From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Chengfeng Ye <nicoyip.dev@gmail.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 5.15.y] KEYS: trusted: Fix TPM teardown ordering
Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2026 11:22:02 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260903152202.886654-1-sashal@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2026090321-fiction-outthink-69f9@gregkh>
From: Chengfeng Ye <nicoyip.dev@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 5e2d672280d97d83de43031d93761b12dadd7b8a ]
trusted_tpm_exit() drops the TPM chip reference and frees the digest
array before unregistering the trusted key type. key_type_lookup()
holds key_types_sem for reading until the key operation finishes, while
unregister_key_type() takes it for writing. It therefore provides the
synchronization point that must precede backend teardown.
The current order permits this interleaving:
CPU 0 CPU 1
trusted_tpm_exit() key_type_lookup("trusted")
put_device(&chip->dev) trusted_tpm_seal()
kfree(digests) pcrlock()
unregister_key_type() tpm_pcr_extend(..., digests)
CPU 1 can consequently dereference the freed digest array. The chip can
also be released before callbacks stop using it.
KASAN reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200
Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810872d000 by task poc/89
Call Trace:
tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200
pcrlock+0x42/0x70 [trusted]
trusted_tpm_seal+0x1b6/0x570 [trusted]
trusted_instantiate+0x293/0x340 [trusted]
__key_instantiate_and_link+0xb2/0x2b0
__key_create_or_update+0x61e/0xb50
__do_sys_add_key+0x1b8/0x310
Allocated by task 88:
__kmalloc_noprof+0x1a7/0x490
do_one_initcall+0xa1/0x390
do_init_module+0x2df/0x840
Freed by task 90:
kfree+0x131/0x3c0
trusted_tpm_exit+0x59/0xa0 [trusted]
__do_sys_delete_module+0x346/0x510
Move unregister_key_type() before releasing either resource. This stops
new lookups and waits for in-flight key operations to finish before the
backend state is destroyed.
Fixes: 0b6cf6b97b7e ("tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chengfeng Ye <nicoyip.dev@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260731140925.2973492-1-nicoyip.dev@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
[ preserved the additional trusted_shash_release() cleanup after unregister_key_type() ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
index 4863ee08b7b11..c482c54be918c 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
@@ -1058,10 +1058,10 @@ static int __init trusted_tpm_init(void)
static void trusted_tpm_exit(void)
{
if (chip) {
+ unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
put_device(&chip->dev);
kfree(digests);
trusted_shash_release();
- unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
}
}
--
2.53.0
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-03 15:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-03 10:44 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KEYS: trusted: Fix TPM teardown ordering" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree gregkh
2026-09-03 15:22 ` Sasha Levin [this message]
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