From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98@gmail.com>,
Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>,
Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>,
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 5.10.y] libceph: fix two unsafe bare decodes in decode_lockers()
Date: Sat, 8 Aug 2026 08:05:45 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260808120545.220270-1-sashal@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2026072949-fresh-evolution-3660@gregkh>
From: Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit a109a556115271ca7896dcda7b4b7e45e156c227 ]
decode_lockers() in cls_lock_client.c contains two bare decode operations
that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger slab-out-of-bounds
reads:
1. ceph_decode_32(p) at the num_lockers field has no preceding bounds
check. ceph_start_decoding() accepts struct_len=0 as valid -- the
internal ceph_decode_need(p, end, 0, bad) always passes -- so when an
OSD sends struct_len=0, ceph_start_decoding() returns success with
p == end. The immediately following bare ceph_decode_32(p) then reads
4 bytes past the validated buffer boundary. The garbage value is
passed directly to kzalloc_objs() as the locker count.
The sibling function decode_watchers() in osd_client.c already uses
ceph_decode_32_safe() after its own ceph_start_decoding() call.
decode_lockers() was the only site using the bare variant.
2. ceph_decode_8(p) after the decode_locker() loop has no preceding
bounds check. If an OSD crafts num_lockers such that the loop
advances p exactly to end, the subsequent bare ceph_decode_8(p) reads
one byte past the validated buffer boundary. The result is passed
directly into *type, which is used as a lock type discriminator by
callers, giving an OSD-controlled one-byte OOB read with direct
influence over the lock type field.
Fix both by replacing bare operations with their safe variants:
ceph_decode_32(p) -> ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, *num_lockers,
err_inval)
ceph_decode_8(p) -> ceph_decode_8_safe(p, end, *type,
err_free_lockers)
The goto targets differ intentionally:
err_inval: is a new label returning -EINVAL directly. It is used for
the pre-allocation failure path where *lockers is not yet allocated
and must not be passed to ceph_free_lockers().
err_free_lockers: is the existing label. It is used for the
post-allocation failure path where *lockers is allocated and must
be freed.
ret is set to -EINVAL before ceph_decode_8_safe() so that
err_free_lockers returns the correct error code on bounds violation.
Without this, err_free_lockers would return a stale ret value (0 from
the successful decode_locker() loop), silently swallowing the error.
-EINVAL is correct for both failure paths. The data received from the
OSD is structurally malformed. -ENOMEM would misrepresent the failure
class to callers and to stable@ backporters triaging error paths.
Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph
deployment can trigger this against any kernel client that issues the
lock.get_info class method (e.g. during RBD exclusive lock acquisition).
[ idryomov: trim changelog, formatting ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d4ed4a530562 ("libceph: support for lock.lock_info")
Signed-off-by: Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c | 8 ++++++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c
index 17447c19d9376..fd39cbda60f65 100644
--- a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c
+++ b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ static int decode_lockers(void **p, void *end, u8 *type, char **tag,
if (ret)
return ret;
- *num_lockers = ceph_decode_32(p);
+ ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, *num_lockers, err_inval);
*lockers = kcalloc(*num_lockers, sizeof(**lockers), GFP_NOIO);
if (!*lockers)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -304,7 +304,8 @@ static int decode_lockers(void **p, void *end, u8 *type, char **tag,
goto err_free_lockers;
}
- *type = ceph_decode_8(p);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ ceph_decode_8_safe(p, end, *type, err_free_lockers);
s = ceph_extract_encoded_string(p, end, NULL, GFP_NOIO);
if (IS_ERR(s)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(s);
@@ -314,6 +315,9 @@ static int decode_lockers(void **p, void *end, u8 *type, char **tag,
*tag = s;
return 0;
+err_inval:
+ return -EINVAL;
+
err_free_lockers:
ceph_free_lockers(*lockers, *num_lockers);
return ret;
--
2.53.0
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-08 12:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-29 13:47 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] libceph: fix two unsafe bare decodes in decode_lockers()" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree gregkh
2026-08-08 12:05 ` Sasha Levin [this message]
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