From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EB7664C954B for ; Thu, 3 Sep 2026 15:27:42 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1788449264; cv=none; b=ZV+5hYLa6vyqFf/RvZbUFgLsPAfjNUcGbqOtM0/d2h3LlrW3cR6ZPoWM9rfjaZ7VrturWynYwwvBMWIQqbGLS6unri4w8NmeLIxYT8FXAtOhO+JG9zGACyOEMaWYEk7JDhsxDZkzGs7e1KpxxHHJ2Jepokr7FOM28OsMncrrdY8= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1788449264; c=relaxed/simple; bh=6V6/8Y+CB53sloAYdyrhNOxrWow9/w0bu50YsNcMUyg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=fFTbm0BS1EacFooHoFeVRlxNQ9MctPuV11HwczG1OEu9lI2MalOFvgdwHhfydTKLpIVmBHchhDNdUOD+prAmhJWKZP9SOn5oTH4gkfqC+81wLmlXIYZuk4H8OU/VtEKk9sLGm8kFuGuJQOVk5qw0EWmVaQQjxux+f5fv/kXvTZc= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=cwdkgGhq; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="cwdkgGhq" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 5630C1F00A3F; Thu, 3 Sep 2026 15:27:42 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1788449262; bh=Fr47hdUWdKt4750VPsBWSRBJstEJ7Xg4cwV0t6owBjA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=cwdkgGhqKOIRT2w8ye+t6gWmWONQ4c5D5Cys0B0BO2JrXkkCzYDxNWDcyATKAE5zB PVs9BCQhGI34+Hr9dJyXChPSrcZH1Po3MgOmXErwBFRs1TzWwxVlNKWY8MouVMmnLv WZlFbq7mCToBr4MFImOek8FxIcEmi8XSH72/Mu/PtHMcamP/vMy9kcgZG5tG9cznoI xVj2Jvo06JaeIdqowmGmpgvO1exO3mAtldo5d/jVNVvVKvteoQ9MFH5WTlW6UZ2NZQ S4NZsE1+Q+OBG+SRPn1tRI/aTt1Gb2a7nKoYWbamoTq8fGv4f/X611jTqy7r2/fuJ5 FUiZySktBAGgQ== From: Sasha Levin To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Chen Linxuan , "Christian Brauner (Amutable)" , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.12.y 2/2] pidfd: hold exec_update_lock around namespace ioctl Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2026 11:27:40 -0400 Message-ID: <20260903152740.890893-2-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.53.0 In-Reply-To: <20260903152740.890893-1-sashal@kernel.org> References: <2026090328-espresso-reveler-1a6b@gregkh> <20260903152740.890893-1-sashal@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Chen Linxuan [ Upstream commit 9688a46802939da28f00cb40e8129615d5d4af39 ] The PIDFD_GET_*_NAMESPACE ioctls in pidfd_ioctl() perform a filesystem credentials ptrace access check before handing out a namespace file descriptor. The accompanying comment states that the code "mirrors nsfs behavior", but, unlike the corresponding procfs paths, it does so without holding the target task's exec_update_lock. proc_ns_get_link() and proc_ns_readlink() both take exec_update_lock for reading around the ptrace check and the namespace lookup, so that the credentials used for the access decision match those of the task when its namespace is read. Without it, a caller can pass the check against the target's old credentials and then read the namespace after the target has execve()'d a setuid binary and committed new credentials -- accessing namespace information it should have been denied. Hold exec_update_lock for reading around the ptrace check and the namespace lookup so that pidfd truly mirrors nsfs behavior, as the comment already claims. open_namespace() itself runs outside the lock: once a namespace reference is obtained it carries its own refcount and is opened with the caller's own credentials, so a concurrent execve() on the target can no longer affect the outcome. Fixes: 5b08bd408534 ("pidfs: allow retrieval of namespace file descriptors") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chen Linxuan Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260731-pidfd-exec-update-lock-v1-1-b388f2f3a8b0@black-desk.cn Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/pidfs.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/pidfs.c b/fs/pidfs.c index 1c54efeaa265a..66afe20420ac5 100644 --- a/fs/pidfs.c +++ b/fs/pidfs.c @@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ static long pidfd_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) struct task_struct *task __free(put_task) = NULL; struct nsproxy *nsp __free(put_nsproxy) = NULL; struct ns_common *ns_common = NULL; + int error; if (!pidfs_ioctl_valid(cmd)) return -ENOIOCTLCMD; @@ -136,20 +137,33 @@ static long pidfd_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) if (arg) return -EINVAL; + /* + * We're trying to open a file descriptor to the namespace so perform a + * filesystem cred ptrace check. Hold @task's exec_update_lock for the + * duration of the ptrace check and the namespace lookup so that the + * credentials used for the access decision match those of @task at the + * time its namespace is read, preventing a concurrent execve() from + * swapping the task's credentials in between the check and the use. We + * mirror nsfs behavior. + */ + error = down_read_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); + if (error) + return error; + + if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) { + error = -EACCES; + goto out_unlock; + } + scoped_guard(task_lock, task) { nsp = task->nsproxy; if (nsp) get_nsproxy(nsp); } - if (!nsp) - return -ESRCH; /* just pretend it didn't exist */ - - /* - * We're trying to open a file descriptor to the namespace so perform a - * filesystem cred ptrace check. Also, we mirror nsfs behavior. - */ - if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) - return -EACCES; + if (!nsp) { + error = -ESRCH; /* just pretend it didn't exist */ + goto out_unlock; + } switch (cmd) { /* Namespaces that hang of nsproxy. */ @@ -221,11 +235,16 @@ static long pidfd_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) #endif break; default: - return -ENOIOCTLCMD; + error = -ENOIOCTLCMD; } - if (!ns_common) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (!error && !ns_common) + error = -EOPNOTSUPP; + +out_unlock: + up_read(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); + if (error) + return error; /* open_namespace() unconditionally consumes the reference */ return open_namespace(ns_common); -- 2.53.0