From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795015551; b=Dxen3911MXOkTB7WBqwEjIt5/YF5fo3KDzbFBanr2cQ72aBLOGAMidmDfzdlfJcKCIBW 3qi9j6yqKWafsbXVFkkjpnfnDV3iTWdbHCbZM3AyyRMS/Ev+/f5jysnKFPm/Zf7dkyOHz U6tZTOHLo6ZGQFnR1MoGxe4AV4Eq82PPpd6Z9Y4WcUhL3dn3CHRKe8If9CgSyv4/CzerT Mzacvgl6wzqXsKRaNM5YHjZOiGBLe7zoVV2yUTjAaqVQJtzvpVLwGNvLXt7r2esb4Yly4 CUxOa72fc4fKVlAh1BsGwzsukcgEwo+/rlYHWwkDriOcW1acx+pqY2o1KJiLwxlXwUw== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795015551; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:X-Mailer: In-Reply-To:References:User-Agent:X-stable:X-Patchwork-Hint: MIME-Version:Content-Transfer-Encoding; bh=8tQjRrrSvEGlz116GKq63qmemNGUyB/wWvQkdcxal7s=; b=MyQKVoVi2mNFOBLKW1n7vSlV3AoCiIkd6SjT/2/Jlq933TDw77gSsgfHU8JqqF6tSbBE EKQCzKH5BmTDGbxosNhsZSLzesUGGCtxwaV6AQQ2JOkI/jCtMt7KwhVomFzifFlHWu/Ui gR3w1QpIFrohkcKiD79iD+1hKPj8FwUX5X9uRZQ1kP7U3sc9gcVljAh+RAdTvvKpm5F1l 0/O532iFC/qfRnweDyRA1ZdzSXpwwssstVnS7E/R0aRKvn3dx5X9Lm7zRzxDMR27KVBpw 5D/e9fbERF0hYB3nMcAHSY/UV8CYEde55rIXQ3X1x3eO+ZuNRS7g+6S/56pi/dyMHQw== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=FLdI3V87; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B0A6F606A325; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:25:51 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=FLdI3V87 Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 1388F1F000C4; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:25:50 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1795015551; bh=8tQjRrrSvEGlz116GKq63qmemNGUyB/wWvQkdcxal7s=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=FLdI3V87tlBAuNRE9Rv63Mpj9l00JPGeMAfjOPLxrzeZueOM14i+OQ5qiYMJmsGkK KpTnk1R1A16dVBbFtj9c5UbInUQFB+CaEqRWwfLbmY71DuLgeu9+tGXFuYPvuwkXvm QhtaxFcrGLtdKKfhsW4GWp2Jfmk34/0KXeKgLyHE= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Fabrice Derepas , Herbert Xu , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 7.3 0215/2651] crypto: asymmetric_keys - fix OOB read in pefile_parse_binary Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:24:15 +0100 Message-ID: <20261118150255.612398253@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.56.0 In-Reply-To: <20261118150247.972732815@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20261118150247.972732815@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 7.3-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Fabrice Derepas [ Upstream commit 37d550172c2d3cdb3a5ace3e6cb0625967d86349 ] pefile_parse_binary() reads the size field of the certificate table's data-directory entry, which sits at fixed index 4 of the PE optional header's data directory: ctx->certs_size = ddir->certs.size; but nothing ensures index 4 is present. n_data_dirents (the untrusted NumberOfRvaAndSizes) is only upper-bounded against header_size and may be 0, and header_size need only satisfy cursor < header_size < datalen. A crafted PE with n_data_dirents = 0 and a tiny header_size therefore causes the ddir->certs.size read to land past the end of the image (CWE-125). The chkaddr() that bounds the certificate blob runs only after this read. verify_pefile_signature() is reached from kexec_file_load() (the lockdown/secure-boot enforced PE-image signature path), and the image is parsed before its signature is checked. The trigger needs CAP_SYS_BOOT and the access is out-of-bounds read only (no write). Require the certificate table's data-directory entry (index 4) to be present; the existing upper-bound check then keeps ddir->certs within [cursor, header_size). Fixes: 26d1164be37f ("pefile: Parse a PE binary to find a key and a signature contained therein") Assisted-by: copilot-cli:claude-opus-4-6 frama-c Signed-off-by: Fabrice Derepas Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c index cec99db14129a..1efd5c0d0e9ce 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c @@ -87,6 +87,11 @@ static int pefile_parse_binary(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen, if (ctx->n_data_dirents > (ctx->header_size - cursor) / sizeof(*dde)) return -ELIBBAD; + /* the certificate table entry must be present in the data directory */ + if (ctx->n_data_dirents <= + offsetof(struct data_directory, certs) / sizeof(*dde)) + return -ELIBBAD; + ddir = pebuf + cursor; cursor += sizeof(*dde) * ctx->n_data_dirents; -- 2.53.0