From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1793802049; b=4hqe9fVFTNNaU5IsJCVdt/o4xlE+nIRyp0hfKAQVTiM7bbkRiuKwLDK+bpwE2W/qL9/+ +zb/A0PfutjikGIlFAOQ9aOup+wheJhby9Vn/h6l8TgCC7hN7E/EhR4FmkkZaz2pB2FwC 4OUpntH3KAF8Q105n4P9OXtvrbtN52VQqAun/Na2TGYVGyBNzulNAJqHj7Ul2psYyd/H1 PY/OB+8buFDiSDDj+bpjh6L4SxbuWWMGzcj8VPJVZsmRnUUkuEMgNIO8Y9Xoet0QQzjhc dtb4bLYh5tQmGJpcJSrrcFN0LIkiAp0hDac6asO0zimewlF2UHxfjIZWnBWLenGzSWg== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1793802049; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:Subject:To:Cc:From:Date:Message-ID: MIME-Version:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding; bh=VBOJDrn+UNlYVMp0q2MsVVFtO3R41DCo5LHq362N290=; b=ZqpcCIzh1Qy+UOLKHDI/kvxySFapK5E/DShuqoEkHTC87OzIAW/soY/zDtPJ9g8EOh67 Ggro2BwrgbPt1I+A2L85H5hnNjRivA4EhUhCYkd7EbLk9T7TcLVm2oqYoFmJ+PcHVT9l/ vh1GboLzs5m7utfweb6JC6ajraFuLXaWN4ow67yO3gFVIBaSxgpkRrYitF3hwyAmQoHG3 wiXXeFm6fc2s1rT6jfPXuj9BHIJ/pO+xLxHj9VPLVc7FaBytCYu9aSn2xQBwF4u2/0w35 w/1Ffk387zOs3ZdltAfAiuRlHGhhdF3xew9BDtmGKG1es6xSJFzv6qzaNnh33SsVR8A== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=kzmym8DU; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C7223606A326 for ; Wed, 4 Nov 2026 14:20:48 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key, unprotected) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=kzmym8DU Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 1F52D1F00919; Wed, 4 Nov 2026 14:20:48 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1793802048; bh=VBOJDrn+UNlYVMp0q2MsVVFtO3R41DCo5LHq362N290=; h=Subject:To:Cc:From:Date; b=kzmym8DUYEURmeL/oCOZIBLvWG8u3TBpPVCWV0gCDq+a8tTwEF5XRIodt4D7RxHPc ZaDzFC/nrlGpcix//hEgcpEXR69H+t++A/CHK9mu+li8qOw0mEBsno2+V5GM3xarwy Bc1XwwlQ5hoz5LQ64k4IuhDRtiKYeUbo/Ccj8Kts= Subject: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] staging: rtl8723bs: fix protected RX frame validation in" failed to apply to 6.18-stable tree To: flynnnchen@tencent.com,gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: From: Date: Wed, 04 Nov 2026 15:20:47 +0100 Message-ID: <2026110447-escalate-hull-6ee2@gregkh> X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ANSI_X3.4-1968 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The patch below does not apply to the 6.18-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to . To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.18.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 495cb31c791bdf3f9efef255a9587b05b0526c9d # git commit -s git send-email --to '' --in-reply-to '2026110447-escalate-hull-6ee2@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.18.y' 'HEAD^..' Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 495cb31c791bdf3f9efef255a9587b05b0526c9d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tianchu Chen Date: Wed, 9 Sep 2026 08:06:26 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] staging: rtl8723bs: fix protected RX frame validation in decrypt path The RX software decrypt path mishandles crafted protected frames from a malicious AP in two ways: 1) decryptor() never checks that a protected frame is long enough to hold the 802.11 header plus the per-cipher trailer. All of rtw_wep_decrypt(), rtw_tkip_decrypt() and rtw_aes_decrypt() compute length = hdr.len - hdrlen - iv_len; and act on the result, and recvframe_chkmic() similarly computes datalen = hdr.len - hdrlen - iv_len - icv_len - 8; for TKIP (the 8-byte Michael MIC is not accounted for in icv_len). A frame shorter than hdrlen + iv_len + icv_len (+ 8 for TKIP) underflows these unsigned subtractions, turning into a ~4 GiB iteration count in aes_decipher()/arc4_crypt()/rtw_seccalctkipmic() or a ~4 GiB crc32_le() length, causing out-of-bounds reads/writes of up to ~4 GiB starting from the rx skb. Reject such frames in decryptor() before touching the IV; this covers all three ciphers and the TKIP MIC check, and also keeps the unconditional iv[3] access within the frame. 2) validate_80211w_mgmt() keeps using the frame - two memcpys through the stale rx_data pointer and a pkt_len update - before checking whether decryptor() returned NULL. On decrypt failure (e.g. a unicast protected deauth/disassoc/action frame with a bad MIC, which this path always software-decrypts) the skb has already been freed, so this is a use-after-free read/write, and the caller's error path frees the frame a second time, drifting free_recvframe_cnt. Bail out immediately when decryptor() fails, freeing the temporary mgmt_DATA buffer first. Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine. Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Assisted-by: LLM Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tianchu Chen Link: https://patch.msgid.link/8ee3bdd1c45034200cb1aa9a7e9b575b9584643a@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c index dde66b68d5e3..0434c2166837 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c @@ -416,8 +416,21 @@ static union recv_frame *decryptor(struct adapter *padapter, union recv_frame *p u32 res = _SUCCESS; if (prxattrib->encrypt > 0) { - u8 *iv = precv_frame->u.hdr.rx_data + prxattrib->hdrlen; + u8 *iv; + u32 min_len = prxattrib->hdrlen + prxattrib->iv_len + prxattrib->icv_len; + /* TKIP appends an 8-byte Michael MIC that icv_len doesn't account for */ + if (prxattrib->encrypt == _TKIP_) + min_len += 8; + + /* a protected frame must be long enough to hold the IV and ICV/MIC */ + if (precv_frame->u.hdr.len < min_len) { + rtw_free_recvframe(precv_frame, + &padapter->recvpriv.free_recv_queue); + return NULL; + } + + iv = precv_frame->u.hdr.rx_data + prxattrib->hdrlen; prxattrib->key_index = (((iv[3]) >> 6) & 0x3); if (prxattrib->key_index > WEP_KEYS) { @@ -1358,6 +1371,10 @@ static signed int validate_80211w_mgmt(struct adapter *adapter, union recv_frame if (!mgmt_DATA) goto validate_80211w_fail; precv_frame = decryptor(adapter, precv_frame); + if (!precv_frame) { + kfree(mgmt_DATA); + goto validate_80211w_fail; + } /* save actual management data frame body */ memcpy(mgmt_DATA, ptr + pattrib->hdrlen + pattrib->iv_len, data_len); /* overwrite the iv field */ @@ -1365,8 +1382,6 @@ static signed int validate_80211w_mgmt(struct adapter *adapter, union recv_frame /* remove the iv and icv length */ pattrib->pkt_len = pattrib->pkt_len - pattrib->iv_len - pattrib->icv_len; kfree(mgmt_DATA); - if (!precv_frame) - goto validate_80211w_fail; } else if (is_multicast_ether_addr(GetAddr1Ptr(ptr)) && (subtype == WIFI_DEAUTH || subtype == WIFI_DISASSOC)) { signed int BIP_ret = _SUCCESS;