FAILED: patch "[PATCH] SUNRPC: svcauth_gss: enforce krb5 token minimum length" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

[<gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>]

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.

To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:

git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x a919c5c88769cf8fb3ec071e6078d830bf512489
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable@vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2026090353-ogle-atop-5025@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' 'HEAD^..'

Possible dependencies:



thanks,

greg k-h

------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------

From a919c5c88769cf8fb3ec071e6078d830bf512489 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Chris Mason <clm@meta.com>
Date: Sat, 23 May 2026 21:02:10 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] SUNRPC: svcauth_gss: enforce krb5 token minimum length

svcauth_gss_unwrap_priv() validates only an upper bound on the
wire-supplied opaque length before handing the buffer to
gss_unwrap():

    if (len > xdr_stream_remaining(xdr))
            goto unwrap_failed;
    offset = xdr_stream_pos(xdr);
    ...
    maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx, offset, offset + len, buf);

The wire value `len` flows unchanged as the upper bound into the
krb5 unwrap path, so a len in [0, 16] passes this check and is
handed to gss_unwrap(). For a krb5 v2 context that lands in
gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(), which reads the 16-byte RFC 4121 token
header fields at ptr+4 and ptr+6 and then calls rotate_left()
before any integrity check. With a sub-header length the header
reads run past the token, and _rotate_left()'s `shift %= buf->len`
path can divide by zero when buf->len has been driven to zero by
the truncated token. A header-only token (len == 16) is equally
invalid: with a non-zero RRC field and the opaque blob ending at
the XDR buffer boundary, rotate_left() builds a zero-length
subbuffer, reaching the same division.

Reject the token at the server entry point before it reaches the
krb5 unwrap core. A valid sealed RFC 4121 token must contain
the 16-byte header plus at least some encrypted payload.

Fix by adding a minimum-length check immediately after the
existing upper-bound check:

    if (len <= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN)
            goto unwrap_failed;

Fixes: 7c9fdcfb1b64 ("[PATCH] knfsd: svcrpc: gss: server-side implementation of rpcsec_gss privacy")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: kres (claude-opus-4-7)
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@meta.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260524010213.557424-2-cel@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>

diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
index d14209031e18..8e8aceb31270 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
@@ -949,6 +949,8 @@ svcauth_gss_unwrap_priv(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, u32 seq, struct gss_ctx *ctx)
 	}
 	if (len > xdr_stream_remaining(xdr))
 		goto unwrap_failed;
+	if (len <= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN)
+		goto unwrap_failed;
 	offset = xdr_stream_pos(xdr);
 
 	saved_len = buf->len;