From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1793835991; b=evMPuX/oKXvbxXx042XUoMG9mcy3FwJUn+gS0LR6XphqOLNwm9P8ihtuNk1r7bw7s7R5 OYBWvSywER6a3dPbI2iEIYgia9oBxsBlDlPfsF0VYQzq/GO5N8lmT1aD670enUp+wRdIo D62eW+PBneUpNu0LFWzR11JhWWZsGeS2Ff5d0vEOXlYm9PZo9HjDs9Ugm+b4H+08pIYbn a4Qh0mXHQEHnEi8y7bK8Ss4mIcaQ40oSy5TXboFJ2QhvqPgzWo50dw4aI+vwG1hfW+mad nKpzdH1mRlJkIraqP3lmSMMqk0OBImGZG5al2XtT6bJOlCnLlqULvUcEa+d3gou+Jaw== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1793835991; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:X-Mailer: In-Reply-To:References:MIME-Version:Content-Transfer-Encoding; bh=WaDki5iflaF1gpBkOLCWiItVv0liaRuAFDb6zs0UdOM=; b=SKo1lP9+GlyCumhP+0X9IWckrxscb/8ojRtJHuwsubD2Vtpk+ueL+jR6HHmAOGHQfo1J hYMv5Lg/A9EQnmZgfN9pG3NXU+XSr89QiUNRXxQZSdgUeLROG586y5pR8PpNl12MGowzy M0c5rQD7yCe3po1TVYQ88H6eQpLP5EaSOkzZ5vlVQ0aF7OHBePbAjoXlMkkAfmgl2sm/u IWrv/ZpjqHLRfkr0px8RQgz/J5jYeTIzWJvjeat0ZPKwe/wZzQa/QWRxoqReDmK4G4+31 4klDEXeqYmw7YUbkeV0uidyD7l3y5Hs/wQpTLBuUPSFTCujrbVFIg8WF8jtmi9UR5rQ== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=Kg6hAPn9; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B44C3606A32C for ; Wed, 4 Nov 2026 23:46:30 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key, unprotected) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=Kg6hAPn9 Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id E680F1F0093A; Wed, 4 Nov 2026 23:46:29 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1793835990; bh=WaDki5iflaF1gpBkOLCWiItVv0liaRuAFDb6zs0UdOM=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=Kg6hAPn9mC1xY1npR67Bsx+q6N2/hs15GsOXM03DmyH/KbIKsVgH1n6xoMUAQi8CH yyQC3MtEWh0/Rwq4EEbinzIaP5kQQ+xjRijyNuFtNtF+gj2rmq5TypHjyW2Sz+JUFP DkJ57Zcmg0red722XqKawQtRT4L1A8u5fLd4bAuYsg54Hg0IxI2luITSnq64y3M16t RNI66awg9JysLdwGyUFKE5whcdtkfzuotPl9beEVv76878sPfjDkJlmAFEw5xmLXwm RVh5ka/ZU/jbecxsA4GwgfRER5UwA1KU7g5DxHyo0A2htVpyecH4sVvI5xcmz5AYWl 1MPWPHljraMyA== From: Sasha Levin To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Tianchu Chen , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.18.y 2/2] staging: rtl8723bs: fix protected RX frame validation in decrypt path Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2026 18:46:27 -0500 Message-ID: <20261104234538.932811-2-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.53.0 In-Reply-To: <20261104234538.932811-1-sashal@kernel.org> References: <2026110447-escalate-hull-6ee2@gregkh> <20261104234538.932811-1-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Tianchu Chen [ Upstream commit 495cb31c791bdf3f9efef255a9587b05b0526c9d ] The RX software decrypt path mishandles crafted protected frames from a malicious AP in two ways: 1) decryptor() never checks that a protected frame is long enough to hold the 802.11 header plus the per-cipher trailer. All of rtw_wep_decrypt(), rtw_tkip_decrypt() and rtw_aes_decrypt() compute length = hdr.len - hdrlen - iv_len; and act on the result, and recvframe_chkmic() similarly computes datalen = hdr.len - hdrlen - iv_len - icv_len - 8; for TKIP (the 8-byte Michael MIC is not accounted for in icv_len). A frame shorter than hdrlen + iv_len + icv_len (+ 8 for TKIP) underflows these unsigned subtractions, turning into a ~4 GiB iteration count in aes_decipher()/arc4_crypt()/rtw_seccalctkipmic() or a ~4 GiB crc32_le() length, causing out-of-bounds reads/writes of up to ~4 GiB starting from the rx skb. Reject such frames in decryptor() before touching the IV; this covers all three ciphers and the TKIP MIC check, and also keeps the unconditional iv[3] access within the frame. 2) validate_80211w_mgmt() keeps using the frame - two memcpys through the stale rx_data pointer and a pkt_len update - before checking whether decryptor() returned NULL. On decrypt failure (e.g. a unicast protected deauth/disassoc/action frame with a bad MIC, which this path always software-decrypts) the skb has already been freed, so this is a use-after-free read/write, and the caller's error path frees the frame a second time, drifting free_recvframe_cnt. Bail out immediately when decryptor() fails, freeing the temporary mgmt_DATA buffer first. Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine. Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Assisted-by: LLM Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tianchu Chen Link: https://patch.msgid.link/8ee3bdd1c45034200cb1aa9a7e9b575b9584643a@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c index 9f9d80e42e4db..f8ade0bea1da0 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c @@ -437,8 +437,21 @@ static union recv_frame *decryptor(struct adapter *padapter, union recv_frame *p u32 res = _SUCCESS; if (prxattrib->encrypt > 0) { - u8 *iv = precv_frame->u.hdr.rx_data + prxattrib->hdrlen; + u8 *iv; + u32 min_len = prxattrib->hdrlen + prxattrib->iv_len + prxattrib->icv_len; + /* TKIP appends an 8-byte Michael MIC that icv_len doesn't account for */ + if (prxattrib->encrypt == _TKIP_) + min_len += 8; + + /* a protected frame must be long enough to hold the IV and ICV/MIC */ + if (precv_frame->u.hdr.len < min_len) { + rtw_free_recvframe(precv_frame, + &padapter->recvpriv.free_recv_queue); + return NULL; + } + + iv = precv_frame->u.hdr.rx_data + prxattrib->hdrlen; prxattrib->key_index = (((iv[3]) >> 6) & 0x3); if (prxattrib->key_index > WEP_KEYS) { @@ -1411,6 +1424,10 @@ static signed int validate_80211w_mgmt(struct adapter *adapter, union recv_frame if (!mgmt_DATA) goto validate_80211w_fail; precv_frame = decryptor(adapter, precv_frame); + if (!precv_frame) { + kfree(mgmt_DATA); + goto validate_80211w_fail; + } /* save actual management data frame body */ memcpy(mgmt_DATA, ptr + pattrib->hdrlen + pattrib->iv_len, data_len); /* overwrite the iv field */ @@ -1418,8 +1435,6 @@ static signed int validate_80211w_mgmt(struct adapter *adapter, union recv_frame /* remove the iv and icv length */ pattrib->pkt_len = pattrib->pkt_len - pattrib->iv_len - pattrib->icv_len; kfree(mgmt_DATA); - if (!precv_frame) - goto validate_80211w_fail; } else if (is_multicast_ether_addr(GetAddr1Ptr(ptr)) && (subtype == WIFI_DEAUTH || subtype == WIFI_DISASSOC)) { signed int BIP_ret = _SUCCESS; -- 2.53.0