From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1794516195; b=4LMvC6kLHYd8x8isNsxbxqNw5bKfLNKdVfIph75UgxL0JDp1xsRMlFF9UhVqAGs8Og3K a2+RagKScZx5b0R8V7fq13fwI8yvrpfHb1IFhLbL97+8TeIFXpTsot/vlKeUyQw8YcoxF h3lInjpns/ZPy0WY17zYA2AEHhvxEn9d6n+GzgjEpKURf3LRZ8QaA7KldkKgZuNpORG9I fa5p1SoUacwueNS8XRvZ1bwerNM2MmyTP4p8jCLzYbdqejecOmta79prH8hYIZQt/n1hK miM+GdsVDiXBKbnBpYMRGob2mqPe3pF4dIp15zKcb2uHJHI2wZpgPrK7Wp9sJW0iGSA== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1794516195; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:X-Mailer: In-Reply-To:References:MIME-Version:Content-Transfer-Encoding; bh=kdEVBEt1ClntwNwB8SzN20dYh+X1xyBgvTT3ehhnRgY=; b=0Cj9OL1ucNnYk/IjNLS9d9YmZgfeUQeLgZ7K3h1ZDC2MpBz45tSeM4QCRVbQ9q5GUebJ tagt4aMhFKQaQ17PzQy50S6Ng4XXMt5Wm3C7HBYoFWRIIHTR4v7mizVtoJe+OaGGkvFPS 96QPY68+pHNB5aWrBXo3jZ1vHHQsj6aVaAx9up9ayN01FaBHvk0ED7DyMeL0j6s5WDivq IS/2E1aE6Q7C4OWECK/oS03DbIbKARtOH4zHkJAcWBttZ90amHcO0duLBSrgOHd8+dO5i K76B8rzAZ8e0NlTspIwAuJQ02StXBDpO4pzyTS1TpC5zkuej81tWFjQjICUy529SqJg== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=cW8DA7UR; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E1658606A32D for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2026 20:43:14 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=cW8DA7UR Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 4D79B1F000C6; Thu, 12 Nov 2026 20:43:14 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1794516194; bh=kdEVBEt1ClntwNwB8SzN20dYh+X1xyBgvTT3ehhnRgY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=cW8DA7URL57r12Uas0L4D6qAGK9PASEYBN98IG+/UTi9rBJ11ovsl/U0fF7R761yt 4a5L2OlYugax8NtWiM7VIZAiX+EXlMiTiIq4iTaRTcV7bnj1dNZFQhZixq3wztjoHc QykiFlFSEGizNF/a4LKPntqmWmqahpilGLIr/pqcx9ULh1xZvNId7x2ySOj7XatriZ gLpnsbWyjSKmmxCFQcVEwpJJPmQWAS8eozId6tKeWxrDXlTlKe55MfvTfVUi4VDNLQ G7KgNV3r/4KnuXzirtavjO/6iVkerV5UdaLzPixr8ro73B8qqc9kvHCom2pFAL+tNW 0paVChXYLjnwA== From: Sasha Levin To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Amir Goldstein , Edvard Conrad , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 7.3.y 2/2] ovl: inherit FMODE_NONOTIFY when reading directory layers Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2026 15:43:12 -0500 Message-ID: <20261112203246.3570016-2-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.53.0 In-Reply-To: <20261112203246.3570016-1-sashal@kernel.org> References: <20261109200159-failed-7.3-9ff338af0e00@kernel.org> <20261112203246.3570016-1-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Amir Goldstein [ Upstream commit 9ff338af0e002fe217cfa16b1289b76f6b21fc72 ] Listing a merged or impure overlay directory opens the real layer directories from ovl_dir_read(), when the readdir cache is filled. Those opens use plain ovl_path_open(), so when the directory fd is one that fanotify created for a permission event, they can still raise FS_OPEN_PERM. A listener that also marks the backing filesystem and calls getdents() on the event fd before answering then deadlocks the same way as with the directory open fixed by the previous commit. Store the overlay user file in struct ovl_readdir_data and pass it to ovl_path_open_realfile() from ovl_dir_read(), for both the merged and the impure cache. Internal readers such as ovl_check_empty_dir() and the mount-time workdir cleanup still pass no user file. A note about severity and real world impact: The FAN_OPEN_PERM event is traditionally used by anti-malware protection agents and security/audit agents. The scope that is often used in those use cases is FAN_MARK_MOUNT and agents typically monitor multiple mounts in a mount namespace. FAN_OPEN_PERM from directory open requires user opt-in with FAN_ONDIR. It is often not the case that anti-malware agents monitor open of directories. Security/audit engines are more likely to opt-into FAN_OPEN_PERM on directories, but are less likely to list the content of a directory within the scope of FAN_OPEN_PERM event, so the real world impact of this bug is likely not significant. Reported-by: Edvard Conrad Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/P5Qu3co--N-9@tuta.io/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Tested-by: Edvard Conrad Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ltp/P5WKBbq--F-9@tuta.io/ Co-developed-by: Edvard Conrad Signed-off-by: Edvard Conrad Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/overlayfs/readdir.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c b/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c index 5d21a328fad46..4cd4af097e5c1 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ struct ovl_dir_cache { struct ovl_readdir_data { struct dir_context ctx; + const struct file *user_file; struct dentry *dentry; bool is_lowest; struct rb_root *root; @@ -377,7 +378,8 @@ static inline int ovl_dir_read(const struct path *realpath, struct file *realfile; int err; - realfile = ovl_path_open(realpath, O_RDONLY | O_LARGEFILE); + realfile = ovl_path_open_realfile(rdd->user_file, realpath, + O_RDONLY | O_LARGEFILE); if (IS_ERR(realfile)) return PTR_ERR(realfile); @@ -421,13 +423,14 @@ static void ovl_dir_reset(struct file *file) } static int ovl_dir_read_merged(struct dentry *dentry, struct list_head *list, - struct rb_root *root) + struct rb_root *root, const struct file *user_file) { int err; struct path realpath; struct ovl_readdir_data rdd = { .ctx.actor = ovl_fill_merge, .ctx.count = INT_MAX, + .user_file = user_file, .dentry = dentry, .list = list, .root = root, @@ -498,9 +501,10 @@ static struct ovl_dir_cache *ovl_dir_cache_check(struct inode *inode, return cache; } -static struct ovl_dir_cache *ovl_cache_get(struct dentry *dentry) +static struct ovl_dir_cache *ovl_dir_cache_get(struct file *file) { int res; + struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry; struct ovl_dir_cache *cache; struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); @@ -521,7 +525,7 @@ static struct ovl_dir_cache *ovl_cache_get(struct dentry *dentry) INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cache->entries); cache->root = RB_ROOT; - res = ovl_dir_read_merged(dentry, &cache->entries, &cache->root); + res = ovl_dir_read_merged(dentry, &cache->entries, &cache->root, file); if (res) { ovl_cache_free(&cache->entries); kfree(cache); @@ -665,8 +669,8 @@ static bool ovl_fill_plain(struct dir_context *ctx, const char *name, return true; } -static int ovl_dir_read_impure(const struct path *path, struct list_head *list, - struct rb_root *root) +static int ovl_dir_read_impure(const struct path *path, struct list_head *list, + struct rb_root *root, const struct file *user_file) { int err; struct path realpath; @@ -674,6 +678,7 @@ static int ovl_dir_read_impure(const struct path *path, struct list_head *list, struct ovl_readdir_data rdd = { .ctx.actor = ovl_fill_plain, .ctx.count = INT_MAX, + .user_file = user_file, .list = list, .root = root, }; @@ -710,9 +715,10 @@ static int ovl_dir_read_impure(const struct path *path, struct list_head *list, return 0; } -static struct ovl_dir_cache *ovl_cache_get_impure(const struct path *path) +static struct ovl_dir_cache *ovl_cache_get_impure(struct file *file) { int res; + const struct path *path = &file->f_path; struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry; struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(dentry->d_sb); @@ -731,7 +737,7 @@ static struct ovl_dir_cache *ovl_cache_get_impure(const struct path *path) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); cache->is_refcounted = false; - res = ovl_dir_read_impure(path, &cache->entries, &cache->root); + res = ovl_dir_read_impure(path, &cache->entries, &cache->root, file); if (res) { ovl_cache_free(&cache->entries); kfree(cache); @@ -852,7 +858,7 @@ static int ovl_iterate_real(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) dput(parent); if (ovl_is_impure_dir(file)) { - rdt.cache = ovl_cache_get_impure(&file->f_path); + rdt.cache = ovl_cache_get_impure(file); if (IS_ERR(rdt.cache)) return PTR_ERR(rdt.cache); } @@ -866,14 +872,13 @@ static int ovl_iterate_real(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) static int ovl_iterate_merged(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) { struct ovl_dir_file *od = file->private_data; - struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry; struct ovl_cache_entry *p; int err; if (!od->cache) { struct ovl_dir_cache *cache; - cache = ovl_cache_get(dentry); + cache = ovl_dir_cache_get(file); if (IS_ERR(cache)) return PTR_ERR(cache); @@ -1120,7 +1125,7 @@ int ovl_check_empty_dir(struct dentry *dentry, struct list_head *list) struct rb_root root = RB_ROOT; with_ovl_creds(dentry->d_sb) - err = ovl_dir_read_merged(dentry, list, &root); + err = ovl_dir_read_merged(dentry, list, &root, NULL); if (err) return err; -- 2.53.0