From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CBF3943B4B9 for ; Wed, 15 Jul 2026 10:12:23 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784110345; cv=none; b=gAwjIatIugygCLh4i5D+Owrz6LjVAmLcQs1xwDBa3WLnRGKy1LWenrAW28biZbE9ZhMkfBGcHZxgJDXFVm0RP0+hxTH+45nDHSIeR1Pl2glWA/TeDkLeRa/eLvUwllVj3dplxU2Am5rAU8LbJBsTh5/9E85GF+Q6Lk3NuXnABc8= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784110345; c=relaxed/simple; bh=MFS1j7p8U7tTHpf8TI1wTUsrrMOJaRTpkGKMp9y6KbI=; h=Subject:To:Cc:From:Date:Message-ID:MIME-Version:Content-Type; b=epJSkzac5amGNirSnh0qR7VMeNAU6PJ95I32sg0eGpM3lr5rfMy57stT0rb0Sc3M+gdYbqf0zTOkH2KspEcNb8yvgB48DwNqmWECSupsr1Z08j27p2+fqBsE34YDfN0bC0m2tFZV1h+yYHh9CeL6yTiMrrnPKxEge6eGCdLQAfc= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=SFKfWHl+; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="SFKfWHl+" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 3E1E31F000E9; Wed, 15 Jul 2026 10:12:23 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1784110343; bh=bx5GLTj1VqeP/F3RJxv1hvH7eJKAF/sGusPS0sEvXtQ=; h=Subject:To:Cc:From:Date; b=SFKfWHl+juXUZMDvYBmx5GXHJpmEwjYanYMTVo4fPbDucCzvh3+Orh/kXeZweOB8k Cyg3ubH4D2zrLUHGeZRANT8LbXicC3SJ8Us2AZ1KE3yJYdQ2EPn14sKPkyXhaywMWT xHk/xDXSNtRw3Es++BkBzyQ5MHKcZy5iHXpF4Xdk= Subject: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] nvmet-auth: validate reply message payload bounds against" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree To: flynnnchen@tencent.com,hare@kernel.org,kbusch@kernel.org Cc: From: Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 12:12:06 +0200 Message-ID: <2026071506-ankle-quartered-9eb2@gregkh> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ANSI_X3.4-1968 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to . To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 3a413ece2504c70aa34a20be4dafec04e8c741f9 # git commit -s git send-email --to '' --in-reply-to '2026071506-ankle-quartered-9eb2@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' 'HEAD^..' Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 3a413ece2504c70aa34a20be4dafec04e8c741f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tianchu Chen Date: Fri, 29 May 2026 14:18:39 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] nvmet-auth: validate reply message payload bounds against transfer length nvmet_auth_reply() accesses the variable-length rval[] array using attacker-controlled hl (hash length) and dhvlen (DH value length) fields without verifying they fit within the allocated buffer of tl bytes. A malicious NVMe-oF initiator can craft a DHCHAP_REPLY message with a small transfer length but large hl/dhvlen values, causing out-of-bounds heap reads when the target processes the DH public key (rval + 2*hl) or performs the host response memcmp. With DH authentication configured, the OOB pointer is passed directly to sg_init_one() and read by crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(), reaching up to 526 bytes past the buffer. This is exploitable pre-authentication. Add bounds validation ensuring sizeof(*data) + 2*hl + dhvlen <= tl before any access to the variable-length fields. Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine. Fixes: db1312dd9548 ("nvmet: implement basic In-Band Authentication") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke Signed-off-by: Tianchu Chen Signed-off-by: Keith Busch diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c b/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c index f1e613e7c63e..0a85acf1e5c7 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c @@ -132,13 +132,22 @@ static u8 nvmet_auth_negotiate(struct nvmet_req *req, void *d) return 0; } -static u8 nvmet_auth_reply(struct nvmet_req *req, void *d) +static u8 nvmet_auth_reply(struct nvmet_req *req, void *d, u32 tl) { struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl = req->sq->ctrl; struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_reply_data *data = d; - u16 dhvlen = le16_to_cpu(data->dhvlen); + u16 dhvlen; u8 *response; + if (tl < sizeof(*data)) + return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD; + + dhvlen = le16_to_cpu(data->dhvlen); + + /* Validate that hl and dhvlen fit within the transfer length */ + if (sizeof(*data) + 2 * (size_t)data->hl + dhvlen > tl) + return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD; + pr_debug("%s: ctrl %d qid %d: data hl %d cvalid %d dhvlen %u\n", __func__, ctrl->cntlid, req->sq->qid, data->hl, data->cvalid, dhvlen); @@ -338,7 +347,7 @@ void nvmet_execute_auth_send(struct nvmet_req *req) switch (data->auth_id) { case NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_REPLY: - dhchap_status = nvmet_auth_reply(req, d); + dhchap_status = nvmet_auth_reply(req, d, tl); if (dhchap_status == 0) req->sq->dhchap_step = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_SUCCESS1;