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From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>, Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 6.18.y 1/3] cred: add kernel_cred() helper
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2026 16:59:56 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260727205958.1929027-1-sashal@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2026072016-oppressed-overstuff-75e8@gregkh>

From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 4c7ceeb62d3330b6fb2b549ae833a92c0f481f3e ]

Access kernel creds based off of init_task. This will let us avoid any
direct access to init_cred.

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251103-work-creds-init_cred-v1-2-cb3ec8711a6a@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 981ccd97f715 ("dm: avoid leaking the caller's thread keyring via the table device file")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 include/linux/cred.h | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index 89ae50ad2acea9..8ab3718184adf8 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@
 struct cred;
 struct inode;
 
+extern struct task_struct init_task;
+
 /*
  * COW Supplementary groups list
  */
@@ -156,6 +158,11 @@ extern struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void);
 extern int commit_creds(struct cred *);
 extern void abort_creds(struct cred *);
 extern struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *);
+static inline const struct cred *kernel_cred(void)
+{
+	/* shut up sparse */
+	return rcu_dereference_raw(init_task.cred);
+}
 extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, u32);
 extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *);
 extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
-- 
2.53.0


  reply	other threads:[~2026-07-27 21:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-07-20 15:30 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] dm: avoid leaking the caller's thread keyring via the table" failed to apply to 6.18-stable tree gregkh
2026-07-27 20:59 ` Sasha Levin [this message]
2026-07-27 20:59   ` [PATCH 6.18.y 2/3] cred: add scoped_with_kernel_creds() Sasha Levin
2026-07-27 20:59   ` [PATCH 6.18.y 3/3] dm: avoid leaking the caller's thread keyring via the table device file Sasha Levin

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