From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from mail-wm1-f45.google.com (mail-wm1-f45.google.com [209.85.128.45]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DEB8E42B32E for ; Wed, 8 Jul 2026 10:43:42 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=209.85.128.45 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1783507431; cv=none; b=C1Mr82b7k/yJbLmNA7rPOX2+QoV3IIgHtNJ4ETr97DpuSGo9s69mU3ITl09DjzHSN5g8oqr6FCB9/cHVZVqf0QM/LWtN9WFE6Ht9RasBSyFu6eVsdy7mKCLapmcoCnDqkzbIW1vaZmI+RymmpUhItcm8vK0j1zixKfW1pNTcjIY= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1783507431; c=relaxed/simple; bh=H5w2AGzF0fc8Ya/zdI3DizU+no0z49YzComkUyJ5R/Y=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:MIME-Version; b=jzMxEcoX8WbQjX/XXkc3zor5J5uQJLQsdGanxbjyOTatCMHZs6x6KgZvdgeWe3V1Dcgj7skCo/34TMqmW5rGEtKidhM3oEH4uEjE+6dUoX8pnJptotODyZ8E3GJVWOOAYUteP9W1255D99RNivWpaIYUGZ2fpDBuBQP3Wo9BwVc= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=gmail.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=gmail.com; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com header.i=@gmail.com header.b=gnnR/jY5; arc=none smtp.client-ip=209.85.128.45 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=gmail.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=gmail.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com header.i=@gmail.com header.b="gnnR/jY5" Received: by mail-wm1-f45.google.com with SMTP id 5b1f17b1804b1-493c52cde9eso3849135e9.3 for ; Wed, 08 Jul 2026 03:43:42 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20251104; t=1783507420; x=1784112220; darn=vger.kernel.org; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:message-id:date:subject:cc :to:from:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=Sd+jn8OxzBqMCiodLdjuCiQn2jNeMVrmmbxD+3HhGec=; b=gnnR/jY5B8K6fgOTPOCE/e30r7is7FBniqGRa96Uo38ATjVUKsRms5RRAQ934ESlLH gjAYl2RW/GW7BHcG5RUCF4rL6cEu4vbEkFnHdbkLOAHh317IPyq3ZAA8YWniqA5HJux3 LqmccOUvedr4wpAoFDqE+csXyRLEUxSUaNZquK6ZEq/cCM3J29XTuwLj+9Bk1iIpslkK 0Gc9h/kY3ntjc5lcmlF/l84lwsxTObJYp23JDxAtk19dlmm4ngeCmeU5DWNFn2keNQoQ LYbNSH2phUJ0pgR5a34HPGiWnvftUS0euQwwq1lpuWLB0H19o1ncHg5V3LDsk4gsUPvL Sdbg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20251104; t=1783507420; x=1784112220; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:message-id:date:subject:cc :to:from:x-gm-gg:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date :message-id:reply-to; bh=Sd+jn8OxzBqMCiodLdjuCiQn2jNeMVrmmbxD+3HhGec=; b=D8rNpRHKluixqtKKi73yafMl1vxEVJec5t16qkQnZ24d2t1p22ROVOVywskxCgN6zN u1bT7YhoLZUo6TglHckTMQ+aYVJ/edgMPDGUCmIYoZe5lpU51GOXJ85JuKKY19zTV1An I/EUOELYOv1ALHvF3BKXEb9UgbEaETisSt0imIn9L1Vr8/inxVc1xq6NCMkAm/k2G5p0 xd+z0i7kqlZs0eg69L2MrXP6O1UgzpFZ8cuc+KaZwDC5wcX1WU7JSvrUwJKHWZtWa076 qpV4OvdV/ZRbh7J5WHfZtNtfRLv1mP/P857a5We4JKWR6U7qnvMw4hqNRRIvJ5etyjU1 qVbQ== X-Forwarded-Encrypted: i=1; AHgh+Rrp4VAmMpMEYd7PmWllq+gM3m1fMYx/CmwqbBlP97zyODybvC6r3s3jzpOYgJVFBYvA8ejk+XU=@vger.kernel.org X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0YwnD+ujp1H3L+3LCfSMhZzBVJRHUB+DHE050lzu1MKkNm7CiOw3 EI0WTPXpBU/vx6tvbqo8RoQdGiPexbbco1NoTkAHWKmvs5bzSRwnCSbQ X-Gm-Gg: AfdE7cm/Y0qrcyTLu0AjMbQrFenz/Ls739eAYM9wG7yAarjAah2xToHRhEcD6jrWand 5gr+xvlIjua2aNcgDhGx+UZJYBRIERsAmTR3o6EvHglj8kdoQYJhDSoMd1Xelu/3HGiHrOTBGpY Fr5eN/Pw2WHL3pn9B00u129ePv9NC/Xup4IiKpujc35iwL1qzJChQyA9Hwq0pWq7pM05WQksXxw NqIW6uOwPpCvVyqg97qwHHWIgKXmemei1X1sDy6Py9bcBhpn3/xZB/oDSfbla+5XFHL0IU8Kp2S glMD/xuOMCZoN+UngmEotnBUq651IbwQAv1BOO1HDQNiA1FCFUW+L3ZXp0WA3LE/xe1m69ZppzI 1lUxYnqYMA+skN7RnaJn30vzDVHIWRjHAUkDl4OYSqttRLFCiMTNBk8EecZ4NHfnQc4il5lic3c 9WoEOJwrLRAzHJXbeMRo/em6oQOPmOVMAol0LA6G/+fWgDdlB275nP X-Received: by 2002:a05:600c:548d:b0:493:b8d9:f28b with SMTP id 5b1f17b1804b1-493e68c7f63mr20954575e9.23.1783507419780; Wed, 08 Jul 2026 03:43:39 -0700 (PDT) Received: from fedora ([2a02:586:e223:fc00:8acb:cd0c:11d0:f2d2]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 5b1f17b1804b1-493e0f50418sm117703385e9.11.2026.07.08.03.43.37 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 08 Jul 2026 03:43:39 -0700 (PDT) From: Panagiotis Petrakopoulos To: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: linux-staging@lists.linux.dev, Hans de Goede , Bastien Nocera , Larry Finger , Jes Sorensen , Manuel Ebner , Panagiotis Petrakopoulos , stable@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v2] staging: rtl8723bs: fix missing shared-key auth challenge length check Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2026 13:42:52 +0300 Message-ID: <20260708104252.144101-1-npetrakopoulos2003@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The WEP shared-key authentication handlers use the challenge-text element's length. This text and its length are attacker-controlled. The handlers do not check the length against the fixed 128-byte chg_txt buffer. In OnAuthClient() the length from rtw_get_ie() can be up to 255 bytes. It is used to perform memcpy() into the 128-byte pmlmeinfo->chg_txt. A malicious AP sending a malformed WLAN_EID_CHALLENGE element can overflow/underfill chg_txt by up to 127 bytes. This is reachable over the air, before association, during shared-key authentication. In the case of an overflow, the driver can write out of bounds. In the case of an underfill, the driver can echo stale buffer memory. In OnAuth() a similar issue is observed. The driver compares a full 128 bytes regardless of the element's length, reading past a shorter element. The challenge text is defined to be exactly 128 octets, which is already provided as the WLAN_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN define; require the element to be exactly that length in both handlers. Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Panagiotis Petrakopoulos Reviewed-by: Manuel Ebner --- v2: improved patch description for clarity. no code changes. testing: Compile-tested only; I do not have RTL8723BS hardware to test the shared-key authentication path at runtime. The change only rejects challenge elements whose length differs from the spec-mandated 128 bytes, so conforming peers are unaffected. drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c index a86d6f97cf02..13634d4e83d1 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c @@ -787,7 +787,7 @@ unsigned int OnAuth(struct adapter *padapter, union recv_frame *precv_frame) p = rtw_get_ie(pframe + WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN + 4 + _AUTH_IE_OFFSET_, WLAN_EID_CHALLENGE, (int *)&ie_len, len - WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN - _AUTH_IE_OFFSET_ - 4); - if (!p || ie_len <= 0) { + if (!p || ie_len != WLAN_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN) { status = WLAN_STATUS_CHALLENGE_FAIL; goto auth_fail; } @@ -873,7 +873,7 @@ unsigned int OnAuthClient(struct adapter *padapter, union recv_frame *precv_fram p = rtw_get_ie(pframe + WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN + _AUTH_IE_OFFSET_, WLAN_EID_CHALLENGE, (int *)&len, pkt_len - WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN - _AUTH_IE_OFFSET_); - if (!p) + if (!p || len != WLAN_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN) goto authclnt_fail; memcpy(pmlmeinfo->chg_txt, p + 2, len); -- 2.55.0