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From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>, Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 5.15.y] asymmetric_keys: reject trust keys without IDs
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2026 12:16:45 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261028161610.943036-1-sashal@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2026102817-causation-protozoan-b0fc@gregkh>

From: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 9695df3b1db4ac4534274d38ee16e3b9b0bf910e ]

The PKCS#8 parser deliberately leaves the asym_key_ids payload slot
empty. key_or_keyring_common() unconditionally dereferences that slot
when a PKCS#8 key is supplied to a key_or_keyring restriction. Both the
plain and :chain forms reach this branch, allowing an unprivileged caller
to trigger a NULL pointer dereference through KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING
followed by add_key().

 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000
 KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
 RIP: 0010:key_or_keyring_common (crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c:205 crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c:279)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  __key_create_or_update (security/keys/key.c:884)
  key_create_or_update (security/keys/key.c:1021)
  __do_sys_add_key (security/keys/keyctl.c:134)
  do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83)
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
  </TASK>
 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

Reject an asymmetric restriction key without key IDs. A PKCS#8 private
key cannot identify the signer of a candidate certificate and is not a
valid trust anchor.

Fixes: 3c58b2362ba8 ("KEYS: Implement PKCS#8 RSA Private Key parser [ver #2]")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260429181629.110802-2-bestswngs@gmail.com
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
[ sashal: Reused the existing signer_ids structure pointer for the NULL check instead of introducing a separate kids variable. ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
index 84cefe3b35856..d95002812bb84 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
@@ -154,6 +154,8 @@ static int key_or_keyring_common(struct key *dest_keyring,
 			const struct asymmetric_key_ids *signer_ids;
 
 			signer_ids = asymmetric_key_ids(trusted);
+			if (!signer_ids)
+				return -ENOKEY;
 
 			/*
 			 * The auth_ids come from the candidate key (the
-- 
2.53.0


      reply	other threads:[~2026-10-28 16:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-28 14:20 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] asymmetric_keys: reject trust keys without IDs" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree gregkh
2026-10-28 16:16 ` Sasha Levin [this message]

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