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From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: yaokai34@huawei.com,peterz@infradead.org,tglx@kernel.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] futex: Fix race in futex_pivot_pending() during private hash" failed to apply to 7.1-stable tree
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2026 09:52:52 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026081352-debate-broadband-ab5e@gregkh> (raw)


The patch below does not apply to the 7.1-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.

To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:

git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-7.1.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 8e7ff730dd96519a333d1570edf1c3fabb6d3629
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable@vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2026081352-debate-broadband-ab5e@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 7.1.y' 'HEAD^..'

Possible dependencies:



thanks,

greg k-h

------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------

From 8e7ff730dd96519a333d1570edf1c3fabb6d3629 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yao Kai <yaokai34@huawei.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2026 20:55:30 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] futex: Fix race in futex_pivot_pending() during private hash
 resize

A task performing a custom private hash resize can remain blocked in
uninterruptible sleep indefinitely.  The hung-task detector reports:

  INFO: task futex-resizer:314 blocked for more than 10 seconds.
  task:futex-resizer state:D stack:14824 pid:314 tgid:312 ppid:311

  Call Trace:
   __schedule+0x521/0xf30
   schedule+0x22/0xa0
   futex_hash_allocate+0x3db/0x490
   __do_sys_prctl+0x6f5/0xbd0
   do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x530
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

  Kernel panic - not syncing: hung_task: blocked tasks

futex_pivot_pending() allows the resize request to continue when
either no replacement hash is pending (hash_new == NULL) or the current
hash reference count has reached zero.

After the final-reference wake, another futex task can complete the
pivot between the two observations:

  T1                                  T2

  futex_hash_allocate()
    wait_var_event(mm, ...)
      futex_pivot_pending(mm)
        hash_new != NULL
                                      futex_hash()
                                        futex_ref_get(old) -> false
                                        futex_pivot_hash(mm)
                                          hash_new = NULL
                                          __futex_pivot_hash(mm, new)
                                            rcu_assign_pointer(hash, new)
        fph = rcu_dereference(hash) /* new */
        futex_ref_is_dead(fph) -> false
      schedule()

The pivot changes the state from hash_new != NULL with a dead current
hash to hash_new == NULL with a live current hash.  Because
futex_pivot_pending() reads hash_new and hash without serialization,
the resize task can observe hash_new in the pre-pivot state and hash in
the post-pivot state, causing futex_pivot_pending() to return false even
though the pivot has completed.  The task then goes to sleep after the
wakeup has already been consumed.

Serialize state reads in futex_pivot_pending() using futex_mm_phash::lock.
This guarantees that futex_pivot_pending() observes hash_new and hash
atomically, eliminating the race condition.

Fixes: bd54df5ea7ca ("futex: Allow to resize the private local hash")
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Yao Kai <yaokai34@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260804125530.3933754-1-yaokai34@huawei.com

diff --git a/kernel/futex/core.c b/kernel/futex/core.c
index 2650d1e52803..128c5752f225 100644
--- a/kernel/futex/core.c
+++ b/kernel/futex/core.c
@@ -1783,14 +1783,15 @@ void futex_hash_free(struct mm_struct *mm)
 
 static bool futex_pivot_pending(struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
+	struct futex_mm_phash *mmph = &mm->futex.phash;
 	struct futex_private_hash *fph;
 
-	guard(rcu)();
+	guard(mutex)(&mmph->lock);
 
-	if (!mm->futex.phash.hash_new)
+	if (!mmph->hash_new)
 		return true;
 
-	fph = rcu_dereference(mm->futex.phash.hash);
+	fph = rcu_dereference_raw(mmph->hash);
 	return futex_ref_is_dead(fph);
 }
 


             reply	other threads:[~2026-08-13  0:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-13  0:52 gregkh [this message]
2026-08-14 12:10 ` FAILED: patch "[PATCH] futex: Fix race in futex_pivot_pending() during private hash" failed to apply to 7.1-stable tree Thomas Gleixner

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