From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1794080117; b=e8pTCx1BSAKT+Gbpdo6uFQKazIR+KKgdGghUjxExcmQrMGMPaHh13+dy1XxVpegBtxUA tn2YpFK09cH2aAplKGylfCo5mNObH+tsjUXnjvgocewOqqMZ9wxdVPhZhdGEcmpFnB8WW kRZ2u++KA3fMdjqR6QUAUU+4F9DnoL9nkHp/oWsoH6y2oT8pfYvrXKfRZ21PvjyJ8Q353 n7n+RSG+1rZUcZIuMfrwEn8l/uHyem+X+IhOxIhAvdymjaDtcY2UYvPvxsnfonp4V50CK Ep7G5C84+DXgdurhmCjLcwJET+OFms7yUijNFDRznaI7cHz3QUOMXYXHjLdAlUuRKjg== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1794080117; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:X-Mailer: MIME-Version:Content-Transfer-Encoding; bh=/8Ruryq7aznKxNzfUkhErK+X8cqsD1LlFqaxaDXaAGs=; b=HvNTKR9Nit3BwOwULWC2KsPleCzdtXhmILneeBE3j75m+C8s1tNkSrnsCx1NvioE5dQV E8fTAEcCQy8i+mMuJpR6OVm2yoUdmCEUpGss0ySLDCjEV5KKnGjxbpHAPoDkfXgjHdxcC 5l0rJxbhyZv2Vp6Ea1D0gRJi5xr+hk+vKQQjOLuFM3H2z590WDEVZf3rFjW3CDq8k0AxZ kutfxoeovVHcIJOVGziqzzTG9BVWkPJq7hlJmKinj71+lqsdw1ZS5XUVTSAgh697OpX25 k+w463gtTo9A0EqslOgLMiXpmE8GDn0nu4FYK7am9XQg5Qc0E0j/p3A7jjgkBgt8llw== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=CqctjKcC; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B737C606A326; Sat, 7 Nov 2026 19:35:16 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=CqctjKcC Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 73F5E1F008A1; Sat, 7 Nov 2026 19:35:16 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1794080116; bh=/8Ruryq7aznKxNzfUkhErK+X8cqsD1LlFqaxaDXaAGs=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date; b=CqctjKcCkoRinB4ByRczZUUiGnUtdEluO6YHBvOeupcKxGLWBufmX2kyWxfIF9XPn LFtG9SzKxu/IHVm0oOXol25OX+EDGx/U29dpZrDOzCQjcOOgjbopNFTAbBSE0Tfuir 3y6nscnXrIomKZ1ZGa/nAn+1JcQQdIoOLIkIlX6R/D2PbDmKlWiValowvg2nSg0wD3 KKFaVRV4p2x/oI6TuHwDifHTXIgnxtZrLcoQsHl3v3PqbphXRxs82f3PfyozqV9VWU mnrjeZbSxz7LV/x3SDpL73HUPVt5M/ICe+e7sqVZi0MLIi/5ETqgS0hTj2QC5BCj5Q s0o9Iw9E8ua0A== From: Eric Biggers To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: fsverity@lists.linux.dev, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Eric Biggers , Fan Wu Subject: [PATCH 6.12] fsverity: Tell LSMs about signature only after verity is enabled Date: Sat, 7 Nov 2026 11:35:13 -0800 Message-ID: <20261107193513.54738-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.56.0 X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 28d74059fddbd8ae83c7715056b303c402071f6f upstream. FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY calls security_inode_setintegrity() before verity has finished being enabled. That's broken because enabling verity can still fail at that point, e.g. due to insufficient xattr space. Afterwards, arbitrary contents can be written to the file, which doesn't actually have verity enabled. The in-core inode stays the same, so the LSM considers it to have verity enabled with a valid signature. (Or rather, in the case of IPE, which is the only LSM that implements security_inode_setintegrity(), it also checks IS_VERITY(), which can be bypassed by enabling verity with no signature after the file writes.) Fix this by moving the call to security_inode_setintegrity() out of fsverity_verify_signature() and into a new function that is called from the appropriate places. Fixes: 7c373e4f1445 ("fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Fan Wu Tested-by: Fan Wu Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261025204534.122506-1-ebiggers@kernel.org (6.12: resolved conflicts with this version storing the fsverity_info pointer in the inode instead of using a hash table) Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- fs/verity/enable.c | 8 ++++++ fs/verity/fsverity_private.h | 8 ++++++ fs/verity/open.c | 9 ++++++ fs/verity/signature.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 4 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/verity/enable.c b/fs/verity/enable.c index c284f46d1b535..197564ecd3ef6 100644 --- a/fs/verity/enable.c +++ b/fs/verity/enable.c @@ -292,6 +292,14 @@ static int enable_verity(struct file *filp, * after the filesystem has successfully enabled verity. */ fsverity_set_info(inode, vi); + + /* + * Now that verity is enabled, report the signature (if any) to + * LSMs. We tolerate that a process racing with this ioctl can + * briefly see verity enabled with no signature reported yet. + */ + fsverity_report_valid_sig(inode, desc->signature, + le32_to_cpu(desc->sig_size)); } out: kfree(params.hashstate); diff --git a/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h b/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h index b3506f56e180b..760f2674c816e 100644 --- a/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h +++ b/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h @@ -135,6 +135,8 @@ void __init fsverity_init_info_cache(void); extern int fsverity_require_signatures; int fsverity_verify_signature(const struct fsverity_info *vi, const u8 *signature, size_t sig_size); +void fsverity_report_valid_sig(const struct inode *inode, const u8 *signature, + size_t sig_size); void __init fsverity_init_signature(void); #else /* !CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES */ @@ -145,6 +147,12 @@ fsverity_verify_signature(const struct fsverity_info *vi, return 0; } +static inline void fsverity_report_valid_sig(const struct inode *inode, + const u8 *signature, + size_t sig_size) +{ +} + static inline void fsverity_init_signature(void) { } diff --git a/fs/verity/open.c b/fs/verity/open.c index bd0497da5cea3..3cf6453001894 100644 --- a/fs/verity/open.c +++ b/fs/verity/open.c @@ -377,6 +377,15 @@ static int ensure_verity_info(struct inode *inode) goto out_free_desc; } + /* + * Now that the signature (if any) has been verified, report it to LSMs. + * Do this before setting the fsverity_info, so that anyone who + * concurrently retrieves the fsverity_info for the same inode is + * guaranteed to see the LSM's signature status populated. + */ + fsverity_report_valid_sig(inode, desc->signature, + le32_to_cpu(desc->sig_size)); + fsverity_set_info(inode, vi); err = 0; out_free_desc: diff --git a/fs/verity/signature.c b/fs/verity/signature.c index 0302a4e506ec4..212e873c84998 100644 --- a/fs/verity/signature.c +++ b/fs/verity/signature.c @@ -42,13 +42,16 @@ static struct key *fsverity_keyring; * @sig_size: size of signature in bytes, or 0 if no signature * * If the file includes a signature of its fs-verity file digest, verify it - * against the certificates in the fs-verity keyring. Note that signatures - * are verified regardless of the state of the 'fsverity_require_signatures' - * variable and the LSM subsystem relies on this behavior to help enforce - * file integrity policies. Please discuss changes with the LSM list - * (thank you!). + * against the certificates in the fs-verity keyring. * - * Return: 0 on success (signature valid or not required); -errno on failure + * Note that signatures are verified regardless of the state of the + * 'fsverity_require_signatures' variable, and the LSM subsystem relies on this + * behavior to help enforce file integrity policies. (See + * fsverity_report_valid_sig(), which assumes that the signature, if present, + * was verified here.) Please discuss changes with the LSM list (thank you!). + * + * Return: 0 if the signature is present and valid, or absent and not required; + * -errno on failure */ int fsverity_verify_signature(const struct fsverity_info *vi, const u8 *signature, size_t sig_size) @@ -111,18 +114,40 @@ int fsverity_verify_signature(const struct fsverity_info *vi, return err; } - err = security_inode_setintegrity(inode, - LSM_INT_FSVERITY_BUILTINSIG_VALID, - signature, - sig_size); + return 0; +} - if (err) { +/* + * If the signature exists, this tells the LSM that it was verified. + * + * fsverity_verify_signature() must have already been called with the same + * signature, *and* the inode must have verity enabled with the signature + * matching it. If called from FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY, the latter means that we + * must be past the point of no return, i.e. verity won't fail to be enabled at + * a later point. This is critical, since LSMs must be told about the signature + * only when the verity status is permanent in the in-core inode. + */ +void fsverity_report_valid_sig(const struct inode *inode, const u8 *signature, + size_t sig_size) +{ + int err; + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!IS_VERITY(inode))) + return; + + if (sig_size == 0) + return; + + err = security_inode_setintegrity( + inode, LSM_INT_FSVERITY_BUILTINSIG_VALID, signature, sig_size); + if (err) fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d exposing file signature to LSMs", err); - return err; - } - - return 0; + /* + * Besides the logging above, ignore errors here. The LSM hook just + * records the signature and doesn't perform access control. And in the + * case of FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY verity was already enabled. + */ } void __init fsverity_init_signature(void) base-commit: 5c40a1750f44dd6c7292d8c8d0b4ffff1734576e -- 2.56.0