From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5B38E3F58CA for ; Tue, 25 Aug 2026 11:24:48 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1787657090; cv=none; b=iWOIY2WpQRQzHSLdOxsU6C5lz49CGtb4byk0GrZXOMWg7v48Ob+HxSY0se0OZIGnxLIL9iVWmCJ6DMnJR4QTLVXTJlh6b5+nd7VfegHa4vvPk7TzKZRMlFsnR7F2hfFhDDh/8TY1pCyZbSV0hZaKwKk5uy0MJhv6ztMOT2cuYFc= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1787657090; c=relaxed/simple; bh=zPhuH//KVykV8keARhOG/Wvrp0/Ji7UM2p/9YetX9ww=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=qypzby3JGDLtlWbJ0V9yW2eRlfFx5IM5ZaoVsZwiqaZehkn8Ah0dlwrH0ETxargYUiBvRFB0y2/MLgKCOEBTBoaHz5zPlrQVPc1GyZ/559bwTGjeCgZ5sYDVsYaZOgN8l3Fy/JoWh6SjGkAhJoQQ+4zu6XaSVq5RqQ+VXL+DfCw= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=BLhc3a4q; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="BLhc3a4q" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id AD7081F00A3E; Tue, 25 Aug 2026 11:24:47 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1787657088; bh=cACnaovBIB+g9+lXmfN+h0clyleZ/vMdBlfq5bi9Rb4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=BLhc3a4qMsk+ZLcR3+a4TmexBneJKr1ASiGQp7w6IYfsEqBZ/3AtFzA8QZyKiIbpG vZGSslEyyuh37juoP2mrau0pm2Md98w4Tnwcjku/qS4A47HfN8LbjSjGvQj+z3xUGL OxZgDzrNvykz26qgUin6tALK6qcKYSAwor7kr6n/p2nkzzwi7zI3qQNYia+FB/Sb2o CNRapZrVmlGhsMeW25dITv54PXwlJtLkpmrocx1RPGtECa17Ueo61pEStLoGOGBreI n52z9dfev4I12crqXbr/m0+MtvE4QhVO46/yEPLWfg4yieTS40aM57TUMIrUjqmODS 70tsKUe4BQY4A== From: Sasha Levin To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Bryam Vargas , Stephen Smalley , Paul Moore , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.6.y 8/9] selinux: reject a permission value exceeding the class permission count Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2026 07:24:39 -0400 Message-ID: <20260825112440.3543785-8-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.53.0 In-Reply-To: <20260825112440.3543785-1-sashal@kernel.org> References: <2026082022-circle-gooey-f888@gregkh> <20260825112440.3543785-1-sashal@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Bryam Vargas [ Upstream commit d14b5d0e97fccd27974fedc03b903408872907fd ] perm_read() bounds a permission value by SEL_VEC_MAX but never by the nprim of the owning class or common, which is taken verbatim from the policy image. security_get_permissions() then writes perms[value - 1] into an nprim-sized kcalloc() array, so a class declaring fewer permissions than its largest permission value drives an out-of-bounds heap write. The top-level symbol tables are validated this way; the nested per-class permission table is not. Reject a permission whose value exceeds nprim, which is already set when perm_read() runs. Well-formed policies are unaffected. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 55fcf09b3fe4 ("selinux: add support for querying object classes and permissions from the running policy") Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas Acked-by: Stephen Smalley [PM: tweak comment for line length] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Stable-dep-of: b98a8ac50775 ("selinux: require a class's permission values to cover its permission count") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c index 6f27c0ccb3468..9bf9327fae365 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c @@ -1120,6 +1120,9 @@ static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *f rc = -EINVAL; if (perdatum->value < 1 || perdatum->value > SEL_VEC_MAX) goto bad; + /* indexes an nprim-sized array in security_get_permissions() */ + if (perdatum->value > s->nprim) + goto bad; rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len); if (rc) -- 2.53.0