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From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
	Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 6.12.y 5/6] KVM: SVM: Move SEV-ES VMSA allocation to a dedicated sev_vcpu_create() helper
Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2026 14:31:56 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260831183157.1673215-5-sashal@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260831183157.1673215-1-sashal@kernel.org>

From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 34bd82aab15b8b9e8e9d923267283c84aa8c2789 ]

Add a dedicated sev_vcpu_create() helper to allocate the VMSA page for
SEV-ES+ vCPUs, and to allow for consolidating a variety of related SEV+
code in the near future.

No functional change intended.

Reviewed-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250819234833.3080255-5-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Stable-dep-of: 42a39ad5d592 ("KVM: SEV: Track the GPA of the guest-controlled VMSA used for SNP guests")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 25 +++++++------------------
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h |  2 ++
 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index d4026cd634c0f..ca07b2c05a4c6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -4669,6 +4669,26 @@ void sev_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 		sev_es_init_vmcb(svm);
 }
 
+int sev_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	struct page *vmsa_page;
+
+	if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * SEV-ES guests require a separate (from the VMCB) VMSA page used to
+	 * contain the encrypted register state of the guest.
+	 */
+	vmsa_page = snp_safe_alloc_page();
+	if (!vmsa_page)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	svm->sev_es.vmsa = page_address(vmsa_page);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 void sev_es_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 {
 	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 44819d9470dcf..c996f07b9c80a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -1433,7 +1433,6 @@ static int svm_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	struct vcpu_svm *svm;
 	struct page *vmcb01_page;
-	struct page *vmsa_page = NULL;
 	int err;
 
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct vcpu_svm, vcpu) != 0);
@@ -1444,24 +1443,18 @@ static int svm_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	if (!vmcb01_page)
 		goto out;
 
-	if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
-		/*
-		 * SEV-ES guests require a separate VMSA page used to contain
-		 * the encrypted register state of the guest.
-		 */
-		vmsa_page = snp_safe_alloc_page();
-		if (!vmsa_page)
-			goto error_free_vmcb_page;
-	}
+	err = sev_vcpu_create(vcpu);
+	if (err)
+		goto error_free_vmcb_page;
 
 	err = avic_init_vcpu(svm);
 	if (err)
-		goto error_free_vmsa_page;
+		goto error_free_sev;
 
 	svm->msrpm = svm_vcpu_alloc_msrpm();
 	if (!svm->msrpm) {
 		err = -ENOMEM;
-		goto error_free_vmsa_page;
+		goto error_free_sev;
 	}
 
 	svm->x2avic_msrs_intercepted = true;
@@ -1471,16 +1464,12 @@ static int svm_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	svm->vmcb01.pa = __sme_set(page_to_pfn(vmcb01_page) << PAGE_SHIFT);
 	svm_switch_vmcb(svm, &svm->vmcb01);
 
-	if (vmsa_page)
-		svm->sev_es.vmsa = page_address(vmsa_page);
-
 	svm->guest_state_loaded = false;
 
 	return 0;
 
-error_free_vmsa_page:
-	if (vmsa_page)
-		__free_page(vmsa_page);
+error_free_sev:
+	sev_free_vcpu(vcpu);
 error_free_vmcb_page:
 	__free_page(vmcb01_page);
 out:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index c34cd7f1408fc..a595064d6a52f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -757,6 +757,7 @@ static inline struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page(void)
 	return snp_safe_alloc_page_node(numa_node_id(), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
 }
 
+int sev_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm);
 void __init sev_set_cpu_caps(void);
@@ -781,6 +782,7 @@ static inline struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page(void)
 	return snp_safe_alloc_page_node(numa_node_id(), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
 }
 
+static inline int sev_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return 0; }
 static inline void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
 static inline void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm) {}
 static inline void __init sev_set_cpu_caps(void) {}
-- 
2.53.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-08-31 18:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-31 12:25 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: SEV: Track the GPA of the guest-controlled VMSA used for" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree gregkh
2026-08-31 18:31 ` [PATCH 6.12.y 1/6] KVM: SVM: Mark VMCB dirty before processing incoming snp_vmsa_gpa Sasha Levin
2026-08-31 18:31   ` [PATCH 6.12.y 2/6] KVM: SVM: Use guard(mutex) to simplify SNP vCPU state updates Sasha Levin
2026-09-01 19:03     ` Sean Christopherson
2026-08-31 18:31   ` [PATCH 6.12.y 3/6] KVM: SVM: Invalidate "next" SNP VMSA GPA even on failure Sasha Levin
2026-08-31 18:31   ` [PATCH 6.12.y 4/6] KVM: SEV: Disable SEV-SNP support on initialization failure Sasha Levin
2026-08-31 18:31   ` Sasha Levin [this message]
2026-08-31 18:31   ` [PATCH 6.12.y 6/6] KVM: SEV: Track the GPA of the guest-controlled VMSA used for SNP guests Sasha Levin

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