From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Hem Parekh <hemparekh1596@gmail.com>,
Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>,
Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>,
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 5.15.y] ksmbd: fix out-of-bounds read in smb_check_perm_dacl()
Date: Sun, 5 Jul 2026 15:06:30 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260705190630.1988235-1-sashal@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2026070254-saddling-prankish-2dc9@gregkh>
From: Hem Parekh <hemparekh1596@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 1ef06004ed4bd6d3ed8c840d9d1a376b66d4935b ]
The permission-check ACE walk in smb_check_perm_dacl() validates the ACE
header size and caps sid.num_subauth at SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES, but it
never checks that ace->size is actually large enough to contain
num_subauth sub-authorities before compare_sids() dereferences them.
CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE covers the SID header up to but excluding the
sub_auth[] array, and offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) is the ACE header,
so the existing guards only guarantee the 8-byte SID base, i.e. zero
sub-authorities. compare_sids() then reads ace->sid.sub_auth[i] for
i < min(local_sid->num_subauth, ace->sid.num_subauth). The local
comparison SIDs (sid_everyone, sid_unix_NFS_mode, and the id_to_sid()
result) always have at least one sub-authority, and an attacker controls
the ACE revision and authority bytes (which lie within the in-bounds SID
base), so they can match one of those SIDs and force the sub_auth read.
A crafted ACE with size == 16 and num_subauth >= 1 placed at the tail of
the security descriptor therefore causes a heap out-of-bounds read of up
to SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES * sizeof(__le32) bytes past the pntsd
allocation. The security descriptor is loaded by ksmbd_vfs_get_sd_xattr()
into a buffer sized exactly to the on-disk data (kzalloc(sd_size) in
ndr_decode_v4_ntacl()), so the read lands past the allocation. The
malformed descriptor can be stored verbatim via SMB2_SET_INFO (the DACL
is not normalised before being written to the security.NTACL xattr) and
the read fires on a subsequent SMB2_CREATE access check, making this
reachable by an authenticated client on a share that uses ACL xattrs.
Add the missing num_subauth-versus-ace_size check, mirroring the
identical guards already present in the sibling parsers parse_dacl() and
smb_inherit_dacl().
Fixes: d07b26f39246 ("ksmbd: require minimum ACE size in smb_check_perm_dacl()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hem Parekh <hemparekh1596@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/ksmbd/smbacl.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/smbacl.c b/fs/ksmbd/smbacl.c
index 5e21424aa97adc..cf5361b63c7dbc 100644
--- a/fs/ksmbd/smbacl.c
+++ b/fs/ksmbd/smbacl.c
@@ -1299,7 +1299,9 @@ int smb_check_perm_dacl(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, const struct path *path,
break;
aces_size -= ace_size;
- if (ace->sid.num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES)
+ if (ace->sid.num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES ||
+ ace_size < offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) + CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE +
+ sizeof(__le32) * ace->sid.num_subauth)
break;
if (!compare_sids(&sid, &ace->sid) ||
--
2.53.0
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-05 19:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-02 13:56 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ksmbd: fix out-of-bounds read in smb_check_perm_dacl()" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree gregkh
2026-07-05 19:06 ` Sasha Levin [this message]
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