From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 03245503BD6 for ; Wed, 16 Sep 2026 14:18:27 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1789568308; cv=none; b=clMr+V0WwuV4LEt4yjE6/BMkC9NSsU5lH9yvGSnxPFliYwPw0Vye2TQYg/VIy76WN3bdRtJEkKmFiihl7TnZ0AiaO3bNmQc1jIiU1bxzZEgVCwjOdkn792KH/Hl7i+RTjdRZiQpYHyONrKrC8ETRclFejRAKQQNwlYJ/SEDAF10= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1789568308; c=relaxed/simple; bh=ZGEzPA+3vS81VHVtjItAaLk9dTLXxiDy5Kj2h5ovVEM=; h=Subject:To:Cc:From:Date:Message-ID:MIME-Version:Content-Type; b=k+vUwQw/RWL17hWQFaipwr19yX5hqeufTHypOT/+lhGdu0lOT5Ca4FIiD+8ZMR8XrIR/jacFTE2h7R3Jr2ZV80Mhw/Ho5l58SPhMOWZGqHKjQMqKllcnjRP6W4uBrXiSP+fOOknQ/XXMRFs35aQ6nR7CPM7ySF2/6ABjL7AIapg= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=XejFLf4R; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="XejFLf4R" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 4159A1F00893; Wed, 16 Sep 2026 14:18:26 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1789568306; bh=ycg8V6F3Jx9UFg9F0pXioyWXKkiDlDx0WYBuwOUF87A=; h=Subject:To:Cc:From:Date; b=XejFLf4RYmMQyM4hqEcBcLsCVMIyD81VH8Z1kF7kXwm00hiVO24B+IjLHacceVxVR k9Da7BayhXgFlaLVw90e9P6qo43J6ABuYmaOjR6l0jjx4aEFl31YizTYAIrosvjOA0 KIO8kEd8rffUH01mC+yK4RuiINjN0yMzmdnyEJu0= Subject: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] tools/bootconfig: Fix integer overflow and truncation in size" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree To: mhiramat@kernel.org,ekffu200098@gmail.com,sashiko-bot@kernel.org Cc: From: Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 15:16:17 +0100 Message-ID: <2026091617-cackle-deeply-2ea2@gregkh> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ANSI_X3.4-1968 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to . To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 462d0b066b613103f579793031429db2ca23abc0 # git commit -s git send-email --to '' --in-reply-to '2026091617-cackle-deeply-2ea2@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' 'HEAD^..' Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 462d0b066b613103f579793031429db2ca23abc0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2026 00:15:24 +0900 Subject: [PATCH] tools/bootconfig: Fix integer overflow and truncation in size checks Sashiko reported that on 32-bit systems, if an attacker crafts size in the bootconfig footer such that adding BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE wraps around (for instance, if size is 0xFFFFFFFF), the size check in load_xbc_from_initrd() can be bypassed: if (stat.st_size < size + BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE) { pr_err("bootconfig size is too big\n"); return -E2BIG; } Furthermore, on 64-bit systems with an initrd > 4.29 GB, comparing a corrupted 32-bit size (e.g. 0xFFFFFFFF) against stat.st_size - BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE can also bypass the check if size is not bounded. Similarly, load_xbc_file() passes 64-bit stat.st_size directly into the 32-bit int size parameter of load_xbc_fd(), truncating large standalone files (>= 2GB). In both cases, passing 0xFFFFFFFF to load_xbc_fd() truncates to -1, resulting in malloc(0), an integer overflow in read(), and an out-of-bounds null-byte write. Fix this by: 1. Rejecting size > XBC_DATA_MAX or size > stat.st_size - BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE in load_xbc_from_initrd(). 2. Rejecting stat.st_size > XBC_DATA_MAX in load_xbc_file() before passing it to load_xbc_fd(). 3. Checking size < 0 || size > XBC_DATA_MAX defensively in load_xbc_fd(). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/178905332413.213925.3179977110281463499.stgit@devnote2/ Fixes: 950313ebf79c ("tools: bootconfig: Add bootconfig command") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Sashiko Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260909161113.16C691F00A3A@smtp.kernel.org/ Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260910010137.EE0431F000FF@smtp.kernel.org/ Assisted-by: Antigravity:gemini-3.8-flash Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) Reviewed-by: Sang-Heon Jeon diff --git a/tools/bootconfig/main.c b/tools/bootconfig/main.c index 7dc9fff9b637..17d971d47f87 100644 --- a/tools/bootconfig/main.c +++ b/tools/bootconfig/main.c @@ -140,6 +140,9 @@ static int load_xbc_fd(int fd, char **buf, int size) { int ret; + if (size < 0 || size > XBC_DATA_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + *buf = malloc(size + 1); if (!*buf) return -ENOMEM; @@ -168,6 +171,13 @@ static int load_xbc_file(const char *path, char **buf) return ret; } + if (stat.st_size > XBC_DATA_MAX) { + pr_err("%s size is too big\n", path); + ret = -E2BIG; + close(fd); + return ret; + } + ret = load_xbc_fd(fd, buf, stat.st_size); close(fd); @@ -218,7 +228,8 @@ static int load_xbc_from_initrd(int fd, char **buf) csum = le32toh(csum); /* Wrong size error */ - if (stat.st_size < size + BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE) { + if (size > XBC_DATA_MAX || + size > stat.st_size - BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE) { pr_err("bootconfig size is too big\n"); return -E2BIG; }