From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Jérémy Jean" <Jeremy.Jean@oss.cyber.gouv.fr>,
"Jakub Kicinski" <kuba@kernel.org>,
"Sasha Levin" <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 6.12.y 2/2] tls: rx: restore msg_iter before TLS 1.3 optimistic retry
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2026 07:39:44 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260819113944.3620902-2-sashal@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260819113944.3620902-1-sashal@kernel.org>
From: Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean@oss.cyber.gouv.fr>
[ Upstream commit 1c8629651cb54f7b51db8fc0b1a9944e4a4b0f5e ]
tls_decrypt_sg() advances msg->msg_iter when it maps user pages for
the optimistic TLS 1.3 zero-copy path. If the decrypted record turns
out not to be unpadded application data, tls_decrypt_sw() retries into
a kernel skb, but leaves the iterator advanced.
The subsequent copy from the skb then writes decrypted bytes again at
a later point in the caller iovecs while recvmsg() reports only the
post-retry length. A TLS peer can trigger this after the receiver
enables TLS_RX_EXPECT_NO_PAD.
Revert the iterator by the number of bytes consumed by the optimistic
mapping before retrying without zero-copy.
Add a selftest which sends a TLS 1.3 control record with
TLS_RX_EXPECT_NO_PAD enabled and verifies that recvmsg() does not
overwrite later iovecs beyond the returned length.
Fixes: ce61327ce989 ("tls: rx: support optimistic decrypt to user buffer with TLS 1.3")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean@oss.cyber.gouv.fr>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260804125528.2139928-1-Jeremy.Jean@oss.cyber.gouv.fr
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/tls/tls_sw.c | 2 ++
tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 59 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
index 2b875369d523..5c55a16ed593 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
@@ -1727,6 +1727,8 @@ tls_decrypt_sw(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *tls_ctx,
/* If opportunistic TLS 1.3 ZC failed retry without ZC */
if (unlikely(darg->zc && prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION &&
darg->tail != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA)) {
+ iov_iter_revert(&msg->msg_iter, strp_msg(darg->skb)->full_len -
+ prot->overhead_size);
darg->zc = false;
if (!darg->tail)
TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSRXNOPADVIOL);
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c b/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c
index 1264a20c1a04..9388e77a1b21 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c
@@ -1650,6 +1650,63 @@ TEST_F(tls, recv_efault)
}
#define TLS_RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE 0x16
+
+TEST_F(tls_basic, recvmsg_nopad_retry_iov)
+{
+ char payload[32];
+ char first_iov[sizeof(payload)];
+ char later_iov[sizeof(payload) * 2];
+ char expected_later_iov[sizeof(later_iov)];
+ char cbuf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(char))];
+ struct tls_crypto_info_keys tls13;
+ struct iovec iov[] = {
+ { .iov_base = first_iov, .iov_len = sizeof(first_iov) },
+ { .iov_base = later_iov, .iov_len = sizeof(later_iov) },
+ };
+ struct msghdr msg = {
+ .msg_iov = iov,
+ .msg_iovlen = ARRAY_SIZE(iov),
+ .msg_control = cbuf,
+ .msg_controllen = sizeof(cbuf),
+ };
+ int one = 1;
+ int ret;
+ int i;
+
+ if (self->notls)
+ SKIP(return, "no TLS support");
+
+ tls_crypto_info_init(TLS_1_3_VERSION, TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128,
+ &tls13, 0);
+
+ ret = setsockopt(self->fd, SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, &tls13, tls13.len);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0);
+
+ ret = setsockopt(self->cfd, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, &tls13, tls13.len);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0);
+
+ ret = setsockopt(self->cfd, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX_EXPECT_NO_PAD,
+ &one, sizeof(one));
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(payload); i++)
+ payload[i] = 0x40 + i;
+ memset(first_iov, 0xa5, sizeof(first_iov));
+ memset(later_iov, 0x5a, sizeof(later_iov));
+ memset(expected_later_iov, 0x5a, sizeof(expected_later_iov));
+
+ /* A control record forces optimistic TLS 1.3 RX to retry. */
+ ret = tls_send_cmsg(self->fd, TLS_RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE,
+ payload, sizeof(payload), 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, sizeof(payload));
+
+ ret = recvmsg(self->cfd, &msg, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, sizeof(payload));
+ EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(first_iov, payload, sizeof(payload)), 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(later_iov, expected_later_iov,
+ sizeof(later_iov)), 0);
+}
+
/* key_update, length 1, update_not_requested */
static const char key_update_msg[] = "\x18\x00\x00\x01\x00";
static void tls_send_keyupdate(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, int fd)
--
2.53.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-19 11:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-17 12:48 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] tls: rx: restore msg_iter before TLS 1.3 optimistic retry" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree gregkh
2026-08-19 11:39 ` [PATCH 6.12.y 1/2] selftests: tls: add rekey tests Sasha Levin
2026-08-19 11:39 ` Sasha Levin [this message]
2026-08-19 15:19 ` Sabrina Dubroca
2026-08-21 16:51 ` Sasha Levin
2026-08-21 20:10 ` Sabrina Dubroca
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