From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1794826528; b=tkMw3KEHDqgElXafRmMcMUvOXn3Ozcv43rdEz7RvhyzxJK/2NeyI1O6iY0KH2pg7vQ7H cw6QuE+3o18HvykhSdjym1tyOdPfQR1KhzNV8rUTvXpVimSkclaigkrIyi7PjNcrzMNVe mf5je0e6covxwEct8SQVT10/DxUYUPWXoN37MgRsV5Lb4N0a/oBVNjjnYDmuU5TUjqe5I 9AimgpxV4gYI+W6Lts1zZv2Ii/+sTyMOqXcHvkfejTNt66ncY7zqEx8ld+cLGJfmibgZn INrWrLKqiwQD0mFdCZCRfIZ2FINjcuLCrlVY8vra8pYtvsppq2PO3ZpLWBvO7r9IpJA== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1794826528; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID: References:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; bh=BKcngCVl81a+5cZXKQf9a6BxtCh+iivu3O1Qx8AltbQ=; b=suavSf8kZy1PJHLO/obKOFT7SQ7Y+OLRizVLFi8044uTmIhW0w4guUpi1Dzu/PkYvUng c96EzuSXsMc89WhfeScCMIE9B8KrW4PCyQOKnUhb3F8s24P1sX8CPoQkDVgXhKOk4KhHW fesp9jOAOYLsNHEcbemVJ6fFaHPjH+zsR1pvysxgayyIx0+cZTP61Dv9p7hHi02GQWlAk wnMObybmUoSACWKHbIgxGFDq/XqhJwCzRh536pzaZfFwn7ZtSWGBL/HO54zbyEtwnlUcL gu1X51aBs9o6t2c0HduMeSDW69YqqtU8dS6aICODtE35wN8aUxT55EJ3Yq6rDeWZXxw== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=eW48fgDz; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9B952606A329 for ; Mon, 16 Nov 2026 10:55:28 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=eW48fgDz Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 8FF391F000C4; Mon, 16 Nov 2026 10:55:27 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1794826528; bh=BKcngCVl81a+5cZXKQf9a6BxtCh+iivu3O1Qx8AltbQ=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To; b=eW48fgDzzDOs6ff2VSkCZ5ZhnZNSLmJIJ2FmLgLmmOPTuW82IsPqc4sa0+mxzgTr0 5Pf9kdVun4VQB5+6aTdEswDRgTOPz6Qr4ERQI27euYwpSUQi0EMtL8BMjr7LSW6hWP auxR7UdLXc1bK73BZqqctXGk8JvraqYHl3823bnY= Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 11:55:24 +0100 From: Greg KH To: Petr Tesarik Cc: Borislav Petkov , Andrea Mattiazzo , cve@kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: 098bcea71b8d security relevant Message-ID: <2026111647-accent-penniless-9cb3@gregkh> References: <2026111326-acre-backhand-a1d5@gregkh> <20261113202510.2107c905@mordecai> <2026111303-colonial-wrongly-7d9c@gregkh> <20261114062419.GBavf-kxerE_YDukB7@fat_crate.local> <20261116094133.4aa496f0@mordecai> <2026111606-uneaten-passport-9d89@gregkh> <20261116114902.561ada6f@mordecai> X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20261116114902.561ada6f@mordecai> On Mon, Nov 16, 2026 at 11:49:02AM +0100, Petr Tesarik wrote: > On Mon, 16 Nov 2026 10:54:47 +0100 > Greg KH wrote: > > > On Mon, Nov 16, 2026 at 09:41:33AM +0100, Petr Tesarik wrote: > > > On Fri, 13 Nov 2026 22:24:19 -0800 > > > Borislav Petkov wrote: > > > > > > > On Fri, Nov 13, 2026 at 02:30:48PM -0500, Greg KH wrote: > > > > > System configurations do not seem to meet the cve.org definition of > > > > > vulnerability, right? > > > > > > > > Yah, a system without any microcode loaded by the BIOS is not the common > > > > situation but rather an exception. > > > > > > One of the systems used by SUSE Performance Team boots the kernel > > > without applying any microcode patch first. We assumed that the > > > microcode from early initrd was applied in that case, but it was > > > applied only to BSP, leaving all other CPUs unpatched. > > > > > > Thank you for explaining to me that failing to apply a security fix > > > (i.e. failing to load the available microcode update) is not security > > > relevant, because the admin should know better and update their BIOS > > > instead. > > > > I'm not saying it is not security relevant, only that it does not match > > the definition of what cve.org considers a vulnerability and so is > > allowed to have a CVE id assigned to. Many such security things like > > this fall into this category, as you know. > > > > > I still do not like the fact that the Linux kernel then lies about the > > > vulnerability status under /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/, > > > because those files are based solely on data from BSP; > > > cpu_show_common() contains: > > > > > > if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(bug)) > > > return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n"); > > > > > > This gives the admin a false sense of security, but I agree it can be > > > perceived as a configuration issue: The admin should not rely on that > > > data, because they can simply check /proc/cpuinfo to see for themselves > > > that all APs actually do not have any microcode applied to them, and > > > then go read AMD errata to understand which CPU vulnerabilities are > > > mitigated with a microcode update. > > > > So is this bug not fixed? If so, it probably should be. > > It is fixed with 098bcea71b8d (by correctly updating the AP microcode). > I guess the commit should be included in stable branches even if it is > not a security fix. It is in the 6.18.y and 7.2 and newer kernels already. If it needs to go to older kernel releases, let stable@vger.kernel.org know with a working backport and they will be glad to queue it up. thanks, greg k-h