From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1793700943; b=i5g+JysTe0AXnHVi9dt+qfHZtZ6JicfrlRaYjwcQpihuFMZl/hvHcd+PNY9VGwcs8UYM BYKnOzxm1FkbriVwA7J+HJb7VzTcfOeefrXV0nxfTIGzkpShHv92YUJaYYZHuIiq4vIez 8reDog6dRy+v0RFBS1Iwy8Jy2dIs5mO5zE8IqWct1aS93ouxR0L4vVxkZdwQClwGVLd0/ IWxpev6lnkwkz4sDuqsaq54mmwRs/HCgilJbpvzU7fxe/Dzk7o31OPaIUWOCGWbicG7nw ZhatqQS8fTHvr2vfrZPt8cnjGN8SZEQzojNBkagPQzgAiujS+PjQ136fuY3gcK721Rw== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1793700943; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:Subject:To:Cc:From:Date:Message-ID: MIME-Version:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding; bh=3eYPYKBjBXmnKf5Sg/q/KG1XpJwC9ltPjWuNSXGiypc=; b=hwAnfpFOwrR8zsASsbY6ISzHYefJBt7quru9Yn29Lfg1nNInYSCd4ldl1I2516p+xqBV av5pti5fWvSVbFdkYeD5yTfHFYoe4WQHXbvlnqlpvE9PWLjsh1T9YA5hK5qQXRfjhDc1j WGuTnNEgDJBmwUO15gkl+NQGPs6wAVnCLb5TMmYD465/NLiksBxbs1JHT6ngJ7f4GLzEQ k9jOzH4FvUzlcXml18+RCoyNnSMtkYTEN/pWiRX4CBcHbSY8uyRFzQnqHsfPGCsNBkHHi 2U6DGh9GV+ZNwrpehuZrhIeXGcOLWNHCFLsg0BBBFJUZEFcFhLdgr+SdSCd5e2n9zPg== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=wLCqFKQH; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D1AAB606D819 for ; Tue, 3 Nov 2026 10:15:42 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key, unprotected) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=wLCqFKQH Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 399F01F000C1; Tue, 3 Nov 2026 10:15:42 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1793700942; bh=3eYPYKBjBXmnKf5Sg/q/KG1XpJwC9ltPjWuNSXGiypc=; h=Subject:To:Cc:From:Date; b=wLCqFKQHAn2LLdrPuFSKxZT7iWLe91+qZV2YbkQ5MnHpG4Bz7uRsrhSUyTRaYuvGx didBf+PDNYbJUJWMURqqEbqPgkRwsgjewZUCII36PnCOlPbt0GF4WO+IuADMfolT3Q EM+7bLoUhHIqN4Kw+dtu9yepl/E1TzYVIrJZLahE= Subject: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ksmbd: deny access for an empty DACL instead of granting the" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree To: elb12345@hotmail.co.uk,linkinjeon@kernel.org Cc: From: Date: Tue, 03 Nov 2026 11:15:39 +0100 Message-ID: <2026110339-patient-entitle-d5cd@gregkh> X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ANSI_X3.4-1968 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to . To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x de0cffef897c1c232ed973f89928cd6c93d0b1e3 # git commit -s git send-email --to '' --in-reply-to '2026110339-patient-entitle-d5cd@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' 'HEAD^..' Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From de0cffef897c1c232ed973f89928cd6c93d0b1e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Aamir Ahmed Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:49:27 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] ksmbd: deny access for an empty DACL instead of granting the request smb_check_perm_dacl() returns the access mask it computes to the SMB2 CREATE handler, which uses it as the granted access for the open. For a security descriptor whose DACL is present but contains no ACEs, the function is supposed to deny access: an empty (non-NULL) DACL grants no access to anyone except the object owner's implicit READ_CONTROL and WRITE_DAC (MS-DTYP 2.4.5). The empty-DACL branch only denies when both - the DACL has no trailing bytes (pdacl_size == sizeof(struct smb_acl)), and - the request contains bits beyond READ_CONTROL / WRITE_DAC. In every other case it takes the shared "goto err_out" with rc still 0, which returns success without modifying *pdaccess, so the caller grants the full requested access. Three problems follow: - The READ_CONTROL / WRITE_DAC carve-out models the owner's implicit rights, but the check runs before is_owner is computed, so those rights are handed to *every* caller, not just the owner. For READ_CONTROL the SMB2 CREATE path does not fall back to inode_permission(), so any user can read the security descriptor of an object whose empty DACL is meant to deny them. - A request of exactly READ_CONTROL and/or WRITE_DAC is granted to any caller. WRITE_DAC lets the handle rewrite the DACL. - A DACL that declares zero ACEs but carries trailing bytes (pdacl_size > sizeof(struct smb_acl)) skips the deny entirely and is granted whatever was requested. On shares where the NT ACL is the authoritative access control -- e.g. "force user" shares, where every client maps to one POSIX identity so POSIX cannot distinguish users -- this is an access-control bypass. Compute is_owner before the empty-DACL branch and deny access from an empty DACL unless the caller is the owner requesting no more than READ_CONTROL / WRITE_DAC. Fixes: e2f34481b24d ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Aamir Ahmed Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon diff --git a/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c b/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c index c959699ace56..664f01263611 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c @@ -1502,21 +1502,27 @@ int smb_check_perm_dacl(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, const struct path *path, if (pdacl_size > acl_size || pdacl_size < sizeof(struct smb_acl)) goto err_out; - if (!pdacl->num_aces) { - if (!(pdacl_size - sizeof(struct smb_acl)) && - *pdaccess & ~(FILE_READ_CONTROL_LE | FILE_WRITE_DAC_LE)) { - rc = -EACCES; - goto err_out; - } - goto err_out; - } - if (!uid) sid_type = SIDUNIX_USER; id_to_sid(uid, sid_type, &sid); vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, d_inode(path->dentry)); is_owner = uid == from_kuid(&init_user_ns, vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid)); + if (!pdacl->num_aces) { + /* + * An empty (present, zero-ACE) DACL grants no access to + * anyone except the object owner's implicit READ_CONTROL + * and WRITE_DAC (MS-DTYP 2.4.5). Deny every other caller, + * deny the owner any access beyond those two bits, and do + * not let trailing bytes after a zero-ACE DACL become an + * implicit grant. + */ + if (!is_owner || + (*pdaccess & ~(FILE_READ_CONTROL_LE | FILE_WRITE_DAC_LE))) + rc = -EACCES; + goto err_out; + } + if (*pdaccess & FILE_MAXIMAL_ACCESS_LE) { ace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)pdacl + sizeof(struct smb_acl)); aces_size = pdacl_size - sizeof(struct smb_acl);