From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795028730; b=iB1UeD/SXh+Z8yPsWlmUaC8Cb52xrMb1nLs4INQgG0Pozlx0L0u/RiL0WkuznFLsrM2r aOMSV3DgrdNyvzcoeW7ExKRtxPTzHyGR5FQsBq9Et6NckvI8BMHmdWeP1I1oi/P8c5uJZ qgqU1VNztBe+MmWqoB/gYZr0HQuDE29GyCMe7V8fVuKR+ANUkyQAa/3PZeakJTuPMeDLQ 3seMLRXLHR4/9ajQm6i4+/Zlv/qtlrJwcJeCLdB8c4DXf+zc8txDiHQiWtOFlKZmzvmoS SbxYq2WB+tkhGQnSiSMMCFiq7JBYex6zg8Mg8CSixPsIyzUm+bYcDcql9ITfvw6wPaA== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795028730; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:X-Mailer: In-Reply-To:References:User-Agent:X-stable:X-Patchwork-Hint: MIME-Version:Content-Transfer-Encoding; bh=PhbANRYKj3R/CGjmgCtFUVcgcH0KQNnHbsRO6a5W3G8=; b=b0Fk8jQo/q9B+STVkC7nmAJvQeK7+syoeurHdReOrVDxQsl7iTJpsyPQ5u0j4fL6Y0tO FjmFoj9lem2IxPowdY9GItJyKS4FksTPzHTg4TRO7hAhIEkrm6P2ZEnAjFl9xPuFlgjRm y3BY2fRNnmNXO8K3CnRNekvIsEIoqoYJFnbXz1VuamEC+lMg2eg7p3y635P6N183Wgbuz +sfzwrMjla+bJnlIRbSbGvIgi3aoJLIrSMOPZBkQRohTcRnVRzfnvRJCRqgY4ghVIpb2L Arf+OXbAN8Jj0yb7Ft4XVb9xgvKV4eHIX2v9QF0yY9haPVfdYIfExmYjGxT7FvHNbzQ== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=n6LAHw5f; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 07B8F606A33D; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 19:05:30 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=n6LAHw5f Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 5995B1F000C4; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 19:05:29 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1795028729; bh=PhbANRYKj3R/CGjmgCtFUVcgcH0KQNnHbsRO6a5W3G8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=n6LAHw5fXl1489CjVn8i9v+9wUoYo+TsuyT9u9iHxO11NcOGbBMzxBndrEFXCRUAi 3JhRfaabIzHhvols9JONh/nS3l6lMiOndzsj0cOboEHG+BoQGPQmgj/00wCXQBa2ed QU7+6O1+xxxUfuv+93595/iRdEVJhrI/+ACt4N8A= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Francis Perron , AutonomousCodeSecurity@microsoft.com, "Cen Zhang (Microsoft)" , John Johansen , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.12 0098/1756] apparmor: fix query_data() output overlapping the lookup key Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:37:05 +0100 Message-ID: <20261118150012.141111120@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.56.0 In-Reply-To: <20261118150007.957976754@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20261118150007.957976754@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Cen Zhang (Microsoft) [ Upstream commit d30844001360a403a511cf24fc75ecaa6a7a7544 ] In query_data(), buf and query point into the same multi_transaction buffer: buf at the start, query a few bytes in, and the lookup key right after the label string that query points to. Reusing the buffer is by design and is safe as long as the query is fully parsed before buf is written to, but the key is not: it is dereferenced on every iteration of label_for_each_confined(), after output has already been written. So when the label has more than one profile with a data table, the data of the first matching profile is written to buf while the key is still needed, and overwrites it if the data is large enough. The later lookups then run on a corrupted key. Besides, if the data has no NUL byte from the key's position to the end of the allocation, strhash() -> strlen() -> jhash() reads past the 4096-byte slab object, triggering an out-of-bound read: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in jhash+0x595/0x5e0 Read of size 1 at addr ff1100001159d000 by task exploit/155 CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 155 Comm: exploit Not tainted 7.3.0-rc7 #1 Call Trace: jhash+0x595/0x5e0 aa_write_access+0x880/0x1400 vfs_write+0x26f/0xd20 ksys_write+0x115/0x210 Writing to the .access file is unprivileged (0666), but triggering this requires loaded profiles that carry a data table, which needs CAP_MAC_ADMIN and is not the case on default distribution policies. Fix by copying the key with kstrdup() before writing any output to buf, so the key stays valid across all loop iterations regardless of what gets written to the overlapping buffer. Fixes: 317d9a054e1c ("apparmor: update query interface to support label queries") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13+ Cc: Francis Perron Reported-by: AutonomousCodeSecurity@microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang (Microsoft) Signed-off-by: John Johansen [ sashal: Retained the older label critical-section API calls without the needput argument. ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c index c94c7c9f227ba..eeed8047b12ff 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c @@ -744,7 +744,7 @@ static void profile_query_cb(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms, static ssize_t query_data(char *buf, size_t buf_len, char *query, size_t query_len) { - char *out; + char *out, *keydup; const char *key; struct label_it i; struct aa_label *label, *curr; @@ -765,11 +765,18 @@ static ssize_t query_data(char *buf, size_t buf_len, if (buf_len < sizeof(bytes) + sizeof(blocks)) return -EINVAL; /* not enough space */ + /* buf overlaps query, keep a copy of the key for the later lookups */ + keydup = kstrdup(key, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!keydup) + return -ENOMEM; + curr = begin_current_label_crit_section(); label = aa_label_parse(curr, query, GFP_KERNEL, false, false); end_current_label_crit_section(curr); - if (IS_ERR(label)) + if (IS_ERR(label)) { + kfree(keydup); return PTR_ERR(label); + } /* We are going to leave space for two numbers. The first is the total * number of bytes we are writing after the first number. This is so @@ -787,13 +794,14 @@ static ssize_t query_data(char *buf, size_t buf_len, if (!profile->data) continue; - data = rhashtable_lookup_fast(profile->data, &key, + data = rhashtable_lookup_fast(profile->data, &keydup, profile->data->p); if (data) { if (out + sizeof(outle32) + data->size > buf + buf_len) { aa_put_label(label); + kfree(keydup); return -EINVAL; /* not enough space */ } outle32 = __cpu_to_le32(data->size); @@ -805,6 +813,7 @@ static ssize_t query_data(char *buf, size_t buf_len, } } aa_put_label(label); + kfree(keydup); outle32 = __cpu_to_le32(out - buf - sizeof(bytes)); memcpy(buf, &outle32, sizeof(outle32)); -- 2.53.0