From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8FE3F390CB8 for ; Thu, 17 Sep 2026 02:27:39 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1789612072; cv=none; b=VXz349qIykSLMR2yqYv0ofNRIvONh/Prd/cxI3fu4o3oBRcOKEWM0Va9vXelYAv6JpjBMcwWZnjEpRPQXNRksbm/Ky5uQoPB5GeHPHSSXUyzd40gANBqMHwe96lgRS7VUFcLyuv9qbQ5hq4dCclmo+O6U/f8WZc1JRt2pfwbS1o= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1789612072; c=relaxed/simple; bh=Zjoh+GrcGESKUR7cwb5OzlgOJN+O3zM2CM/TqZKh/Qc=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version:Content-Type; b=IHte942FeNfHmIvjISP+z1ZTlh/Xb91+SQkB9Ob67n4XqiADzStFbtN8bSJcCwF3iYjymROm63QSQA4srGNJgVCGtQ1UIDuLtCVPj058o066BJq0chfFphOu+cS1bg3hrDBpKCT194Eqa2fTfQ6d90Ad9W25DseLKXbafyaDJyQ= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=Tmc7asz/; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="Tmc7asz/" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 978CF1F00898; Thu, 17 Sep 2026 02:27:35 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1789612056; bh=JxXb1HTX8jWPoZuJcA6PV2WDh813IoxTrEPeKXwwBHs=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=Tmc7asz/2Zdbo11gGRV8pjF16S8xfob1DCb6S4fqF35zzP/OlMa+IqUJVXziJ9e21 zrnhO4uSK70tDy132H3mPrO9IRPeSJKgr32aamgz4A9Qr3au+qFPp3xL/wEyLM2jQk GS4+t/MzIG4Tc9GnBD1Cl6A2pJWDf5jfbZx0ojsY/l9RMF/S2efNiRUVidgc11smpa qL2s74942Q8kDXzFFBCDOF+gHFDuyk9yyaQo6jXBvNajDURRP0bN2g2YJ2VVgJAd0e XiB0qQWVoKLalKpbxzIflNTJ5HzvQfo+3E5oLNHiw7eaCCJ3njPJ0yV0ZNA+ifpuKU kPfHXdtNzV75A== From: Sasha Levin To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Norbert Szetei , =?UTF-8?q?G=C3=BCnther=20Noack?= , =?UTF-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl=20Sala=C3=BCn?= , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.12.y 2/2] landlock: Fix use-after-free of the source's parent directory Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 22:27:33 -0400 Message-ID: <20260917022733.3831420-2-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.53.0 In-Reply-To: <20260917022733.3831420-1-sashal@kernel.org> References: <2026091642-android-strode-2706@gregkh> <20260917022733.3831420-1-sashal@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Norbert Szetei [ Upstream commit 2c6dc792538260a8087ac5b22c31b3b8e47c85d6 ] current_check_refer_path() reads old_dentry->d_parent without holding a reference nor a lock on it, and then dereferences it in collect_domain_accesses() and in the audit record. A reference on a child does not pin its parent: __d_move() reassigns dentry->d_parent and drops the reference the child held on its former parent. hook_path_rename() is not affected because the rename path calls lock_rename() before the hook, so the source cannot be reparented under it. hook_path_link() has no such protection: filename_linkat() holds a reference on the source dentry but neither locks nor references its parent, so a concurrent rename(2) can reparent the source while security_path_link() runs, and the former parent can then be removed and freed while the hook walks it. A process can trigger this after entering a Landlock domain that handles at least one filesystem access right. The process can then race a linkat(2) loop against rename(2) and rmdir(2): BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in collect_domain_accesses+0x278/0x290 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888160bd53f4 by task llrepro2/549 collect_domain_accesses+0x278/0x290 current_check_refer_path+0x952/0x1120 security_path_link+0x1be/0x320 filename_linkat+0x342/0x6d0 __x64_sys_linkat+0xfa/0x150 Freed by task 562: kmem_cache_free+0x139/0x4c0 i_callback+0x4b/0x80 rcu_core+0x7dc/0x10a0 Take a reference on the dentry selected as the source parent, using dget() for the common-mount-root case and dget_parent() otherwise. Release it after the hierarchy walk and synchronous audit logging. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: b91c3e4ea756 ("landlock: Add support for file reparenting with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER") Signed-off-by: Norbert Szetei Reviewed-by: Günther Noack Tested-by: Günther Noack Link: https://patch.msgid.link/E9CDD9E6-E960-4DE2-B1AC-5667D52ABB3E@doyensec.com [mic: Clarify the caller, reachability, and reference handling] Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün [ adapted to older Landlock helpers using dom and lacking audit arguments. ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- security/landlock/fs.c | 18 ++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c index b96a4daa5b2a2..5b852c2965cf2 100644 --- a/security/landlock/fs.c +++ b/security/landlock/fs.c @@ -1192,11 +1192,12 @@ static int current_check_refer_path(struct dentry *const old_dentry, /* * old_dentry may be the root of the common mount point and * !IS_ROOT(old_dentry) at the same time (e.g. with open_tree() and - * OPEN_TREE_CLONE). We do not need to call dget(old_parent) because - * we keep a reference to old_dentry. + * OPEN_TREE_CLONE). Pin the dentry used as old_parent in either case. + * Otherwise, dget_parent() safely fetches and pins the current parent + * against a concurrent rename(2). */ - old_parent = (old_dentry == mnt_dir.dentry) ? old_dentry : - old_dentry->d_parent; + old_parent = (old_dentry == mnt_dir.dentry) ? dget(old_dentry) : + dget_parent(old_dentry); /* new_dir->dentry is equal to new_dentry->d_parent */ allow_parent1 = collect_domain_accesses(dom, mnt_dir.dentry, old_parent, @@ -1204,8 +1205,10 @@ static int current_check_refer_path(struct dentry *const old_dentry, allow_parent2 = collect_domain_accesses( dom, mnt_dir.dentry, new_dir->dentry, &layer_masks_parent2); - if (allow_parent1 && allow_parent2) + if (allow_parent1 && allow_parent2) { + dput(old_parent); return 0; + } /* * To be able to compare source and destination domain access rights, @@ -1216,8 +1219,11 @@ static int current_check_refer_path(struct dentry *const old_dentry, if (is_access_to_paths_allowed( dom, &mnt_dir, access_request_parent1, &layer_masks_parent1, old_dentry, access_request_parent2, &layer_masks_parent2, - exchange ? new_dentry : NULL)) + exchange ? new_dentry : NULL)) { + dput(old_parent); return 0; + } + dput(old_parent); /* * This prioritizes EACCES over EXDEV for all actions, including -- 2.53.0