From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1794060578; b=mj/MYFj5BqrQIn08YigWIe+OQrE8p9UOr9kq7BqLLEI4vADMT9oD6qso3ek5/PTEKPCG GcMkXmx0ZCpwtls97G2qY5m0tORw35P4OqtUrBX+grLcVbmwLnmpdSLTKYTfBKtDDT+k/ qVALUnxnDOp4ULcK3h8qYDeAsNNHs7aQ3pYmveRVhUjezxNEF4uFuRPXT8yrcxOdFzahs Am+xYtWataHXIuA14TiRdqmeePB0HZLOnptjvBUP+Kt3q4oqZ8j+pB+BjUOfCVE5oLdtj lFX5iuIrpxGfD8xk6kEh0st6lOcwQRo/TI4sY8+IpqybjE1QtHD1D1MNH7a37upa1sA== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1794060578; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:X-Mailer: In-Reply-To:References:User-Agent:X-stable:X-Patchwork-Hint: MIME-Version:Content-Transfer-Encoding; bh=CR+VsrMhjR9BVTcIk3x8c3V8OHWD3YRuR54mPqgXxSo=; b=Nlk+8MRIARgtjnWMuXWecF2s6GL57JmWQxGIIsneAEKvAlmWxHr7YNRhifrQuxbhD7Eq 3RJxcge+3Fw61w4FlubF+vuxuJkgffFeojzMcaYjwZWQIQH7Yl1tV7RwNt8eUuBnhdSzd y7qFpUCTem9DuKuyv1IdrrnqSTuhTYwyHhmixu/izhn0r6qctLXm5Pb4+DVoJVZHGZW2k y9QH13EPZ87XWn6d3/Axko3KyIk26vPETzxh1Sv1ZE7+6s2wbRcbwGgbMyIysZzMN1m0R r+YibxTt0c+Vsy5EFs1vJ/AAcBdRZw6VWy5h0QOSpi/bPMha0MPdqKVCBVUWvyPZsIg== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=tZ4LOvMm; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 558C4606A326; Sat, 7 Nov 2026 14:09:37 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=tZ4LOvMm Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id E291B1F0089F; Sat, 7 Nov 2026 14:09:36 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1794060577; bh=CR+VsrMhjR9BVTcIk3x8c3V8OHWD3YRuR54mPqgXxSo=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=tZ4LOvMmiF+8UXiz9409znD90Edj90yYyY/8svhj9vanjC/3fHqUobG2gcfZ4FaL5 fJ0aOx3T6RS0+vKiAnz0/0yCWe07YuivGPeujvna1/ybqmEoR2dlwl1coazJXnkteS 8gWaH1Ud8y65WpAQ6z8h0hu4vzvWrHR3FFDq/qIc= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.12 0009/1536] Revert "KVM: s390: move pv gmap functions into kvm" Date: Sat, 7 Nov 2026 08:33:45 -0500 Message-ID: <20261107134957.935874730@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.56.0 In-Reply-To: <20261107134957.653319350@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20261107134957.653319350@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ This reverts commit 0962b3d34c742be43c7488a7cad839e73ae08005. Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/s390/include/asm/gmap.h | 1 - arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h | 6 +- arch/s390/kernel/uv.c | 292 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- arch/s390/kvm/Makefile | 2 +- arch/s390/kvm/gmap.c | 212 ------------------------- arch/s390/kvm/gmap.h | 17 -- arch/s390/kvm/intercept.c | 3 +- arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c | 1 - arch/s390/kvm/pv.c | 21 --- arch/s390/mm/gmap.c | 28 ---- 10 files changed, 268 insertions(+), 315 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 arch/s390/kvm/gmap.c delete mode 100644 arch/s390/kvm/gmap.h diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/gmap.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/gmap.h index 22775b1ce7101..9725586f42597 100644 --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/gmap.h +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/gmap.h @@ -152,7 +152,6 @@ int s390_replace_asce(struct gmap *gmap); void s390_uv_destroy_pfns(unsigned long count, unsigned long *pfns); int __s390_uv_destroy_range(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, unsigned long end, bool interruptible); -int kvm_s390_wiggle_split_folio(struct mm_struct *mm, struct folio *folio, bool split); /** * s390_uv_destroy_range - Destroy a range of pages in the given mm. diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h index 5cd127654a860..153d93468b77c 100644 --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h @@ -476,12 +476,12 @@ static inline int is_prot_virt_host(void) } int uv_pin_shared(unsigned long paddr); +int gmap_make_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr, void *uvcb); +int gmap_destroy_page(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr); int uv_destroy_folio(struct folio *folio); int uv_destroy_pte(pte_t pte); int uv_convert_from_secure_pte(pte_t pte); -int make_folio_secure(struct folio *folio, struct uv_cb_header *uvcb); -int uv_convert_from_secure(unsigned long paddr); -int uv_convert_from_secure_folio(struct folio *folio); +int gmap_convert_to_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr); void setup_uv(void); diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c index 23c3637f5014b..9646f773208a1 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c @@ -19,6 +19,19 @@ #include #include +#if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM) +unsigned long __gmap_translate(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr) +{ + return 0; +} + +int gmap_fault(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr, + unsigned int fault_flags) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif + /* the bootdata_preserved fields come from ones in arch/s390/boot/uv.c */ int __bootdata_preserved(prot_virt_guest); EXPORT_SYMBOL(prot_virt_guest); @@ -146,7 +159,6 @@ int uv_destroy_folio(struct folio *folio) folio_put(folio); return rc; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(uv_destroy_folio); /* * The present PTE still indirectly holds a folio reference through the mapping. @@ -163,7 +175,7 @@ int uv_destroy_pte(pte_t pte) * * @paddr: Absolute host address of page to be exported */ -int uv_convert_from_secure(unsigned long paddr) +static int uv_convert_from_secure(unsigned long paddr) { struct uv_cb_cfs uvcb = { .header.cmd = UVC_CMD_CONV_FROM_SEC_STOR, @@ -175,12 +187,11 @@ int uv_convert_from_secure(unsigned long paddr) return -EINVAL; return 0; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_convert_from_secure); /* * The caller must already hold a reference to the folio. */ -int uv_convert_from_secure_folio(struct folio *folio) +static int uv_convert_from_secure_folio(struct folio *folio) { int rc; @@ -195,7 +206,6 @@ int uv_convert_from_secure_folio(struct folio *folio) folio_put(folio); return rc; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_convert_from_secure_folio); /* * The present PTE still indirectly holds a folio reference through the mapping. @@ -227,33 +237,13 @@ static int expected_folio_refs(struct folio *folio) return res; } -/** - * make_folio_secure() - make a folio secure - * @folio: the folio to make secure - * @uvcb: the uvcb that describes the UVC to be used - * - * The folio @folio will be made secure if possible, @uvcb will be passed - * as-is to the UVC. - * - * Return: 0 on success; - * -EBUSY if the folio is in writeback or has too many references; - * -E2BIG if the folio is large; - * -EAGAIN if the UVC needs to be attempted again; - * -ENXIO if the address is not mapped; - * -EINVAL if the UVC failed for other reasons. - * - * Context: The caller must hold exactly one extra reference on the folio - * (it's the same logic as split_folio()) - */ -int make_folio_secure(struct folio *folio, struct uv_cb_header *uvcb) +static int make_folio_secure(struct folio *folio, struct uv_cb_header *uvcb) { int expected, cc = 0; - if (folio_test_large(folio)) - return -E2BIG; if (folio_test_writeback(folio)) - return -EBUSY; - expected = expected_folio_refs(folio) + 1; + return -EAGAIN; + expected = expected_folio_refs(folio); if (!folio_ref_freeze(folio, expected)) return -EBUSY; set_bit(PG_arch_1, &folio->flags); @@ -277,7 +267,251 @@ int make_folio_secure(struct folio *folio, struct uv_cb_header *uvcb) return -EAGAIN; return uvcb->rc == 0x10a ? -ENXIO : -EINVAL; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(make_folio_secure); + +/** + * should_export_before_import - Determine whether an export is needed + * before an import-like operation + * @uvcb: the Ultravisor control block of the UVC to be performed + * @mm: the mm of the process + * + * Returns whether an export is needed before every import-like operation. + * This is needed for shared pages, which don't trigger a secure storage + * exception when accessed from a different guest. + * + * Although considered as one, the Unpin Page UVC is not an actual import, + * so it is not affected. + * + * No export is needed also when there is only one protected VM, because the + * page cannot belong to the wrong VM in that case (there is no "other VM" + * it can belong to). + * + * Return: true if an export is needed before every import, otherwise false. + */ +static bool should_export_before_import(struct uv_cb_header *uvcb, struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + /* + * The misc feature indicates, among other things, that importing a + * shared page from a different protected VM will automatically also + * transfer its ownership. + */ + if (uv_has_feature(BIT_UV_FEAT_MISC)) + return false; + if (uvcb->cmd == UVC_CMD_UNPIN_PAGE_SHARED) + return false; + return atomic_read(&mm->context.protected_count) > 1; +} + +/* + * Drain LRU caches: the local one on first invocation and the ones of all + * CPUs on successive invocations. Returns "true" on the first invocation. + */ +static bool drain_lru(bool *drain_lru_called) +{ + /* + * If we have tried a local drain and the folio refcount + * still does not match our expected safe value, try with a + * system wide drain. This is needed if the pagevecs holding + * the page are on a different CPU. + */ + if (*drain_lru_called) { + lru_add_drain_all(); + /* We give up here, don't retry immediately. */ + return false; + } + /* + * We are here if the folio refcount does not match the + * expected safe value. The main culprits are usually + * pagevecs. With lru_add_drain() we drain the pagevecs + * on the local CPU so that hopefully the refcount will + * reach the expected safe value. + */ + lru_add_drain(); + *drain_lru_called = true; + /* The caller should try again immediately */ + return true; +} + +/* + * Requests the Ultravisor to make a page accessible to a guest. + * If it's brought in the first time, it will be cleared. If + * it has been exported before, it will be decrypted and integrity + * checked. + */ +int gmap_make_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr, void *uvcb) +{ + struct vm_area_struct *vma; + bool drain_lru_called = false; + spinlock_t *ptelock; + unsigned long uaddr; + struct folio *folio; + pte_t *ptep; + int rc; + +again: + rc = -EFAULT; + mmap_read_lock(gmap->mm); + + uaddr = __gmap_translate(gmap, gaddr); + if (IS_ERR_VALUE(uaddr)) + goto out; + vma = vma_lookup(gmap->mm, uaddr); + if (!vma) + goto out; + /* + * Secure pages cannot be huge and userspace should not combine both. + * In case userspace does it anyway this will result in an -EFAULT for + * the unpack. The guest is thus never reaching secure mode. If + * userspace is playing dirty tricky with mapping huge pages later + * on this will result in a segmentation fault. + */ + if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)) + goto out; + + rc = -ENXIO; + ptep = get_locked_pte(gmap->mm, uaddr, &ptelock); + if (!ptep) + goto out; + if (pte_present(*ptep) && !(pte_val(*ptep) & _PAGE_INVALID) && pte_write(*ptep)) { + folio = page_folio(pte_page(*ptep)); + rc = -EAGAIN; + if (folio_test_large(folio)) { + rc = -E2BIG; + } else if (folio_trylock(folio)) { + if (should_export_before_import(uvcb, gmap->mm)) + uv_convert_from_secure(PFN_PHYS(folio_pfn(folio))); + rc = make_folio_secure(folio, uvcb); + folio_unlock(folio); + } + + /* + * Once we drop the PTL, the folio may get unmapped and + * freed immediately. We need a temporary reference. + */ + if (rc == -EAGAIN || rc == -E2BIG) + folio_get(folio); + } + pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptelock); +out: + mmap_read_unlock(gmap->mm); + + switch (rc) { + case -E2BIG: + folio_lock(folio); + rc = split_folio(folio); + folio_unlock(folio); + folio_put(folio); + + switch (rc) { + case 0: + /* Splitting succeeded, try again immediately. */ + goto again; + case -EAGAIN: + /* Additional folio references. */ + if (drain_lru(&drain_lru_called)) + goto again; + return -EAGAIN; + case -EBUSY: + /* Unexpected race. */ + return -EAGAIN; + } + WARN_ON_ONCE(1); + return -ENXIO; + case -EAGAIN: + /* + * If we are here because the UVC returned busy or partial + * completion, this is just a useless check, but it is safe. + */ + folio_wait_writeback(folio); + folio_put(folio); + return -EAGAIN; + case -EBUSY: + /* Additional folio references. */ + if (drain_lru(&drain_lru_called)) + goto again; + return -EAGAIN; + case -ENXIO: + if (gmap_fault(gmap, gaddr, FAULT_FLAG_WRITE)) + return -EFAULT; + return -EAGAIN; + } + return rc; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gmap_make_secure); + +int gmap_convert_to_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr) +{ + struct uv_cb_cts uvcb = { + .header.cmd = UVC_CMD_CONV_TO_SEC_STOR, + .header.len = sizeof(uvcb), + .guest_handle = gmap->guest_handle, + .gaddr = gaddr, + }; + + return gmap_make_secure(gmap, gaddr, &uvcb); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gmap_convert_to_secure); + +/** + * gmap_destroy_page - Destroy a guest page. + * @gmap: the gmap of the guest + * @gaddr: the guest address to destroy + * + * An attempt will be made to destroy the given guest page. If the attempt + * fails, an attempt is made to export the page. If both attempts fail, an + * appropriate error is returned. + */ +int gmap_destroy_page(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr) +{ + struct vm_area_struct *vma; + struct folio_walk fw; + unsigned long uaddr; + struct folio *folio; + int rc; + + rc = -EFAULT; + mmap_read_lock(gmap->mm); + + uaddr = __gmap_translate(gmap, gaddr); + if (IS_ERR_VALUE(uaddr)) + goto out; + vma = vma_lookup(gmap->mm, uaddr); + if (!vma) + goto out; + /* + * Huge pages should not be able to become secure + */ + if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)) + goto out; + + rc = 0; + folio = folio_walk_start(&fw, vma, uaddr, 0); + if (!folio) + goto out; + /* + * See gmap_make_secure(): large folios cannot be secure. Small + * folio implies FW_LEVEL_PTE. + */ + if (folio_test_large(folio) || !pte_write(fw.pte)) + goto out_walk_end; + rc = uv_destroy_folio(folio); + /* + * Fault handlers can race; it is possible that two CPUs will fault + * on the same secure page. One CPU can destroy the page, reboot, + * re-enter secure mode and import it, while the second CPU was + * stuck at the beginning of the handler. At some point the second + * CPU will be able to progress, and it will not be able to destroy + * the page. In that case we do not want to terminate the process, + * we instead try to export the page. + */ + if (rc) + rc = uv_convert_from_secure_folio(folio); +out_walk_end: + folio_walk_end(&fw, vma); +out: + mmap_read_unlock(gmap->mm); + return rc; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gmap_destroy_page); /* * To be called with the folio locked or with an extra reference! This will diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/Makefile b/arch/s390/kvm/Makefile index d972dea657fd1..02217fb4ae10f 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/Makefile +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/Makefile @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include $(srctree)/virt/kvm/Makefile.kvm ccflags-y := -Ivirt/kvm -Iarch/s390/kvm kvm-y += kvm-s390.o intercept.o interrupt.o priv.o sigp.o -kvm-y += diag.o gaccess.o guestdbg.o vsie.o pv.o gmap.o +kvm-y += diag.o gaccess.o guestdbg.o vsie.o pv.o kvm-$(CONFIG_VFIO_PCI_ZDEV_KVM) += pci.o obj-$(CONFIG_KVM) += kvm.o diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/gmap.c b/arch/s390/kvm/gmap.c deleted file mode 100644 index 02adf151d4de4..0000000000000 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/gmap.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,212 +0,0 @@ -// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -/* - * Guest memory management for KVM/s390 - * - * Copyright IBM Corp. 2008, 2020, 2024 - * - * Author(s): Claudio Imbrenda - * Martin Schwidefsky - * David Hildenbrand - * Janosch Frank - */ - -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include - -#include -#include -#include - -#include "gmap.h" - -/** - * should_export_before_import - Determine whether an export is needed - * before an import-like operation - * @uvcb: the Ultravisor control block of the UVC to be performed - * @mm: the mm of the process - * - * Returns whether an export is needed before every import-like operation. - * This is needed for shared pages, which don't trigger a secure storage - * exception when accessed from a different guest. - * - * Although considered as one, the Unpin Page UVC is not an actual import, - * so it is not affected. - * - * No export is needed also when there is only one protected VM, because the - * page cannot belong to the wrong VM in that case (there is no "other VM" - * it can belong to). - * - * Return: true if an export is needed before every import, otherwise false. - */ -static bool should_export_before_import(struct uv_cb_header *uvcb, struct mm_struct *mm) -{ - /* - * The misc feature indicates, among other things, that importing a - * shared page from a different protected VM will automatically also - * transfer its ownership. - */ - if (uv_has_feature(BIT_UV_FEAT_MISC)) - return false; - if (uvcb->cmd == UVC_CMD_UNPIN_PAGE_SHARED) - return false; - return atomic_read(&mm->context.protected_count) > 1; -} - -static int __gmap_make_secure(struct gmap *gmap, struct page *page, void *uvcb) -{ - struct folio *folio = page_folio(page); - int rc; - - /* - * Secure pages cannot be huge and userspace should not combine both. - * In case userspace does it anyway this will result in an -EFAULT for - * the unpack. The guest is thus never reaching secure mode. - * If userspace plays dirty tricks and decides to map huge pages at a - * later point in time, it will receive a segmentation fault or - * KVM_RUN will return -EFAULT. - */ - if (folio_test_hugetlb(folio)) - return -EFAULT; - if (folio_test_large(folio)) { - mmap_read_unlock(gmap->mm); - rc = kvm_s390_wiggle_split_folio(gmap->mm, folio, true); - mmap_read_lock(gmap->mm); - if (rc) - return rc; - folio = page_folio(page); - } - - if (!folio_trylock(folio)) - return -EAGAIN; - if (should_export_before_import(uvcb, gmap->mm)) - uv_convert_from_secure(folio_to_phys(folio)); - rc = make_folio_secure(folio, uvcb); - folio_unlock(folio); - - /* - * In theory a race is possible and the folio might have become - * large again before the folio_trylock() above. In that case, no - * action is performed and -EAGAIN is returned; the callers will - * have to try again later. - * In most cases this implies running the VM again, getting the same - * exception again, and make another attempt in this function. - * This is expected to happen extremely rarely. - */ - if (rc == -E2BIG) - return -EAGAIN; - /* The folio has too many references, try to shake some off */ - if (rc == -EBUSY) { - mmap_read_unlock(gmap->mm); - kvm_s390_wiggle_split_folio(gmap->mm, folio, false); - mmap_read_lock(gmap->mm); - return -EAGAIN; - } - - return rc; -} - -/** - * gmap_make_secure() - make one guest page secure - * @gmap: the guest gmap - * @gaddr: the guest address that needs to be made secure - * @uvcb: the UVCB specifying which operation needs to be performed - * - * Context: needs to be called with kvm->srcu held. - * Return: 0 on success, < 0 in case of error (see __gmap_make_secure()). - */ -int gmap_make_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr, void *uvcb) -{ - struct kvm *kvm = gmap->private; - struct page *page; - int rc = 0; - - lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->srcu); - - page = gfn_to_page(kvm, gpa_to_gfn(gaddr)); - mmap_read_lock(gmap->mm); - if (page) - rc = __gmap_make_secure(gmap, page, uvcb); - kvm_release_page_clean(page); - mmap_read_unlock(gmap->mm); - - return rc; -} - -int gmap_convert_to_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr) -{ - struct uv_cb_cts uvcb = { - .header.cmd = UVC_CMD_CONV_TO_SEC_STOR, - .header.len = sizeof(uvcb), - .guest_handle = gmap->guest_handle, - .gaddr = gaddr, - }; - - return gmap_make_secure(gmap, gaddr, &uvcb); -} - -/** - * __gmap_destroy_page() - Destroy a guest page. - * @gmap: the gmap of the guest - * @page: the page to destroy - * - * An attempt will be made to destroy the given guest page. If the attempt - * fails, an attempt is made to export the page. If both attempts fail, an - * appropriate error is returned. - * - * Context: must be called holding the mm lock for gmap->mm - */ -static int __gmap_destroy_page(struct gmap *gmap, struct page *page) -{ - struct folio *folio = page_folio(page); - int rc; - - /* - * See gmap_make_secure(): large folios cannot be secure. Small - * folio implies FW_LEVEL_PTE. - */ - if (folio_test_large(folio)) - return -EFAULT; - - rc = uv_destroy_folio(folio); - /* - * Fault handlers can race; it is possible that two CPUs will fault - * on the same secure page. One CPU can destroy the page, reboot, - * re-enter secure mode and import it, while the second CPU was - * stuck at the beginning of the handler. At some point the second - * CPU will be able to progress, and it will not be able to destroy - * the page. In that case we do not want to terminate the process, - * we instead try to export the page. - */ - if (rc) - rc = uv_convert_from_secure_folio(folio); - - return rc; -} - -/** - * gmap_destroy_page() - Destroy a guest page. - * @gmap: the gmap of the guest - * @gaddr: the guest address to destroy - * - * An attempt will be made to destroy the given guest page. If the attempt - * fails, an attempt is made to export the page. If both attempts fail, an - * appropriate error is returned. - * - * Context: may sleep. - */ -int gmap_destroy_page(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr) -{ - struct page *page; - int rc = 0; - - mmap_read_lock(gmap->mm); - page = gfn_to_page(gmap->private, gpa_to_gfn(gaddr)); - if (page) - rc = __gmap_destroy_page(gmap, page); - kvm_release_page_clean(page); - mmap_read_unlock(gmap->mm); - return rc; -} diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/gmap.h b/arch/s390/kvm/gmap.h deleted file mode 100644 index f2b52ce29be3d..0000000000000 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/gmap.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,17 +0,0 @@ -/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -/* - * KVM guest address space mapping code - * - * Copyright IBM Corp. 2007, 2016, 2025 - * Author(s): Martin Schwidefsky - * Claudio Imbrenda - */ - -#ifndef ARCH_KVM_S390_GMAP_H -#define ARCH_KVM_S390_GMAP_H - -int gmap_make_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr, void *uvcb); -int gmap_convert_to_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr); -int gmap_destroy_page(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr); - -#endif diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/intercept.c b/arch/s390/kvm/intercept.c index deb2f2b3e5c33..9c4304d484de7 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/intercept.c +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/intercept.c @@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ #include "gaccess.h" #include "trace.h" #include "trace-s390.h" -#include "gmap.h" u8 kvm_s390_get_ilen(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { @@ -550,7 +549,7 @@ static int handle_pv_uvc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) * If the unpin did not succeed, the guest will exit again for the UVC * and we will retry the unpin. */ - if (rc == -EINVAL || rc == -ENXIO) + if (rc == -EINVAL) return 0; /* * If we got -EAGAIN here, we simply return it. It will eventually diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c index d7f2fa2a4b5f9..634460bcb8963 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c @@ -49,7 +49,6 @@ #include "kvm-s390.h" #include "gaccess.h" #include "pci.h" -#include "gmap.h" #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS #include "trace.h" diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/pv.c b/arch/s390/kvm/pv.c index 22c012aa5206b..75e81ba26d047 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/pv.c +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/pv.c @@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ #include #include #include "kvm-s390.h" -#include "gmap.h" bool kvm_s390_pv_is_protected(struct kvm *kvm) { @@ -639,28 +638,10 @@ static int unpack_one(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long addr, u64 tweak, .tweak[1] = offset, }; int ret = gmap_make_secure(kvm->arch.gmap, addr, &uvcb); - unsigned long vmaddr; - bool unlocked; *rc = uvcb.header.rc; *rrc = uvcb.header.rrc; - if (ret == -ENXIO) { - mmap_read_lock(kvm->mm); - vmaddr = gfn_to_hva(kvm, gpa_to_gfn(addr)); - if (kvm_is_error_hva(vmaddr)) { - ret = -EFAULT; - } else { - ret = fixup_user_fault(kvm->mm, vmaddr, FAULT_FLAG_WRITE, &unlocked); - if (!ret) - ret = __gmap_link(kvm->arch.gmap, addr, vmaddr); - } - mmap_read_unlock(kvm->mm); - if (!ret) - return -EAGAIN; - return ret; - } - if (ret && ret != -EAGAIN) KVM_UV_EVENT(kvm, 3, "PROTVIRT VM UNPACK: failed addr %llx with rc %x rrc %x", uvcb.gaddr, *rc, *rrc); @@ -679,8 +660,6 @@ int kvm_s390_pv_unpack(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, KVM_UV_EVENT(kvm, 3, "PROTVIRT VM UNPACK: start addr %lx size %lx", addr, size); - guard(srcu)(&kvm->srcu); - while (offset < size) { ret = unpack_one(kvm, addr, tweak, offset, rc, rrc); if (ret == -EAGAIN) { diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c b/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c index 2527c6574ad12..eb0b51a36be01 100644 --- a/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c +++ b/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c @@ -2982,31 +2982,3 @@ int s390_replace_asce(struct gmap *gmap) return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(s390_replace_asce); - -/** - * kvm_s390_wiggle_split_folio() - try to drain extra references to a folio and optionally split - * @mm: the mm containing the folio to work on - * @folio: the folio - * @split: whether to split a large folio - * - * Context: Must be called while holding an extra reference to the folio; - * the mm lock should not be held. - */ -int kvm_s390_wiggle_split_folio(struct mm_struct *mm, struct folio *folio, bool split) -{ - int rc; - - lockdep_assert_not_held(&mm->mmap_lock); - folio_wait_writeback(folio); - lru_add_drain_all(); - if (split) { - folio_lock(folio); - rc = split_folio(folio); - folio_unlock(folio); - - if (rc != -EBUSY) - return rc; - } - return -EAGAIN; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_s390_wiggle_split_folio); -- 2.53.0