From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795058875; b=zg8lPaYhUpsRjRe2FnUxxhzZYDTAjYVHlEJgRBlBAarYLKZlliWhegvHDNcfUI+RYLTK h6vsYnDMknYvAMA3ampTUZa++2Z0XL2toLnFlPyAKI0cXPwkhHTUuBREJAegx16AjtF/M m5tmDBspHfBkPgZ7VEvEtUpozSPkcvjpJCQ/iinFlaMXLLBgAFH3M2knFEVLHIqlahEr1 mKBrEJA3z0gcdKgDLay53xsJZCHp9revgxspvscyO02lrsYwGzHQs1f91VyeOlZ4ZBTeF ZvDINVFN1DS9Iya3g4Aiz4e8S9dXQebBqoGptgZG1CQ9deIS8b+LrePzBNpXGaYAWgQ== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795058875; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:X-Mailer: In-Reply-To:References:User-Agent:X-stable:X-Patchwork-Hint: MIME-Version:Content-Transfer-Encoding; bh=7fe5Y9UT2hdQ0yghWGmbh6sJaJz/bt6UmROwndCRz3w=; b=G6Yx/Sjq5Ev+yBL2TyingyihGe/tv/fPRpoCx8Th7cIwbkdmNEhPM2dxGzmzDiV95nO6 NBt1YQwvSZlIro/9/dgIOB2Ww6tNyOE4sk8ZKS94B6zms8oDbp3oEzFf0cbA7SYnWGMxJ 1qAIX6xNfFG9g0+VLKaljMpwL0wnPLfAu4fqiWUnlexF3pQsveMCzQRMvk/esSN8UgrZz au7j4LYGo1yWUgtdqbyGl0BKbeEdtCzBtAv3IoCA56x5Zt0Bpy3H01Atlro9rHEYgV6AC kPHTJcugG4jMHoZys/gU02rMi4YIDGe5Tmup9frYcsZictOfgiSjDhTOaVfbtHEpHMQ== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=gMB2OcjE; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 44736606A336; Thu, 19 Nov 2026 03:27:55 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=gMB2OcjE Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 9864B1F000C5; Thu, 19 Nov 2026 03:27:54 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1795058875; bh=7fe5Y9UT2hdQ0yghWGmbh6sJaJz/bt6UmROwndCRz3w=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=gMB2OcjEumCyMl6aevY3LNV75AL8o4qRtdVQ8wDw+sOuy1YOypFiKx0XB6tdOEDDv KF2idB3RnQOY1Dphq2ytF+VcRqxZfEvoQNL/f1WMPDiyIROB0cXpnfuqINvSbSbX9Q b24ir9YQGpV7bdKjqnkGAZfgjy3VA3l8UdG/FYFs= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Andrey Albershteyn , Eric Biggers , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 5.10 0642/1848] fsverity: Explicitly require FMODE_READ to retrieve hashes Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:44:40 +0100 Message-ID: <20261118145942.637601871@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.56.0 In-Reply-To: <20261118145911.150052362@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20261118145911.150052362@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Eric Biggers commit 1acb4fd2d011c4bd6cc961095ae17361c71ff61a upstream. The comment in fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata(), which justifies not checking for FMODE_READ, doesn't consider that the nonstandard access mode 3 (ioctl-only) exists. Opening an ioctl-only fd generally requires read (and write) permission. However, there are gaps with certain LSMs: an ioctl-only fd requests read (and write) permission via security_inode_permission, but not security_file_open. With certain LSMs relying on the latter, such as Landlock and AppArmor, an ioctl-only fd can be opened without the LSM granting read (and write) permission. Since FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA returns hashes of file contents blocks, it should require read permission. This also applies to FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY, which returns a hash for the whole file. Meanwhile, ioctl-only fds are a rarely-used feature, not known to be used with either ioctl. Therefore, just disallow these ioctls on ioctl-only file descriptors, similar to what was already done with FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY. More specifically, explicitly check for FMODE_READ. This also covers write-only fds to non-verity files which otherwise would have failed with ENODATA. This change in error code for write-only fds should be fine too, as these ioctls cannot be usefully used with write-only fds anyway, but it's worth noting as another technicality. Fixes: 4dd893d832cf ("fs-verity: implement FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY ioctl") Fixes: e17fe6579de0 ("fs-verity: add FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA ioctl") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Andrey Albershteyn Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261022211522.1489943-1-ebiggers@kernel.org (5.10: dropped the FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA changes, since that ioctl does not exist in this version) Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst | 2 ++ fs/verity/measure.c | 10 ++++++++++ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst index 895e9711ed881..4bd6f25e1a4b3 100644 --- a/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst @@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ fatal signal), no changes are made to the file. FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY can fail with the following errors: - ``EACCES``: the process does not have write access to the file +- ``EBADF``: the file descriptor is not open for reading - ``EBADMSG``: the signature is malformed - ``EBUSY``: this ioctl is already running on the file - ``EEXIST``: the file already has verity enabled @@ -207,6 +208,7 @@ regardless of the size of the file. FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY can fail with the following errors: +- ``EBADF``: the file descriptor is not open for reading - ``EFAULT``: the caller provided inaccessible memory - ``ENODATA``: the file is not a verity file - ``ENOTTY``: this type of filesystem does not implement fs-verity diff --git a/fs/verity/measure.c b/fs/verity/measure.c index df409a5682edf..be3628f9e557f 100644 --- a/fs/verity/measure.c +++ b/fs/verity/measure.c @@ -28,6 +28,16 @@ int fsverity_ioctl_measure(struct file *filp, void __user *_uarg) const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg; struct fsverity_digest arg; + /* + * This ioctl returns a hash of the file contents, so it should require + * read permission. Disallow it on ioctl-only (i.e., nonstandard access + * mode 3) fds, which can in some cases be acquired without passing all + * LSM read-permission checks. Also disallow write-only fds, which can + * refer only to non-verity files which would fail with ENODATA anyway. + */ + if (!(filp->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) + return -EBADF; + vi = fsverity_get_info(inode); if (!vi) return -ENODATA; /* not a verity file */ -- 2.53.0