From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 55A7940B396 for ; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 11:56:45 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784635006; cv=none; b=WnV6pAA/G7VWwRHgfq44t/IddYQJduqhBG357j3IEu/tXiCWkribof7A0OVrPPSJR73gU78EgqFYF1YYBvTswwrn36zJuyXO9UXVe7nT5xc7LPUqyXve6xbe1IwuMp7bRMmUtVrlEprPSXycvo9VT1b5yNPDWhJL/lGzkJrVMgs= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784635006; c=relaxed/simple; bh=6A/oEKLYnKPpZA0jI/W65o6JxdDIoxuwaBwvvna/E+c=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=sPwF9eSnamysSYWYsn1w5nLt461wrHqOnhFeiF+9gMumslwkAiciqQV/gV4w2RklXJNxxmh9TrOEdiQRKf+R1ZW/tdz2BIwEBd5sr7DuFTrgASB3cg/9MPiRr9lnqt+4rA8U+ZuHoqKIVLZp1Bb8XZzAuyWHfHy6mYDlZezEw0o= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=m3YWPa+x; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="m3YWPa+x" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 863971F00A3D; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 11:56:44 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1784635005; bh=D7awcoz+w7Wx1Dk6mImW/KEzUUl+FT3DDM0YNT1nXn4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=m3YWPa+xgtHtcwXLHUP6WSTmU32A0x/BlkLVCMPOUPzDOEoyIT8bGU5XRv1t4duyL BM6B9lYLH7j3qu7DemH+bk8j/3IpoezEdh7wkJkihs8f3XnA5VVa31hMPTnLik8YAx h0eXHnkSWHEj8L82zUfOq8g1Hvc4E/ULCCujP0zBHvsjx+XJzGGd5yMM414HOwNxji VyStIB/IZRxMKNQF9ROR217SHAonGCQq9QaM/HhYp5eIN7ettFPr3knzyehsQ/h0Z1 zw5L5Vb5u/yG5XUonUCHBcNVbxSSsYfAK/zlDpKfBE1A3OO7Mvljjke6ZGuoT3bM1J CXaC9FAa+++wQ== From: Sasha Levin To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ricardo Robaina , Richard Guy Briggs , Paul Moore , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 5.10.y 2/2] audit: fix potential integer overflow in audit_log_n_hex() Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2026 07:56:42 -0400 Message-ID: <20260721115642.3699441-2-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.53.0 In-Reply-To: <20260721115642.3699441-1-sashal@kernel.org> References: <2026071527-delusion-yarn-0b07@gregkh> <20260721115642.3699441-1-sashal@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Ricardo Robaina [ Upstream commit 65dfde57d1e29ce2b76fc23dd565eccd5c0bc0f0 ] The function calculates new_len as len << 1 for hex encoding. This has two overflow risks: the shift itself can overflow when len is large, and the result can be truncated when assigned to new_len (declared as int) from the size_t calculation. Fix by using check_shl_overflow() to catch shift overflow and changing new_len and loop counter i to size_t to prevent truncation. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 168b7173959f ("AUDIT: Clean up logging of untrusted strings") Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs Signed-off-by: Ricardo Robaina [PM: remove vertical whitspace noise] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- kernel/audit.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 2d38092a30322a..b8014cfe276cf0 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "audit.h" @@ -2034,7 +2035,8 @@ void audit_log_format(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt, ...) void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) { - int i, avail, new_len; + int avail; + size_t i, new_len; unsigned char *ptr; struct sk_buff *skb; @@ -2044,7 +2046,12 @@ void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf, BUG_ON(!ab->skb); skb = ab->skb; avail = skb_tailroom(skb); - new_len = len<<1; + + if (check_shl_overflow(len, 1, &new_len)) { + audit_log_format(ab, "?"); + return; + } + if (new_len >= avail) { /* Round the buffer request up to the next multiple */ new_len = AUDIT_BUFSIZ*(((new_len-avail)/AUDIT_BUFSIZ) + 1); -- 2.53.0