From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B038E41CB25 for ; Mon, 20 Jul 2026 14:18:11 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784557092; cv=none; b=fea4b9IjKVfq03UFT/duZpGznD+7TxFPzHHOOxmXN4n341OcG0h1Jq1znHTegq8sVA2bI/c1STMlXEgofQ3JWPNd35Vo8Z+P4gt6dQWVlECi6u/3mM4w+7f1qQ2rqvBc4zckIGH+ESQaINiBnmyWh5j9hAh2/XYyO41ni6kpD8Q= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784557092; c=relaxed/simple; bh=XL4p+KArZZ6S46q2byC2GEJfFFG38xdgDEi/o2TE01k=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=b8xPIWiNOwlonATnj7JpgvB2xj+hO2vLYAB947yD5IMAB8pY1NM2MDHlfL5OPxVVM6lS9Fj05QPHDoHDTUGkaZ6qPFKYmadXOZuoREPSK4eRVDs34oF7+eS4ppvZiTC3LeTuo/PpKuQ3+Pc3GhRPhq103AVZtusLhTbxYxKl7OI= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=F7PLWQoG; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="F7PLWQoG" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B8C211F000E9; Mon, 20 Jul 2026 14:18:10 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1784557091; bh=J9lT6x47j9571nSNWjQDfEcPY17tWCLtUD6LxMsuBts=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=F7PLWQoGwaafNZFB4oH2j8WPUca2KVVzMYgTqc+vz1PosbBvIFYLPad3xpsxbYj7c e4T0iRkcv12ORdx7ZXSYIVbKEUAUVPrTeUsaZ32pIPFwhvztxUd6zCTh3FOwF6gM8X ZVR1C+lPng3Hiq+Tc6bdka6r4nyuubm4bBVJn2IACynLTShKMH2/1pionsOGpYWsS9 L6FGp0sR6XdF9jwbJTn4S1ypEmceNsicYoxlmjvIZavpBW0V0RbPBm+l9ebDE0huA6 SMZAczzcqQyjl/PgOxjg75tqdra89G0ZdnrXjqd8tdJFchQUFmJH6Ylc5GAqQ9JtTQ UOYU7c3Kdidbw== From: Sasha Levin To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Tianchu Chen , Hannes Reinecke , Keith Busch , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.1.y 3/3] nvmet-auth: validate reply message payload bounds against transfer length Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2026 10:18:06 -0400 Message-ID: <20260720141806.1621638-3-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.53.0 In-Reply-To: <20260720141806.1621638-1-sashal@kernel.org> References: <2026071506-uncounted-retaliate-5437@gregkh> <20260720141806.1621638-1-sashal@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Tianchu Chen [ Upstream commit 3a413ece2504c70aa34a20be4dafec04e8c741f9 ] nvmet_auth_reply() accesses the variable-length rval[] array using attacker-controlled hl (hash length) and dhvlen (DH value length) fields without verifying they fit within the allocated buffer of tl bytes. A malicious NVMe-oF initiator can craft a DHCHAP_REPLY message with a small transfer length but large hl/dhvlen values, causing out-of-bounds heap reads when the target processes the DH public key (rval + 2*hl) or performs the host response memcmp. With DH authentication configured, the OOB pointer is passed directly to sg_init_one() and read by crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(), reaching up to 526 bytes past the buffer. This is exploitable pre-authentication. Add bounds validation ensuring sizeof(*data) + 2*hl + dhvlen <= tl before any access to the variable-length fields. Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine. Fixes: db1312dd9548 ("nvmet: implement basic In-Band Authentication") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke Signed-off-by: Tianchu Chen Signed-off-by: Keith Busch Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c b/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c index a5da361547f02d..ec3071f4f9f350 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c @@ -109,13 +109,22 @@ static u8 nvmet_auth_negotiate(struct nvmet_req *req, void *d) return 0; } -static u8 nvmet_auth_reply(struct nvmet_req *req, void *d) +static u8 nvmet_auth_reply(struct nvmet_req *req, void *d, u32 tl) { struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl = req->sq->ctrl; struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_reply_data *data = d; - u16 dhvlen = le16_to_cpu(data->dhvlen); + u16 dhvlen; u8 *response; + if (tl < sizeof(*data)) + return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD; + + dhvlen = le16_to_cpu(data->dhvlen); + + /* Validate that hl and dhvlen fit within the transfer length */ + if (sizeof(*data) + 2 * (size_t)data->hl + dhvlen > tl) + return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD; + pr_debug("%s: ctrl %d qid %d: data hl %d cvalid %d dhvlen %u\n", __func__, ctrl->cntlid, req->sq->qid, data->hl, data->cvalid, dhvlen); @@ -287,7 +296,7 @@ void nvmet_execute_auth_send(struct nvmet_req *req) switch (data->auth_id) { case NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_REPLY: - dhchap_status = nvmet_auth_reply(req, d); + dhchap_status = nvmet_auth_reply(req, d, tl); if (dhchap_status == 0) req->sq->dhchap_step = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_SUCCESS1; -- 2.53.0