From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 75E7A223DFF for ; Sun, 4 Oct 2026 01:40:56 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1791078057; cv=none; b=geld+kKkouIBL9GbmfRCAesZekYl2PfdQs9RSPtiDWtxxhN2Qrxvy0bTo37L8q5M0VVSYqjLz+InmtH/GGB26QOm6O5xZlHsJ6xKkucbKRQzotfSH5fRYGtmxxn40rqOg1pekqV4G/zwRHBWkz6eUDcy8XwG5s+tjIOgTqMRq08= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1791078057; c=relaxed/simple; bh=2lCTA2R70bvejbLEPUspotcC1enyL90FTunnQDyp/CA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=fhimcIx06/exkmnVabPpF/iFO+BruY5IsjPoXR/Z9EkSFEcdlLkSyR79mhO3dcK1c/Oc/a0pzZpClbVW53pP01ImP61SfyYBJ52xUdv4dcB+TdqtYtOdztzoVhgblLs2Orf7yzPBJUtOiDxSdEMn9tmMufmKGb85Yg+NTLDGcQI= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=WgGP6Xfd; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="WgGP6Xfd" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 6F0291F0089C; Sun, 4 Oct 2026 01:40:49 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1791078056; bh=yW+jEEgw5W8NVPogMKQtcpoS7MkvFnEtpeHCJz2T6hc=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=WgGP6Xfd7X0MhiwBl9dFuYxtp6n63P690DL36LlhZGs+qtCg1zM0HqdIrRwv8w0e0 iwgdthrbLcxaT5y8K+sdC8p/vAfzB1hq2m6N8fGEZIGRZZz2pKxGTGuhH2qvUv0TaZ 0p3Bb3T9Lzf+pRMbUhEpVGK+BmPEb6S79gmWFtxWZcdJiODAMZc8lIJMYLMMe6tnfK zp+OfZK4GtpqjkM+o0W+yL6Za6cjXwGzzWZKfjhohPbDyPAs/aWSGpez9IA1smI0tl LNe6GzCKRCPyT8TzVkqzAO0FJpDZcEJHVLIdWoxV2IcZFlc1W0bSUhUGqqP/vmzQ+T RYaXj4jhZIepA== From: Sasha Levin To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen , Jonathan McDowell , Ross Philipson , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 7.2.y 5/8] tpm-buf: Merge TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR and TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW Date: Sat, 3 Oct 2026 21:39:59 -0400 Message-ID: <20261004012400.1311672-5-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.53.0 In-Reply-To: <20261004012400.1311672-1-sashal@kernel.org> References: <2026100307-vacancy-udder-83a1@gregkh> <20261004012400.1311672-1-sashal@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Jarkko Sakkinen [ Upstream commit 0b9551c189518544b65000a234277298e931c8f3 ] Merge TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR and TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW flags into the TPM_BUF_INVALID flag, as their behavior is identical (the only difference being the associated log messages). Message-ID: <20260125192526.782202-11-jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson Stable-dep-of: 9b522400bf5c ("tpm: fix off-by-four bounds check in tpm2_get_random()") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c | 10 ++++------ include/linux/tpm.h | 8 +++----- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 6 +++--- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c index 4c4f450630dfe..61833b4d81f03 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c @@ -103,13 +103,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_length); */ void tpm_buf_append(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u8 *new_data, u16 new_length) { - /* Return silently if overflow has already happened. */ - if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) + if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) return; if ((buf->length + new_length) > PAGE_SIZE) { WARN(1, "tpm_buf: write overflow\n"); - buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW; + buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_INVALID; return; } @@ -176,14 +175,13 @@ static void tpm_buf_read(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset, size_t count, void { off_t next_offset; - /* Return silently if overflow has already happened. */ - if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR) + if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) return; next_offset = *offset + count; if (next_offset > buf->length) { WARN(1, "tpm_buf: read out of boundary\n"); - buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR; + buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_INVALID; return; } diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 3630b2ea6aefa..3c6a5bcc138a0 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -201,12 +201,10 @@ enum tpm_chip_flags { #define to_tpm_chip(d) container_of(d, struct tpm_chip, dev) enum tpm_buf_flags { - /* the capacity exceeded: */ - TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW = BIT(0), /* TPM2B format: */ - TPM_BUF_TPM2B = BIT(1), - /* read out of boundary: */ - TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR = BIT(2), + TPM_BUF_TPM2B = BIT(0), + /* The buffer is in invalid and unusable state: */ + TPM_BUF_INVALID = BIT(1), }; /* diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 70913da617631..ec8dc00f84e29 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, /* creation PCR */ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0); - if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) { + if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) { rc = -E2BIG; tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); goto out; @@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; blob_len = tpm_buf_read_u32(&buf, &offset); - if (blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE || buf.flags & TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR) { + if (blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE || buf.flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) { rc = -E2BIG; goto out; } @@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, tpm_buf_append(&buf, blob, blob_len); - if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) { + if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) { rc = -E2BIG; tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); goto out; -- 2.53.0