From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9A2313F2101; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 18:48:53 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784659734; cv=none; b=PKF/LfE8qU9I6vmbKTbaO4OjpbN+WT2Qh9zNfGXxIlmApRwlhB3cZd57vodHKsKaZ51g/rX4kByKRD3mxhHzgULxNIGBZvUP5j/Gs9H071ebAPpO8S49c4AxZFnBJbZYa6cOs9s9UHCBHg2DYVsI6k2yEuBZEOATjCPg3biqEGM= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784659734; c=relaxed/simple; bh=BFkQK+OvquuesXy7RDETrsWU1MXafFmntJgzM+USSuA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=OPerX8K5xnlZviQZT4ljXbYclRuV8vvJVTXCi06CgyZeYbWEI8hPGwLmkNP0/x2L8c96Zvvu8GFbpVNMvjSaImNGslT6iRVz//oRidlzUO4f9rbq0rBou7b+3APk1aJeelatyhB4xdRTUzS/FTAoFsF+Kd0swbNC++W34AQtzGg= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=0PlaJvEx; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="0PlaJvEx" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C14AC1F000E9; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 18:48:52 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1784659733; bh=ZCz0yQUjAmK+rOwQbW3vAgJx4TYs/TMfRc2/V1dArQQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=0PlaJvExOGl+byFlsiqqZhaQHsenwCCP19C8Y9j4muH/tHyLVOqmEKpxgYKYewibU BcINkBvJR3fYTwuymfwYcw9CPQkfxhY1gg7m1qQF8+kaBxuCUb6C40O14cZJxKZ36V RrrJZHAIf5sc8ca9rHb5FOHPNQVV7oIIAeiVuW7Q= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, sashiko , Xin Long , Jakub Kicinski , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 7.1 0713/2077] sctp: validate embedded address parameter length Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2026 17:06:26 +0200 Message-ID: <20260721152609.615848045@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260721152552.646164743@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260721152552.646164743@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Xin Long [ Upstream commit e9361d0ca55c4af12aac09e2572852fa91046229 ] sctp_verify_asconf() and sctp_verify_param() only validate ADD_IP, DEL_IP, and SET_PRIMARY parameters against a fixed minimum size of sizeof(struct sctp_addip_param) + sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr). This ensures the outer parameter is large enough to contain an embedded address parameter header, but does not verify that the embedded address parameter's declared length fits within the bounds of the outer parameter. Later, sctp_process_param() and sctp_process_asconf_param() extract the embedded address parameter and pass it to af->from_addr_param(), which uses the address parameter length to parse the variable-length address payload. A malformed peer can therefore advertise an embedded address parameter length that exceeds the remaining bytes in the enclosing parameter. Validate that addr_param->p.length does not exceed the space available after the sctp_addip_param header before processing the embedded address parameter. Reject malformed parameters when the embedded address length extends beyond the enclosing parameter bounds. This prevents out-of-bounds reads when parsing malformed parameters carried in INIT or ASCONF processing paths. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: sashiko Signed-off-by: Xin Long Link: https://patch.msgid.link/7838b86b69f52add28808fb59034c8f992e97b2d.1781043268.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c index 1741a9f33d8c71..41958b8e59fd53 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c @@ -2641,6 +2641,9 @@ static int sctp_process_param(struct sctp_association *asoc, goto fall_through; addr_param = param.v + sizeof(struct sctp_addip_param); + if (ntohs(addr_param->p.length) > + ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(struct sctp_addip_param)) + break; af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(addr_param->p.type)); if (!af) @@ -3039,13 +3042,16 @@ static __be16 sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc, union sctp_addr addr; struct sctp_af *af; - addr_param = (void *)asconf_param + sizeof(*asconf_param); - if (asconf_param->param_hdr.type != SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP && asconf_param->param_hdr.type != SCTP_PARAM_DEL_IP && asconf_param->param_hdr.type != SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY) return SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PARAM; + addr_param = (void *)asconf_param + sizeof(*asconf_param); + if (ntohs(addr_param->p.length) > + ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length) - sizeof(*asconf_param)) + return SCTP_ERROR_PROTO_VIOLATION; + switch (addr_param->p.type) { case SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS: if (!asoc->peer.ipv6_address) -- 2.53.0