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From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Haofeng Li <lihaofeng@kylinos.cn>,
	ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong@kylinos.cn>,
	Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>,
	Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>,
	Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 6.1.y 2/3] ksmbd: validate num_subauth when copying ACE in set_ntacl_dacl
Date: Sat,  8 Aug 2026 13:14:23 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260808171424.498621-2-sashal@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260808171424.498621-1-sashal@kernel.org>

From: Haofeng Li <lihaofeng@kylinos.cn>

[ Upstream commit 47f0b34f6bc98ed85bfdc293e8f3e432ec24958d ]

set_ntacl_dacl() copies each ACE from the attacker-controlled stored
security descriptor verbatim into the response DACL without checking
sid.num_subauth. The ACE bytes (including an unchecked num_subauth)
originate from an authenticated SMB2_SET_INFO(SecInfo=DACL) that is
stored raw via ksmbd_vfs_set_sd_xattr(); parse_dacl() rejects a bad ACE
with `break` rather than an error, so parse_sec_desc() still returns
success and the malformed SD reaches the xattr intact.

On a subsequent SMB2_QUERY_INFO(SecInfo=DACL) for an inode carrying a
POSIX access ACL, build_sec_desc() -> set_ntacl_dacl() ->
set_posix_acl_entries_dacl() walks the copied ACEs and reads

    ntace->sid.sub_auth[ntace->sid.num_subauth - 1]

with num_subauth taken straight from the stored SD. Since sub_auth[]
is fixed at SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES (15), a crafted num_subauth (e.g.
255) drives an out-of-bounds heap read of ~1 KB with an offset fully
controlled by an authenticated client.

The sibling functions already gate this field:
  parse_dacl()    -- num_subauth == 0 || > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES
  parse_sid()     -- num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES
  smb_copy_sid()  -- min_t(u8, num_subauth, SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES)
set_ntacl_dacl() is the lone inconsistent path that omits the check.

Add the same num_subauth validation in set_ntacl_dacl() before copying
the ACE, matching the gate already enforced by parse_dacl().

Signed-off-by: Haofeng Li <lihaofeng@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong@kylinos.cn>
Suggested-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Stable-dep-of: bbf0a8e93120 ("ksmbd: restore DACL size on check_add_overflow() to avoid malformed ACL")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/smb/server/smbacl.c | 8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c b/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c
index 3a250ddb1a2a9..45c9b980418e8 100644
--- a/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c
@@ -740,12 +740,18 @@ static void set_ntacl_dacl(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
 			if (nt_ace_size > aces_size)
 				break;
 
+			if (ntace->sid.num_subauth == 0 ||
+			    ntace->sid.num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES)
+				goto next_ace;
+
 			memcpy((char *)pndace + size, ntace, nt_ace_size);
 			if (check_add_overflow(size, nt_ace_size, &size))
 				break;
+			num_aces++;
+
+next_ace:
 			aces_size -= nt_ace_size;
 			ntace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)ntace + nt_ace_size);
-			num_aces++;
 		}
 	}
 
-- 
2.53.0


  reply	other threads:[~2026-08-08 17:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-07-29 13:55 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ksmbd: restore DACL size on check_add_overflow() to avoid" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree gregkh
2026-08-08 17:14 ` [PATCH 6.1.y 1/3] ksmbd: fix SID memory leak in set_posix_acl_entries_dacl() on overflow Sasha Levin
2026-08-08 17:14   ` Sasha Levin [this message]
2026-08-08 17:14   ` [PATCH 6.1.y 3/3] ksmbd: restore DACL size on check_add_overflow() to avoid malformed ACL Sasha Levin

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