FAILED: patch "[PATCH] audit: fix potential integer overflow in audit_log_n_hex()" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

[<gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>]

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.

To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:

git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 65dfde57d1e29ce2b76fc23dd565eccd5c0bc0f0
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable@vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2026071526-proposal-crusher-04da@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' 'HEAD^..'

Possible dependencies:



thanks,

greg k-h

------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------

From 65dfde57d1e29ce2b76fc23dd565eccd5c0bc0f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ricardo Robaina <rrobaina@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2026 11:04:11 -0300
Subject: [PATCH] audit: fix potential integer overflow in audit_log_n_hex()

The function calculates new_len as len << 1 for hex encoding. This
has two overflow risks: the shift itself can overflow when len is
large, and the result can be truncated when assigned to new_len
(declared as int) from the size_t calculation.

Fix by using check_shl_overflow() to catch shift overflow and
changing new_len and loop counter i to size_t to prevent truncation.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 168b7173959f ("AUDIT: Clean up logging of untrusted strings")
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Robaina <rrobaina@redhat.com>
[PM: remove vertical whitspace noise]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index feaa4e2271d7..562476937fa7 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
 #include <net/ip.h>
 #include <net/ipv6.h>
 #include <linux/sctp.h>
+#include <linux/overflow.h>
 
 #include "audit.h"
 
@@ -2080,7 +2081,8 @@ void audit_log_format(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt, ...)
 void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf,
 		size_t len)
 {
-	int i, avail, new_len;
+	int avail;
+	size_t i, new_len;
 	unsigned char *ptr;
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 
@@ -2090,7 +2092,12 @@ void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf,
 	BUG_ON(!ab->skb);
 	skb = ab->skb;
 	avail = skb_tailroom(skb);
-	new_len = len<<1;
+
+	if (check_shl_overflow(len, 1, &new_len)) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, "?");
+		return;
+	}
+
 	if (new_len >= avail) {
 		/* Round the buffer request up to the next multiple */
 		new_len = AUDIT_BUFSIZ*(((new_len-avail)/AUDIT_BUFSIZ) + 1);