From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795014395; b=3QFHFcw9H/L/JVqPho3G3y5p/xkPMkv1FO0K/4e9LVAGXH7cC2/QUx3ovRPK7upQ4Z7g K94e3e1eMkZ/bEwV98x9tpnkQcgyAvCMfFNI0zF8BDcbHBiOO5niRioaG/zEJHo44dGim AUz203GZJngP98gpCyCcNAGveolUz/0EcpgzxkOb7b/fiqc7bZajnbZHPNygFAYVoOnZz k4jUsfT7326aicogAt21hcmr0v3EVqnoy+IDW8lh6RgwJVQTCy+LtdPQHDDJuzKjzRD17 InBw8YsrVlbtJREllZ86QG3HMa6uLGjlVL+Ka8veD+rBdq2WGP9kd+tNQFS4QuostSA== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795014395; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:X-Mailer: In-Reply-To:References:User-Agent:X-stable:X-Patchwork-Hint: MIME-Version:Content-Transfer-Encoding; bh=itvMFU6nWBEWJLXBDMfT4Lx1k+PgK9eqt2edNFvb6iA=; b=GEGmedA7MiNXL5r5YK46BYZiqZ9lnmFs0RZK7zOFcj862CFEBIt3JHx2oR9U3RdaxF8P bmAMKYxXQ1eGVYW6dDzzdkgrsEsEArt9gJev03kWo7h8HOBCCv25JSM4gF1HFqVl1loli BBRTheJCiw1mdE4aWEDE2fsEP1tekVdjYnDbJq0wYc+p7NZF4e6AIYvxc+1tSQhcaFRsY T/0SadmcxVCFudAfckiASgi89OT22KydZuuBuNklchan8NBndOves4fQLYMcqTziNm3oF LRz8fn2/XJnZli93L8Dwk67Wf/wGDAHl7/+zgUiygtzHwWl+9KNKAyhGOi9t7QfRqqQ== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=HmraQneK; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 48DCA606A31C; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:06:35 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=HmraQneK Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 9B2EF1F000C5; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:06:34 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1795014395; bh=itvMFU6nWBEWJLXBDMfT4Lx1k+PgK9eqt2edNFvb6iA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=HmraQneKlnUNNN3yPkDkzH65vNxq5MOhv1xqezWrNaostYBYIvvU5S/EWjLid1sUh iGEhyGFzN2N031jFNwBSCnc3TVDI3Jw28Max3mK494e4kJ/0y2O6dEdptJvxykMcv1 6wHnAxIjZCpgpeWlV648N5fBkB3rz0lzoA7oeKzc= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" Subject: [PATCH 6.6 0001/3318] x86/bugs: Mitigate TSA on AMD Zen5 Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:10:23 +0100 Message-ID: <20261118150313.635843521@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.56.0 In-Reply-To: <20261118150313.527275416@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20261118150313.527275416@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" Commit cf27412f19c9cc5909b9107cd1b3f4ab7608e362 upstream. Zen5 is affected by TSA too, along with a third variant called TSA_FILL. Detect the vuln there and mitigate it. For Zen5, a table of microcode revisions is not needed because appropriate microcode sets the VERW_CLEAR CPUID bit, which simplifies mitigation detection considerably. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 9 +++++++-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 4 +++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 3 ++- arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h | 2 ++ 6 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -475,6 +475,8 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM (21*32+13) /* "" Clear CPU buffers using VERW before VMRUN */ #define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER (21*32+14) /* Use IBPB on exit-to-userspace, see VMSCAPE bug */ +#define X86_FEATURE_TSA_FILL_NO (21*32+17) /* AMD CPU not vulnerable to TSA-FILL */ + /* * BUG word(s) */ --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -594,9 +594,14 @@ static void tsa_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 if (amd_check_tsa_microcode()) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_VERW_CLEAR); } else { - setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO); - setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO); + if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN5)) { + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO); + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO); + } } + + if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN5)) + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSA_FILL_NO); } static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1341,6 +1341,7 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_ VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB | SRSO | VMSCAPE), VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB | SRSO | VMSCAPE), VULNBL_AMD(0x19, SRSO | TSA | VMSCAPE), + VULNBL_AMD(0x1a, SRSO | TSA | VMSCAPE), {} }; @@ -1547,7 +1548,8 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru if (c->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) { if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO) || - !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO)) { + !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO) || + !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TSA_FILL_NO)) { if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, TSA) || /* Enable bug on Zen guests to allow for live migration. */ (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) && cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN))) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits { X86_FEATURE_BMEC, CPUID_EBX, 3, 0x80000020, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO, CPUID_ECX, 1, 0x80000021, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO, CPUID_ECX, 2, 0x80000021, 0 }, + { X86_FEATURE_TSA_FILL_NO, CPUID_ECX, 7, 0x80000021, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_PERFMON_V2, CPUID_EAX, 0, 0x80000022, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_V2, CPUID_EAX, 1, 0x80000022, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_PMC_FREEZE, CPUID_EAX, 2, 0x80000022, 0 }, --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c @@ -794,11 +794,12 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void) kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_VERW_CLEAR); kvm_cpu_cap_init_kvm_defined(CPUID_8000_0021_ECX, - F(TSA_SQ_NO) | F(TSA_L1_NO) + F(TSA_SQ_NO) | F(TSA_L1_NO) | F(TSA_FILL_NO) ); kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO); kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO); + kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_TSA_FILL_NO); /* * Synthesize "LFENCE is serializing" into the AMD-defined entry in --- a/arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ enum kvm_only_cpuid_leafs { /* CPUID level 0x80000021 (ECX) */ #define KVM_X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_8000_0021_ECX, 1) #define KVM_X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_8000_0021_ECX, 2) +#define KVM_X86_FEATURE_TSA_FILL_NO KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_8000_0021_ECX, 7) struct cpuid_reg { u32 function; @@ -137,6 +138,7 @@ static __always_inline u32 __feature_tra KVM_X86_TRANSLATE_FEATURE(BHI_CTRL); KVM_X86_TRANSLATE_FEATURE(TSA_SQ_NO); KVM_X86_TRANSLATE_FEATURE(TSA_L1_NO); + KVM_X86_TRANSLATE_FEATURE(TSA_FILL_NO); default: return x86_feature; }