From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1794415614; b=4XvRPp+BpO9SVlXFHVDjQcxklka0orvLVyakKeaRLMmq1oskHojrjA/kJA9APdOFLp08 y+uyrKuYh2HavgExMWxoUu44FSSvjnky2nAclBoR8EIVAlP1C5xvmCw0nY15tywQgpqc8 VeTWq9J7S0s08958tOQDgzQF/mXVB+O2ahTj0zARMgl3tly7PKysUcZ6dq6x1wrGoiUil syibFA6zF8Jau9Gzi4UtqROtP6zxBzFI+AuW6wnPZ15UFPeA5ZnF8Rj9Gc9LemUdMcGQa KunsLNsb2aFB31bYlJDuiQhdLx51f57FkKeb5JmRgyaEsda7oxxW/vkQHloiLq0LATQ== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1794415614; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:X-Mailer: In-Reply-To:References:MIME-Version:Content-Transfer-Encoding; bh=XIcwCQ6rFgjGDhkQ2dSkFu407opQAQ0iOtmYLdaiic8=; b=b2Shr1jYSyclF3eKsg0558GZZx/6iYIEg0eHn8xrOrUEfF0u9uJfPCyoUwimnw+uwWRk pvz71ap3bvH0RweoW2A6FK6BAFH8v1b9nLiQa791vaNuHauqg3IFB9Hw4Yg7ns3t/YD/l COH1aLwTqQYIcok+7P+v8b43iFSjLmfDpbfppnL8bimpGBpz8Jjz6JkNuuU3PVdcAkWj3 +3ARoBfdOBj9TWpErGCeWsHPgMPDZM+wYizsn0v40gsxnT5VG1hMqirGJw+zt3IedPql+ jzfODJQC+WmfZpQm/r+nYpciyPGCMIpc5gXc8SMvs7Fn9ype1yo3DKLG4xTIEmvhawQ== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b="K/EtOMUy"; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 28B9E606A31C for ; Wed, 11 Nov 2026 16:46:54 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=K/EtOMUy Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 4753F1F00A06; Wed, 11 Nov 2026 16:46:53 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1794415613; bh=XIcwCQ6rFgjGDhkQ2dSkFu407opQAQ0iOtmYLdaiic8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=K/EtOMUy91UsAtp4Ia6xZscmede9hBK0PRYhvWsDPGoCMGAK11Zbdi8u1GS2BzU0G I1Gskli/Pc2D+yJwhoSJhCXaBNR8FgP6/lkLQOh6UeSqRGJi1V71RMp5yPf8lW3JkA fXblRSgADi2cbDMZuj2iQkfsweifXS9YP8BFkZrb5+a4DlNw0vKKgNfq2dtclHD2Nt cRtr2OljOHEoMXKjh2aor5cSnUMFupG8M4pEq8IdraYigi0oYSPPa2eEB0wRAnaUuV w1ms0ayaDzCrBt/Q9OY2zrGuoHqCurMDDzcR08HwTMXdjf3UOSLt9gdG3h09jLQzcd w6whbghxDLaDA== From: Sasha Levin To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Yehyeong Lee , Hannes Reinecke , Christoph Hellwig , Keith Busch , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.1.y 4/4] nvme-auth: fail when the controller does not authenticate itself Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2026 11:46:49 -0500 Message-ID: <20261111164614.3321142-4-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.53.0 In-Reply-To: <20261111164614.3321142-1-sashal@kernel.org> References: <20261107054808-failed-6.1-f9e43d924bc7@kernel.org> <20261111164614.3321142-1-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Yehyeong Lee [ Upstream commit f9e43d924bc74feeb56197de82b2845de2a4b85a ] nvme_auth_process_dhchap_success1() returns success as soon as the controller clears the rvalid flag in its DH-HMAC-CHAP success1 message, without looking at whether the host had asked the controller to authenticate. A host configured with a controller secret sends a challenge in its reply, computes the expected controller response, and sets chap->bi_directional; if the controller then answers with rvalid = 0 the response is never compared, the host still sends success2, and the queue is marked as authenticated. A malicious or man-in-the-middle controller therefore only has to clear one flag to turn the configured bidirectional authentication into a one-way one, without holding any secret of its own. The target side already treats the mirror image of this as fatal: when the host supplied a challenge but no controller key is configured, nvmet_auth_success1() fails the authentication rather than answering with rvalid = 0. Refuse the connection if the controller returns no response although bidirectional authentication was requested. chap->bi_directional is the right condition rather than ctrl->ctrl_key, because secure concatenation sends a challenge only to derive the PSK and deliberately clears bi_directional; a one-way setup without a controller secret keeps returning success as before. Fixes: f50fff73d620 ("nvme: implement In-Band authentication") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Yehyeong Lee Signed-off-by: Keith Busch Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/nvme/host/auth.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c b/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c index 5bac8a34a9a43..a6dd41057737e 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c @@ -369,8 +369,21 @@ static int nvme_auth_process_dhchap_success1(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, nvme_auth_hmac_name(chap->hash_id), nvme_auth_dhgroup_name(chap->dhgroup_id)); - if (!data->rvalid) + if (!data->rvalid) { + /* + * The controller did not return a response. If we asked it to + * authenticate itself the session must not be used, otherwise + * mutual authentication would silently degrade to one-way. + */ + if (chap->bi_directional) { + dev_warn(ctrl->device, + "qid %d: controller did not authenticate\n", + chap->qid); + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_FAILED; + return -ECONNREFUSED; + } return 0; + } /* Validate controller response */ if (memcmp(chap->response, data->rval, data->hl)) { -- 2.53.0