From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E5C37485CD9 for ; Tue, 25 Aug 2026 15:09:42 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1787670585; cv=none; b=M9uMPgxJHujasHL3/VgayZYCwRR+0yWbxDHSWVDK+2p9iAsFOdryGT3/w2UhEFDOnkYXBf4SW8BZXqDEbXqBE6ckpphODOr3WC4AgGpSsGVBZ0dD8evy0RhbcQFTNFYcQwkfWAok+HnA6JCnS73P+JeLONxb+MpGrNjHgOIVd0U= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1787670585; c=relaxed/simple; bh=SgH4cRUaajW97LW4DVu6lG2C3p0i5wvBrzADtRkng4Y=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=UHmU+YM4i2ePzaX9zCathN/CIySAXMBewBcj95JMWjEpKmVBTZdbY3JCDTfm80WTVDtMWMiPVHfOs4a2nlOhLwE4iRkTj0BFOMbbipnsVdV09FE8GuN8kd5W0TUhTJALDbIVNYkri8iAFQtxf2ozpIVNNcaE/ZIKyfrRwPAajVw= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=eKNpJqfR; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="eKNpJqfR" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 3C69C1F000E9; Tue, 25 Aug 2026 15:09:41 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1787670581; bh=X2XXOhRGoT+163dalXBqwu0qhy1X5lF3xW1EWIepZWs=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=eKNpJqfR5l0vSqcVLpSI9hgWQQKKzSc+w/r814Cla5eEcVToLB5gTX3lCPMK6DRHw DiOma+xzb9MwSVxvLPQUqf2CqLRwtaCot+x9YbxW7/HIauRYw2vZq5DkW2UjsBEFGl B66+XOSqk1A9TweNNlVwZy2XRXUMHKEfTbYKsezY/1BvGJI/TdmCJkxBjVVF8byw66 aAQKzrhLpyt/ST5KDXVR6MOThWPlUBv9wIJcYom1XzyO2CN6XmQKdOiGO3dNEaGHZW k75CumSD1VpRPG2PEwZW+Vm9EXpw6LfHH4v64fAMfOTmrN26A0WVvpjOrrLNjtlR2Q ibLU58zQW7RGA== From: Sasha Levin To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Bryam Vargas , Stephen Smalley , Paul Moore , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.1.y 2/3] selinux: reject a permission value exceeding the class permission count Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2026 11:09:36 -0400 Message-ID: <20260825150937.4024395-2-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.53.0 In-Reply-To: <20260825150937.4024395-1-sashal@kernel.org> References: <2026082022-lyrically-condiment-ea5e@gregkh> <20260825150937.4024395-1-sashal@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Bryam Vargas [ Upstream commit d14b5d0e97fccd27974fedc03b903408872907fd ] perm_read() bounds a permission value by SEL_VEC_MAX but never by the nprim of the owning class or common, which is taken verbatim from the policy image. security_get_permissions() then writes perms[value - 1] into an nprim-sized kcalloc() array, so a class declaring fewer permissions than its largest permission value drives an out-of-bounds heap write. The top-level symbol tables are validated this way; the nested per-class permission table is not. Reject a permission whose value exceeds nprim, which is already set when perm_read() runs. Well-formed policies are unaffected. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 55fcf09b3fe4 ("selinux: add support for querying object classes and permissions from the running policy") Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas Acked-by: Stephen Smalley [PM: tweak comment for line length] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Stable-dep-of: b98a8ac50775 ("selinux: require a class's permission values to cover its permission count") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c index 8d37adf8608f3..20a9b7a3c204c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c @@ -1126,6 +1126,12 @@ static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *f len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); perdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]); + rc = -EINVAL; + if (perdatum->value < 1 || perdatum->value > SEL_VEC_MAX) + goto bad; + /* indexes an nprim-sized array in security_get_permissions() */ + if (perdatum->value > s->nprim) + goto bad; rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len); if (rc) -- 2.53.0