From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E4EE83C0A04 for ; Mon, 31 Aug 2026 22:44:22 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1788216264; cv=none; b=Q1ocoEq/coZAB91rmdzLr+0P5M3oTvRdQGsiXnDbSOQlXt7PtVcq0s6bJxH3iLC430TcRdgVDjjRiJWzSwNg/6ywhG+OZPeVnJ8EQ4HQMBstClIt/qIQwbHmqb1FnyPmPyt9dSuMkvnDuMg4FS+vuri8phHibJYh8lW6sDmeh5M= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1788216264; c=relaxed/simple; bh=fR2H00D+e+9AAFFVAckiVGjJKA4dqXx/M731dQEMGSc=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=J65VGhcdmTfuMHWpw6okUDouhtiRoLiHAqlWn8XFlNekSEukkLSVwitcUJBPnyczKvkefJwsQaWiX9DOKmHPQbvYBRaTq4udgAhdi+p1ITxL3O5P1Pjx9Ec3G2s/li4uWfy8Lpr0L2W65ABGPpF5PnFdGUSlNwLlpgeqXWDCgB8= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=lwuZUb3Q; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="lwuZUb3Q" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 099661F00A3D; Mon, 31 Aug 2026 22:44:21 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1788216262; bh=cHXuqndgk5yASvby+K8L/6U2QTS+JHZnwcgganRp68I=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=lwuZUb3Qh1UbBtmSUC310MizE66rMy+iHNwWhQJrBUHXDCYWj4q0DQYjA4VBaXvh3 ZfRP+LiKO1sPJeSO6Bpvk4nv6BmEW3/gXjQrCvN/zr8Ged8rbrS6d2vWCnKgrdZDY4 0UT+B4r3LJoA9p2i9w+LQBGVHWQCOEF8zbpK+sSVSnzqUS2Cq+SNkP5hapViZlGAa4 OnMvmkGiuffAtFA8AoiutzPeX79cZq1G2k1hcHdWCBdT9Mcw34KwE+3dO/nEHgRc6I iH5J/mjt9y0KVOPX+lZVe0YETL1DGB1elnfq/f+aqgege3uzRBWGLa8qmE1BS4DBg8 sc3U0Gz55D3KA== From: Sasha Levin To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Sean Christopherson , Ackerley Tng , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 7.1.y 4/8] KVM: SEV: Wire up kvm_x86_ops.gmem_xxx() if and only if CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2026 18:44:13 -0400 Message-ID: <20260831224417.1903154-4-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.53.0 In-Reply-To: <20260831224417.1903154-1-sashal@kernel.org> References: <2026083159-request-customs-f573@gregkh> <20260831224417.1903154-1-sashal@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Sean Christopherson [ Upstream commit 01a96ff30dde5127c37497f1e098e639e7ae152f ] Wire up the SEV-SNP guest_memfd kvm_x86_ops hooks if and only if SEV is actually enabled, and drop the now-unnecessary stubs. Leaving the hooks NULL allows the static call infrastructure to elide the CALL+RET, and more importantly, referencing the hooks if and only if SEV support is enabled will allow conditionally definining the hooks using their corresponding HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_XXX Kconfig. No functional change intended. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.12.x Reviewed-by: Ackerley Tng Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260709204948.1988414-5-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Stable-dep-of: d1a3c2162334 ("KVM: SEV: Forcefully invalidate SNP VMSA if its backing gmem page is zapped") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 8 ++++---- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 10 ---------- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index d8eff8f11c5f0..2a2679824bd7e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -5400,6 +5400,10 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = { .vm_copy_enc_context_from = sev_vm_copy_enc_context_from, .vm_move_enc_context_from = sev_vm_move_enc_context_from, + + .gmem_prepare = sev_gmem_prepare, + .gmem_invalidate = sev_gmem_invalidate, + .gmem_max_mapping_level = sev_gmem_max_mapping_level, #endif .check_emulate_instruction = svm_check_emulate_instruction, @@ -5411,10 +5415,6 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = { .vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = svm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector, .vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons = avic_vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons, .alloc_apic_backing_page = svm_alloc_apic_backing_page, - - .gmem_prepare = sev_gmem_prepare, - .gmem_invalidate = sev_gmem_invalidate, - .gmem_max_mapping_level = sev_gmem_max_mapping_level, }; /* diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h index f92d49a9223a7..954302305e750 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h @@ -993,16 +993,6 @@ static inline int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd) { return 0; } static inline int sev_dev_get_attr(u32 group, u64 attr, u64 *val) { return -ENXIO; } #define max_sev_asid 0 static inline void sev_handle_rmp_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 error_code) {} -static inline int sev_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn, int max_order) -{ - return 0; -} -static inline void sev_gmem_invalidate(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end) {} -static inline int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, bool is_private) -{ - return 0; -} - static inline struct vmcb_save_area *sev_decrypt_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return NULL; -- 2.53.0