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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	patches@lists.linux.dev, Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu>,
	Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Subject: [PATCH 7.3 27/38] asymmetric_keys: reject trust keys without IDs
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2026 18:00:14 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261028165941.095572709@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261028165940.394092994@linuxfoundation.org>

7.3-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>

commit 9695df3b1db4ac4534274d38ee16e3b9b0bf910e upstream.

The PKCS#8 parser deliberately leaves the asym_key_ids payload slot
empty. key_or_keyring_common() unconditionally dereferences that slot
when a PKCS#8 key is supplied to a key_or_keyring restriction. Both the
plain and :chain forms reach this branch, allowing an unprivileged caller
to trigger a NULL pointer dereference through KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING
followed by add_key().

 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000
 KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
 RIP: 0010:key_or_keyring_common (crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c:205 crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c:279)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  __key_create_or_update (security/keys/key.c:884)
  key_create_or_update (security/keys/key.c:1021)
  __do_sys_add_key (security/keys/keyctl.c:134)
  do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83)
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
  </TASK>
 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

Reject an asymmetric restriction key without key IDs. A PKCS#8 private
key cannot identify the signer of a candidate certificate and is not a
valid trust anchor.

Fixes: 3c58b2362ba8 ("KEYS: Implement PKCS#8 RSA Private Key parser [ver #2]")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260429181629.110802-2-bestswngs@gmail.com
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c |    8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
@@ -243,10 +243,14 @@ static int key_or_keyring_common(struct
 			if (IS_ERR(key))
 				key = NULL;
 		} else if (trusted->type == &key_type_asymmetric) {
+			const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids;
 			const struct asymmetric_key_id **signer_ids;
 
-			signer_ids = (const struct asymmetric_key_id **)
-				asymmetric_key_ids(trusted)->id;
+			kids = asymmetric_key_ids(trusted);
+			if (!kids)
+				return -ENOKEY;
+
+			signer_ids = (const struct asymmetric_key_id **)kids->id;
 
 			/*
 			 * The auth_ids come from the candidate key (the



  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-10-28 17:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-28 16:59 [PATCH 7.3 00/38] 7.3.1-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 16:59 ` [PATCH 7.3 01/38] genirq/proc: Fix missing CPU header in /proc/interrupts Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 16:59 ` [PATCH 7.3 02/38] mm/damon/core: error damos_commit_quota_goal() for zero target_value Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 16:59 ` [PATCH 7.3 03/38] Bluetooth: L2CAP: refuse __l2cap_chan_add if chan already has conn Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 16:59 ` [PATCH 7.3 04/38] tools/dma: fix building with O= Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 16:59 ` [PATCH 7.3 05/38] tracing: Hold trace_types_lock when updating modules in persistent instances Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 16:59 ` [PATCH 7.3 06/38] tracing: Hold trace_types_lock when resetting last boot data from readers Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 16:59 ` [PATCH 7.3 07/38] tracing: Reject incomplete event filter expressions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 16:59 ` [PATCH 7.3 08/38] tracing: Save the event file instead of the compatible histogram Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 16:59 ` [PATCH 7.3 09/38] tracing: Unregister field variable histograms when the command fails Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 16:59 ` [PATCH 7.3 10/38] tracing: Add the bucket size to expr_field_str() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 16:59 ` [PATCH 7.3 11/38] tracing: Fix 64-bit and signed histogram fields on 32-bit kernels Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 16:59 ` [PATCH 7.3 12/38] tracing/histograms: Verify event_call identity when updating synth_event refcount Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 17:00 ` [PATCH 7.3 13/38] tracing/syscalls: Use copy_from_user for the faultable syscall buffer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 17:00 ` [PATCH 7.3 14/38] io_uring/poll: avoid retry wakeup loss when dropping ownership Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-29  7:53   ` Jiri Slaby
2026-10-29  9:07     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 17:00 ` [PATCH 7.3 15/38] io_uring/wait: wake real-time waiters from hard interrupt context Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 17:00 ` [PATCH 7.3 16/38] io_uring/net: keep recv buffer select length within MAX_RW_COUNT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 17:00 ` [PATCH 7.3 17/38] io_uring/waitid: prevent cancel reference wrap Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 17:00 ` [PATCH 7.3 18/38] io_uring: end the drain when the drain request completes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 17:00 ` [PATCH 7.3 19/38] keys: Avoid the owner account dereference in named keyring lookup Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 17:00 ` [PATCH 7.3 20/38] keys: Check the authorization payload in process keyring searches Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 17:00 ` [PATCH 7.3 21/38] keys: Protect the type name while describing a key Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 17:00 ` [PATCH 7.3 22/38] keys: make keyring indexes independent of kernel addresses Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 17:00 ` [PATCH 7.3 23/38] keys: Protect the read method check against type removal Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 17:00 ` [PATCH 7.3 24/38] KEYS: Fix key_reject_and_link() race with keyring restriction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 17:00 ` [PATCH 7.3 25/38] KEYS: trusted: Fix blob allocation size in tpm2_key_decode() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 17:00 ` [PATCH 7.3 26/38] keys/trusted_keys: return immediately after TPM unseal failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 17:00 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2026-10-28 17:00 ` [PATCH 7.3 28/38] ftrace: Initialize modname and offset in print_rec() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 17:00 ` [PATCH 7.3 29/38] coredump: hold RCU while releasing parked threads Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 17:00 ` [PATCH 7.3 30/38] signal: only SIGKILL and the freezers interrupt a coredumping task Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 17:00 ` [PATCH 7.3 31/38] io-wq: order the exit bit against worker creation task work Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 17:00 ` [PATCH 7.3 32/38] signal: dont retarget shared signals in a dying thread group Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 17:00 ` [PATCH 7.3 33/38] ptrace: refuse to change the signal mask of a user worker Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 17:00 ` [PATCH 7.3 34/38] fork: release the files of a failed fork after sched_cancel_fork() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 17:00 ` [PATCH 7.3 35/38] exit: hang up the tty before closing the files Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 17:00 ` [PATCH 7.3 36/38] coredump: prevent TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL from interrupting coredumps Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 17:00 ` [PATCH 7.3 37/38] pid_namespace: prevent TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL from interrupting the reaper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 17:00 ` [PATCH 7.3 38/38] signal: allow taks to temporarily block TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-10-28 18:08 ` [PATCH 7.3 00/38] 7.3.1-rc1 review Ronald Warsow
2026-10-28 19:40 ` Brett A C Sheffield
2026-10-29  4:01 ` Takeshi Ogasawara
2026-10-29  5:00 ` Peter Schneider
2026-10-29 12:06 ` Barry K. Nathan
2026-10-29 13:53 ` Miguel Ojeda
2026-10-29 14:12 ` Ron Economos
2026-10-29 14:42 ` SJ Park
2026-10-29 15:17 ` Shuah Khan
2026-10-29 17:48 ` Florian Fainelli

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