-bh
> > read-side critical section before returning, since leaving it held would
> > disable BH on that CPU for good.
> >
>
> sashiko-gemini's complaints:
> https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260624224016.24018-1-jhs%40mojatatu.com
> seem bogus to me (someone correct me if i am wrong). I am only going
> to address the first claim of "TOCTOU / "resurrection" race in
> teql_master_xmit()"
> teql_master_xmit() holds rcu_read_lock_bh() across the entire
> traversal. teql_destroy() freeing can only proceed once the qdisc's
> RCU grace period has elapsed - so where is this TOCTOU? Let's say this
> were true: both calls hold the slaves_lock.
> The other issues are of similar nature.
Hi Jamal,
I think the central question here is about the protection offered by RCU
in these code paths. And while I agree it protects the use of elements
of the list, I think the problem flagged relates to the management of
the list itself.
The example AI gave me when I asked is like this:
Assume a TEQL master has one slave, `q`.
The list is circular: `q->next == q`.
1. CPU A (Transmitting): Enters `teql_master_xmit()`.
It reads `master->sla ves` and gets a local pointer to `q`.
2. CPU B (Destroying): Calls `teql_destroy(q)`.
It takes the lock, unlinks `q`, and sets `master->slaves = NULL`.
The list is now logically empty.
3. CPU A: Finishes its work and prepares to rotate the list head
to the next slave.
It takes the lock.
4. CPU A (The "Use" / The Resurrection):
It executes: `rcu_assign_pointer(master->slaves, NEXT_SLAVE(q));`
Because `q` was circular, `NEXT_SLAVE(q)` is still `q`.
5. CPU A: Releases the lock.
**The global `master->slaves` is now `q` again.**
6. The System: The RCU grace period expires. CPU B finishes
`teql_destroy()` and the memory for `q` is freed.
The global `master->slaves` pointer is now a **dangling pointer**
pointing to freed memory.
> OTOH, sashiko-claude
> (https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/sashiko/#/patchset/20260624224016.24018-1-jhs%40mojatatu.com)
> does make some valid claims which are low value, so not sure a resend
> is worth it.
> For example in claim 1 it says "Should the changelog mention this
> teql_dequeue() site too?" Sure I can - but just because I provided
> extra information in the commit log, which I could have omitted, now I
> have to add more info? ;->
FWIIW, I think there is a value in tightening up the commit message.
E.g. so it's accurate when we look at again in two years time.
But I also lean towards it not being necessary to post an update
only to address this.
> The second claim is "rcu_dereference_bh()
> should be rcu_dereference_protected() on writer side". Sparse didnt
> complain and i dont see this as breakage rather a consistency measure.
I think it would be good to address in the long run. But as per my comment
immediately above, I also lean towards it not being necessary to post an
update only to address this.
> Unless I am missing something ..
>
> cheers,
> jamal
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-26 14:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-24 22:40 [PATCH net v2 1/1] net/sched: sch_teql: Introduce slaves_lock to avoid race condition and UAF Jamal Hadi Salim
2026-06-26 10:16 ` Jamal Hadi Salim
2026-06-26 14:15 ` Simon Horman [this message]
2026-06-26 16:11 ` Jamal Hadi Salim
2026-06-27 16:36 ` Simon Horman
2026-06-27 21:03 ` Jamal Hadi Salim
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