From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Haofeng Li <lihaofeng@kylinos.cn>,
ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong@kylinos.cn>,
Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>,
Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>,
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 6.1.y 2/3] ksmbd: validate num_subauth when copying ACE in set_ntacl_dacl
Date: Sat, 8 Aug 2026 13:14:23 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260808171424.498621-2-sashal@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260808171424.498621-1-sashal@kernel.org>
From: Haofeng Li <lihaofeng@kylinos.cn>
[ Upstream commit 47f0b34f6bc98ed85bfdc293e8f3e432ec24958d ]
set_ntacl_dacl() copies each ACE from the attacker-controlled stored
security descriptor verbatim into the response DACL without checking
sid.num_subauth. The ACE bytes (including an unchecked num_subauth)
originate from an authenticated SMB2_SET_INFO(SecInfo=DACL) that is
stored raw via ksmbd_vfs_set_sd_xattr(); parse_dacl() rejects a bad ACE
with `break` rather than an error, so parse_sec_desc() still returns
success and the malformed SD reaches the xattr intact.
On a subsequent SMB2_QUERY_INFO(SecInfo=DACL) for an inode carrying a
POSIX access ACL, build_sec_desc() -> set_ntacl_dacl() ->
set_posix_acl_entries_dacl() walks the copied ACEs and reads
ntace->sid.sub_auth[ntace->sid.num_subauth - 1]
with num_subauth taken straight from the stored SD. Since sub_auth[]
is fixed at SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES (15), a crafted num_subauth (e.g.
255) drives an out-of-bounds heap read of ~1 KB with an offset fully
controlled by an authenticated client.
The sibling functions already gate this field:
parse_dacl() -- num_subauth == 0 || > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES
parse_sid() -- num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES
smb_copy_sid() -- min_t(u8, num_subauth, SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES)
set_ntacl_dacl() is the lone inconsistent path that omits the check.
Add the same num_subauth validation in set_ntacl_dacl() before copying
the ACE, matching the gate already enforced by parse_dacl().
Signed-off-by: Haofeng Li <lihaofeng@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong@kylinos.cn>
Suggested-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Stable-dep-of: bbf0a8e93120 ("ksmbd: restore DACL size on check_add_overflow() to avoid malformed ACL")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/smb/server/smbacl.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c b/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c
index 3a250ddb1a2a9..45c9b980418e8 100644
--- a/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c
@@ -740,12 +740,18 @@ static void set_ntacl_dacl(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
if (nt_ace_size > aces_size)
break;
+ if (ntace->sid.num_subauth == 0 ||
+ ntace->sid.num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES)
+ goto next_ace;
+
memcpy((char *)pndace + size, ntace, nt_ace_size);
if (check_add_overflow(size, nt_ace_size, &size))
break;
+ num_aces++;
+
+next_ace:
aces_size -= nt_ace_size;
ntace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)ntace + nt_ace_size);
- num_aces++;
}
}
--
2.53.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-08 17:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-29 13:55 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ksmbd: restore DACL size on check_add_overflow() to avoid" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree gregkh
2026-08-08 17:14 ` [PATCH 6.1.y 1/3] ksmbd: fix SID memory leak in set_posix_acl_entries_dacl() on overflow Sasha Levin
2026-08-08 17:14 ` Sasha Levin [this message]
2026-08-08 17:14 ` [PATCH 6.1.y 3/3] ksmbd: restore DACL size on check_add_overflow() to avoid malformed ACL Sasha Levin
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20260808171424.498621-2-sashal@kernel.org \
--to=sashal@kernel.org \
--cc=chenxiaosong@kylinos.cn \
--cc=lihaofeng@kylinos.cn \
--cc=linkinjeon@kernel.org \
--cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=stfrench@microsoft.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox