From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3C5D631327F for ; Thu, 3 Sep 2026 09:56:33 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1788429394; cv=none; b=RWbk+uYzosR3UGIXe4l8M8PZAAh77Vuu8Pd3gRWd3Bh1ly1rkepkFydObOU2AVtGS2O4q8aUiFOcss81Dr1vP+WrDuZR/7qQogHVccD6/O4heC+W7y2Vsp/UJUEToweIqhQpVOxk6ELq6eHOVFWXlqTxd5zqripvUju0n5cMqPo= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1788429394; c=relaxed/simple; bh=2yiKJL6znWxeIZrCyrZRpjJvcuQSuHOUegBi8j6SYgU=; h=Subject:To:Cc:From:Date:Message-ID:MIME-Version:Content-Type; b=s8fVKWbz8ys3VzizYb8FqmHlPYv19I7aegJVRSzUYhVIdhwXhLBHKUjYRewDEWBJivGVn7wa6c24USQP/6dOzuKMkgqpLmI6MGXijM6DkvE0iMSI237BSY8nTDUsExQ8aUmrJG8l5pAdrCY1QIVIrsDK5Y1NO0r6+nnHgVq86ew= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=Er+nrqxx; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="Er+nrqxx" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 78EC41F000E9; Thu, 3 Sep 2026 09:56:32 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1788429393; bh=Ecook38XgRcEGLKoPMbHMYM5kUJ3kPcuw3t8Qrix0/Q=; h=Subject:To:Cc:From:Date; b=Er+nrqxx74p6HJpQwHHC3GsZlIqxZSV1ulUrxiWOPlBGNxiKbbFqYMUMFS4UUIlSB rnsKAn2N36e+8aqTocARWRYuHAHf/29Mn3imTWfrZCYiEaC3SWjxhF0pBDFvHxvux4 zRHgQoP3zHboe5Gi/rFjC7qHuY2RYkd5hwFizsWo= Subject: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] pidfd: hold exec_update_lock around namespace ioctl" failed to apply to 6.18-stable tree To: me@black-desk.cn,brauner@kernel.org Cc: From: Date: Thu, 03 Sep 2026 11:56:28 +0200 Message-ID: <2026090328-fleshed-scrambler-e1f2@gregkh> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ANSI_X3.4-1968 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The patch below does not apply to the 6.18-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to . To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.18.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 9688a46802939da28f00cb40e8129615d5d4af39 # git commit -s git send-email --to '' --in-reply-to '2026090328-fleshed-scrambler-e1f2@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.18.y' 'HEAD^..' Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 9688a46802939da28f00cb40e8129615d5d4af39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chen Linxuan Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2026 22:50:08 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] pidfd: hold exec_update_lock around namespace ioctl The PIDFD_GET_*_NAMESPACE ioctls in pidfd_ioctl() perform a filesystem credentials ptrace access check before handing out a namespace file descriptor. The accompanying comment states that the code "mirrors nsfs behavior", but, unlike the corresponding procfs paths, it does so without holding the target task's exec_update_lock. proc_ns_get_link() and proc_ns_readlink() both take exec_update_lock for reading around the ptrace check and the namespace lookup, so that the credentials used for the access decision match those of the task when its namespace is read. Without it, a caller can pass the check against the target's old credentials and then read the namespace after the target has execve()'d a setuid binary and committed new credentials -- accessing namespace information it should have been denied. Hold exec_update_lock for reading around the ptrace check and the namespace lookup so that pidfd truly mirrors nsfs behavior, as the comment already claims. open_namespace() itself runs outside the lock: once a namespace reference is obtained it carries its own refcount and is opened with the caller's own credentials, so a concurrent execve() on the target can no longer affect the outcome. Fixes: 5b08bd408534 ("pidfs: allow retrieval of namespace file descriptors") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chen Linxuan Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260731-pidfd-exec-update-lock-v1-1-b388f2f3a8b0@black-desk.cn Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) diff --git a/fs/pidfs.c b/fs/pidfs.c index aaa609ddab04..7fc3c1f5a578 100644 --- a/fs/pidfs.c +++ b/fs/pidfs.c @@ -531,6 +531,7 @@ static long pidfd_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) struct task_struct *task __free(put_task) = NULL; struct nsproxy *nsp __free(put_nsproxy) = NULL; struct ns_common *ns_common = NULL; + int error; if (!pidfs_ioctl_valid(cmd)) return -ENOIOCTLCMD; @@ -554,20 +555,33 @@ static long pidfd_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) if (arg) return -EINVAL; + /* + * We're trying to open a file descriptor to the namespace so perform a + * filesystem cred ptrace check. Hold @task's exec_update_lock for the + * duration of the ptrace check and the namespace lookup so that the + * credentials used for the access decision match those of @task at the + * time its namespace is read, preventing a concurrent execve() from + * swapping the task's credentials in between the check and the use. We + * mirror nsfs behavior. + */ + error = down_read_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); + if (error) + return error; + + if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) { + error = -EACCES; + goto out_unlock; + } + scoped_guard(task_lock, task) { nsp = task->nsproxy; if (nsp) get_nsproxy(nsp); } - if (!nsp) - return -ESRCH; /* just pretend it didn't exist */ - - /* - * We're trying to open a file descriptor to the namespace so perform a - * filesystem cred ptrace check. Also, we mirror nsfs behavior. - */ - if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) - return -EACCES; + if (!nsp) { + error = -ESRCH; /* just pretend it didn't exist */ + goto out_unlock; + } switch (cmd) { /* Namespaces that hang of nsproxy. */ @@ -649,11 +663,16 @@ static long pidfd_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) #endif break; default: - return -ENOIOCTLCMD; + error = -ENOIOCTLCMD; } - if (!ns_common) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (!error && !ns_common) + error = -EOPNOTSUPP; + +out_unlock: + up_read(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); + if (error) + return error; /* open_namespace() unconditionally consumes the reference */ return open_namespace(ns_common);