From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795034733; b=uZgwMwsQ5FP+FirCZuMPD0P06afkwSp0FrEU/fTqlztBC25tWN4OpSfTzfY/LZz+xfSZ divdRYWGUt5fagjgD/68y/eZvvqYEMI7AEQw8DqJ+gsw7oq+OwQG41OaDDjT8fRbnoJNh 6OX1RhaSCSt9StnZeL669SyRHGNQ711B51MXT2SDQ+64FbtXABRutng8s9EldPqOD/bLU qynxtY/mXYgNb8lyOgrgKrrNoRvhD/HQmGaTAizLc395Sdj9XKkB8Zxq3HKVJrCITAIhP IlJa/UUm6aN7x6nd5P3c/wPXrepRiuFTEpN+2T1UaeFUpI1g3jRIiXJBq6CykEciqqg== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795034733; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:X-Mailer: In-Reply-To:References:User-Agent:X-stable:X-Patchwork-Hint: MIME-Version:Content-Transfer-Encoding; bh=SefkBFqx50toPA/KL0RGiLXUb75t5Ubts3S/fy5gjOA=; b=h7z7rbUgQIYxcCutlGcbMHt3v13ekY6T3AfM53ZYORWbg+YcOqAwPNAnvkYErJEqkpz0 66ZiexUp9dHKfm2fysSicY7E3ywsfbUyMsLAFFpp+jpbM/9X6+cn8wvTkSaWvPVpq+MN8 MWzrYvLVwQbMhEUmfJmEGeXfhIzllqIh70lIo+1/dbjEGKv/sRFgbEjL5e2zx39Gn5NVm NgYWvZ6Lkc2j6I0PwbevcYb7Fxgc7AtPvA/Bufa9qmN8hBaCuW2h5r5qcc78pmGFbrAyD bAeqCwH8hNnQpdP854zh5/TQJAhQTVPgLtCiypJYwJki0ko63wWQXOju6/O/2NNmmng== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=fzgacLGb; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5896C606A31C; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 20:45:33 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=fzgacLGb Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id AFBD61F000C4; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 20:45:32 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1795034733; bh=SefkBFqx50toPA/KL0RGiLXUb75t5Ubts3S/fy5gjOA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=fzgacLGb7z8UaJg8xehUaMDKdE5BZZ5gb5ANTyJPHJMoEiCKHH8cjU45ololYdtOt WI293OxGE1E79qQVjD3e2Y5QXWfVvnpaxfIGIY4Dg5fdfP6TxnDviQPF6t+MJWeW+0 P+8qvTrtz82Sky9Gega21093HYZd6cqMsEFJ3jgU= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Sashiko , "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" , Sang-Heon Jeon , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.6 0472/3318] tools/bootconfig: Fix integer overflow and truncation in size checks Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:18:14 +0100 Message-ID: <20261118150331.063559921@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.56.0 In-Reply-To: <20261118150313.527275416@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20261118150313.527275416@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) [ Upstream commit 462d0b066b613103f579793031429db2ca23abc0 ] Sashiko reported that on 32-bit systems, if an attacker crafts size in the bootconfig footer such that adding BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE wraps around (for instance, if size is 0xFFFFFFFF), the size check in load_xbc_from_initrd() can be bypassed: if (stat.st_size < size + BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE) { pr_err("bootconfig size is too big\n"); return -E2BIG; } Furthermore, on 64-bit systems with an initrd > 4.29 GB, comparing a corrupted 32-bit size (e.g. 0xFFFFFFFF) against stat.st_size - BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE can also bypass the check if size is not bounded. Similarly, load_xbc_file() passes 64-bit stat.st_size directly into the 32-bit int size parameter of load_xbc_fd(), truncating large standalone files (>= 2GB). In both cases, passing 0xFFFFFFFF to load_xbc_fd() truncates to -1, resulting in malloc(0), an integer overflow in read(), and an out-of-bounds null-byte write. Fix this by: 1. Rejecting size > XBC_DATA_MAX or size > stat.st_size - BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE in load_xbc_from_initrd(). 2. Rejecting stat.st_size > XBC_DATA_MAX in load_xbc_file() before passing it to load_xbc_fd(). 3. Checking size < 0 || size > XBC_DATA_MAX defensively in load_xbc_fd(). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/178905332413.213925.3179977110281463499.stgit@devnote2/ Fixes: 950313ebf79c ("tools: bootconfig: Add bootconfig command") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Sashiko Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260909161113.16C691F00A3A@smtp.kernel.org/ Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260910010137.EE0431F000FF@smtp.kernel.org/ Assisted-by: Antigravity:gemini-3.8-flash Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) Reviewed-by: Sang-Heon Jeon Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- tools/bootconfig/main.c | 13 ++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/bootconfig/main.c b/tools/bootconfig/main.c index d302235f6b974..655ca7da4b843 100644 --- a/tools/bootconfig/main.c +++ b/tools/bootconfig/main.c @@ -139,6 +139,9 @@ static int load_xbc_fd(int fd, char **buf, int size) { int ret; + if (size < 0 || size > XBC_DATA_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + *buf = malloc(size + 1); if (!*buf) return -ENOMEM; @@ -167,6 +170,13 @@ static int load_xbc_file(const char *path, char **buf) return ret; } + if (stat.st_size > XBC_DATA_MAX) { + pr_err("%s size is too big\n", path); + ret = -E2BIG; + close(fd); + return ret; + } + ret = load_xbc_fd(fd, buf, stat.st_size); close(fd); @@ -217,7 +227,8 @@ static int load_xbc_from_initrd(int fd, char **buf) csum = le32toh(csum); /* Wrong size error */ - if (stat.st_size < size + BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE) { + if (size > XBC_DATA_MAX || + size > stat.st_size - BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE) { pr_err("bootconfig size is too big\n"); return -E2BIG; } -- 2.53.0