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From: Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@suse.com>
To: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Andrea Mattiazzo <amattiazzo@suse.de>,
	cve@kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: 098bcea71b8d security relevant
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 11:49:02 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261116114902.561ada6f@mordecai> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2026111606-uneaten-passport-9d89@gregkh>

On Mon, 16 Nov 2026 10:54:47 +0100
Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> On Mon, Nov 16, 2026 at 09:41:33AM +0100, Petr Tesarik wrote:
> > On Fri, 13 Nov 2026 22:24:19 -0800
> > Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> wrote:
> >   
> > > On Fri, Nov 13, 2026 at 02:30:48PM -0500, Greg KH wrote:  
> > > > System configurations do not seem to meet the cve.org definition of
> > > > vulnerability, right?    
> > > 
> > > Yah, a system without any microcode loaded by the BIOS is not the common
> > > situation but rather an exception.  
> > 
> > One of the systems used by SUSE Performance Team boots the kernel
> > without applying any microcode patch first. We assumed that the
> > microcode from early initrd was applied in that case, but it was
> > applied only to BSP, leaving all other CPUs unpatched.
> > 
> > Thank you for explaining to me that failing to apply a security fix
> > (i.e. failing to load the available microcode update) is not security
> > relevant, because the admin should know better and update their BIOS
> > instead.  
> 
> I'm not saying it is not security relevant, only that it does not match
> the definition of what cve.org considers a vulnerability and so is
> allowed to have a CVE id assigned to.  Many such security things like
> this fall into this category, as you know.
> 
> > I still do not like the fact that the Linux kernel then lies about the
> > vulnerability status under /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/,
> > because those files are based solely on data from BSP;
> > cpu_show_common() contains:
> > 
> > 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(bug))
> > 		return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n");
> > 
> > This gives the admin a false sense of security, but I agree it can be
> > perceived as a configuration issue: The admin should not rely on that
> > data, because they can simply check /proc/cpuinfo to see for themselves
> > that all APs actually do not have any microcode applied to them, and
> > then go read AMD errata to understand which CPU vulnerabilities are
> > mitigated with a microcode update.  
> 
> So is this bug not fixed?  If so, it probably should be.

It is fixed with 098bcea71b8d (by correctly updating the AP microcode).
I guess the commit should be included in stable branches even if it is
not a security fix.

Petr T

       reply	other threads:[~2026-11-16 10:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <c78fbc1b-b190-4111-a6a8-f456b5c85a51@suse.de>
     [not found] ` <2026111326-acre-backhand-a1d5@gregkh>
     [not found]   ` <20261113202510.2107c905@mordecai>
     [not found]     ` <2026111303-colonial-wrongly-7d9c@gregkh>
     [not found]       ` <20261114062419.GBavf-kxerE_YDukB7@fat_crate.local>
     [not found]         ` <20261116094133.4aa496f0@mordecai>
     [not found]           ` <2026111606-uneaten-passport-9d89@gregkh>
2026-11-16 10:49             ` Petr Tesarik [this message]
2026-11-16 10:55               ` 098bcea71b8d security relevant Greg KH

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