From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0C31F3403F7 for ; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 11:47:06 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784634428; cv=none; b=kev+Rna8sbnRIys9Z+cu+BGxWsQZLDv7PFU7fShK5JMN7e9Rphf69r0WvyXm4JTIP64AOmkq58/kpX3AzG1HKrYVaxTzacwAhsGHiAdKIR/dVxJWOcUf3HkJrgdqN8oUyeqkyDaBw/hMpNCIA/FHY599evw7WSM8YP049/teujQ= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784634428; c=relaxed/simple; bh=5DTmFwU1zmGwmurXWBfNr6x7VAHB4MOhHuIqX6lDvPU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=E3hu7+5Ifb6dlmN/7qKKVrQURlVkLpzEg0dau6v3CSwD9n1oE75XAsO0aRr+neIiiPvJelZGkJM/8BCQyBX1cagwD+i18MXaWYqCSD4AQVXegK6BzbUjqu8QIs6CejLcztHnlB3sXHX4/VJR/OHvm9tqyp7KkewQ0NSOru9BnC4= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=mCQ9EqTb; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="mCQ9EqTb" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id F167B1F00A3E; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 11:47:05 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1784634426; bh=XbjMLMJbWuyFCvNFvXXqQbH4dA/xwOEXYnTkkQ8YbpE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=mCQ9EqTb2e7J+L6tw9JDErCA3Ej8NNPWJkOdAX6S2hWPjvuM6NK0sZdzIRBo9rU3a +kkAkLcQEqho41Jde/HpC7OwnwuLiUllsbCIks3xVcGs6SrcPP2RFJYXlYly16aU83 5CdPHfh/RDGDhesxtBgOAm+u8jQQR/ytz88ojlLYMkoy4Gv9UsdnRsowykfI3wLkgb Zt79bLCuYa9Up37az7mslY6gotbP+9SN9Ig8hR8pSbqSrfAQI3eoJcwofAWOBs8sqP VGpw/MSUCRM2tazuKfvN7IsuLz3RdzDGkyVUgRcZjFwV4m7LL/0i4bFvyYXDotY9oE wwv1b7oto23Hg== From: Sasha Levin To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ricardo Robaina , Richard Guy Briggs , Paul Moore , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 5.15.y 2/2] audit: fix potential integer overflow in audit_log_n_hex() Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2026 07:47:03 -0400 Message-ID: <20260721114703.3688208-2-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.53.0 In-Reply-To: <20260721114703.3688208-1-sashal@kernel.org> References: <2026071526-subarctic-bloating-472e@gregkh> <20260721114703.3688208-1-sashal@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Ricardo Robaina [ Upstream commit 65dfde57d1e29ce2b76fc23dd565eccd5c0bc0f0 ] The function calculates new_len as len << 1 for hex encoding. This has two overflow risks: the shift itself can overflow when len is large, and the result can be truncated when assigned to new_len (declared as int) from the size_t calculation. Fix by using check_shl_overflow() to catch shift overflow and changing new_len and loop counter i to size_t to prevent truncation. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 168b7173959f ("AUDIT: Clean up logging of untrusted strings") Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs Signed-off-by: Ricardo Robaina [PM: remove vertical whitspace noise] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- kernel/audit.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 6cd9421a5610fd..d1e18676ffa1a2 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "audit.h" @@ -2037,7 +2038,8 @@ void audit_log_format(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt, ...) void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) { - int i, avail, new_len; + int avail; + size_t i, new_len; unsigned char *ptr; struct sk_buff *skb; @@ -2047,7 +2049,12 @@ void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf, BUG_ON(!ab->skb); skb = ab->skb; avail = skb_tailroom(skb); - new_len = len<<1; + + if (check_shl_overflow(len, 1, &new_len)) { + audit_log_format(ab, "?"); + return; + } + if (new_len >= avail) { /* Round the buffer request up to the next multiple */ new_len = AUDIT_BUFSIZ*(((new_len-avail)/AUDIT_BUFSIZ) + 1); -- 2.53.0